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 Implicit anti-gay attitudes are relatively unconscious, automatic evaluations of gay men 
and lesbians which are measured by assessing the strength of associations in a speeded 
classification task.  In contrast to other implicit prejudices (e.g., racism, sexism) there are 
unique challenges to overcome when measuring implicit attitudes toward gay men and 
lesbians. For example, there is no visible characteristic that can be reliably used to 
identify sexual orientation, nor are there any names, and only a few nouns (e.g., gay) 
which are uniquely associated with this social category. As the measurement of implicit 
anti-gay attitudes relies on the presentation of at least six stimuli to represent the social 
category, continued discussion on stimuli selection is needed. To date, researchers have 
relied on the use of stimuli that are conceptually related to the category of GAY (e.g., the 
rainbow flag, same-sex wedding cake toppers), and therefore these measures may be 
eliciting related attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward the amorphous category GAY, rather than 
to GAY PEOPLE).  The main aim of this thesis was to present a new approach which 
addresses this shortcoming. I provided evidence for the person-based approach to implicit 
antigay attitudes in two initial studies. Study 1 demonstrated that presenting faces of 
straight male, straight female, gay male, and lesbian target stimuli (who are known for 
their sexual orientation) with opposite gender distracter stimuli elicits implicit gender 
attitudes consistent with previous research (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). However, the 
same set of gay target stimuli presented with straight distracter stimuli of the same gender 
(e.g., lesbian targets, and straight female distracters), substantially reduced and reversed 
the pattern of results, such that gay men are weakly implicitly associated with positive 
and lesbians are weakly implicitly associated with negative. Moreover, these patterns are 
affected by participant’s own gender and sexual orientation (Study 2). These findings are 
 ix 
interpreted as evidence that the person-based approach is assessing constructs of implicit 
gender attitudes and implicit sexual orientation-based attitudes that are distinct. 
Furthermore, Study 3 replicated the results of previous implicit prejudice research (using 
stimuli that have typically represented gay men and lesbians in implicit measures; e.g., 
Nosek, 2005) and the findings of Study 1 (i.e., using the person-based approach) 
providing evidence of the meaningful differences between implicit attitudes towards the 
category GAY and to GAY PEOPLE. Finally, studies 4 and 5 explored the role of 
religion and religiosity, known predictors of anti-gay attitudes, on implicit person-based 
antigay attitudes. Study 4 revealed that only religious fundamentalism was a strong 
predictor of explicit gay attitudes, and that no significant regression model was found that 
predicted implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. In contrast, Study 5 used contextual 
variation to prime the construct of religion (i.e., distracter stimuli were faces of religious 
individuals, such as nuns and priests) and revealed that relevant religious stimuli led to a 
subsequent increase in positive implicit person-based attitudes towards gay people for 
Atheist, but not Christian participants. Taken together, these findings provide strong 
evidence for the person-based approach to anti-gay attitudes, suggest that implicit 
prejudice towards gay people differs from in important ways from implicit attitudes 
towards the category gay, and demonstrated that implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes 
have a meaningful, but complex relationship with religiosity. As a result, the proposed 
measure of implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes makes a novel and important 
contribution to the current anti-gay literature and provides researchers with a much 
needed and well validated alternative to the typical approach.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview 
_____________________________________ 
 
While many minority groups are the target for prejudice... and discrimination... in 
our society, few persons face this hostility without the support and acceptance of their 
family as [those who are] gay, lesbian, and bisexual. 
-Virginia Uribe and Karen Harbeck (1992, p.13)  
1.1 Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians 
Gay men and lesbians have long been victims of personal and social discrimination. 
Until relatively recently, individuals admitting to having a minority sexual orientation (i.e., 
not being straight) were considered to have a mental illness (Hooker, 1961; Stone, 2000). 
Though this is typically no longer the case, gay people still frequently face prejudice and 
discrimination in the form of ostracism from their social groups (Rivers, 2000) or family 
(Ryan, Huebner, Diaz, & Sanchez, 2009), as well as physical and psychological abuse (i.e., 
hate crimes; Grein, McFalls, & Smith, 2001; Herek, 2009a; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). 
In addition, 79 countries around the world still have criminal laws against homosexual 
activities (The International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association [IGLA], 
2014), with a further 10 countries that have laws where (even alleged) homosexual 
activities can be punished by public whipping or by being stoned to death (Rupar, 2014).  
Gay people also face more subtle and insidious discrimination, including being paid 
less than straight people (Berg & Lien, 2002), being more likely to be overlooked for 
employment (Tilcsik, 2011), being less likely to receive help when needed (Gabriel & 
Banse, 2006), and being evaluated more harshly when they make decisions that are 
unsuccessful (Shepherd & Patzelt, 2014). As can be seen from these examples, there are 
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social and cultural norms and practices that result in the unfair treatment of gay people 
(Kelley, 2001). Ranging from physical violence or incarceration, to lack of support, there is 
abundant evidence that gay people around the world face prejudice and discrimination on 
the basis of their sexual orientation.      
Sexual orientation-based inequality in Australia has become a topic of much social 
debate with growing public support for same-sex marriage, which has been dismissed by 
the government. Specifically, in 2009 the Australian Marriage Bill (The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) was amended to redefine marriage as the union of a 
man to a woman by adding the wording “to the exclusion of all others” to the bill 
(Attorney-Generals’ Department, 2010, subsection 5[1]). In amending this law, the 
Australian Government has sought to deny gay people the right to marry a same-sex 
partner. In 2013, same-sex marriage was legalized in the Australian Capital Territory (The 
Marriage Equality [Same Sex] Act 2013, Australian Capital Territory Government, 2001). 
However, only five days later, the federal High Court unanimously voted to revoke the Act 
in its entirety, voiding the 31 marriages that had taken place (Marszalek, 2013).  For many 
(Brown, 2010; Byrne, 2013; Patten, 2010), this is considered a clear example of 
institutionalised discrimination and further support for notion that that anti-gay attitudes 
appear to be an acceptable form of prejudice (Pereira, Monteiro, & Camino, 2009).  
While the literature has reported unequivocally negative attitudes toward gay men 
and lesbians (Whitley, 2009), there is some evidence that anti-gay attitudes are weakening 
and that attitudes are becoming more progressive (see Herek & McLemore, 2013; Kelley, 
2001). However, this is not always the case (Herek, 2007). One explanation of these 
inconsistencies is that people are becoming increasingly aware that admitting to being 
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prejudiced reflects poorly on them, and thus some individuals are more concerned about 
admitting their anti-gay attitudes. Previous research  has found that norms of social 
desirability, which typically produce lower explicit prejudice and discrimination, are 
unrelated to anti-gay attitudes (Pereira et al., 2009). For this reason, social psychologists are 
careful to ensure that the effect of these factors on attitudes toward gay men and lesbians 
are limited (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008; Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007; Rohner & 
Björklund, 2006).   
1.2 Dual Attitudes: Measuring Attitudes Explicitly and Implicitly 
Traditionally, attitudes have been conceptualised and measured explicitly. That is, 
attitudes have been defined as consciously held evaluations of a target that can be measured 
simply by asking people to report their views (i.e., self-report, usually in the form of a 
survey or questionnaire). A common approach to measuring explicit attitudes is to ask 
participants their level of agreement with pre-validated items using a Likert or Likert-type 
scale (e.g., ranging from 1 [strongly disagree] to 5 [strongly agree]; for a discussion on 
measuring attitudes, see Summers, 1971).   
An alternative approach is to use indirect measures (Cook & Selltiz, 1964) which 
allow researchers to assess a participant’s attitude by evaluating either their behaviour or 
performance on a related task. This is especially useful when measuring attitudes towards 
sensitive topics. A classic example of how behaviours can be used to indicate attitudes is 
the work of Bogardus (1927), who showed that racial friendliness is linked to where people 
choose to sit, to the extent that individuals with more negative racial attitudes sit further 
away from stigmatized ethnic group members. Following this tradition, recent advances in 
social cognition research have seen attitudes conceptualized and measured implicitly. In 
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short, implicit attitudes have been proposed to be the implicit association between an 
attitude object (e.g., a social category such as gay men) and valence (i.e., GOOD and BAD) 
with positive implicit attitudes being those where the attitude object is more strongly 
associated with GOOD than BAD, and implicitly negative attitudes are the reverse 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  Implicit association measures use response accuracy or 
latency to assess the strength of implicit associations between attitude objects and valence 
(Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) with the most common implicit 
measure used in social psychology being the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et 
al., 1998), with growing support for the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001). The underlying approach of these measures is that assigning an attitude 
object and positive or negative attributes to a single response action will facilitate response 
speed and accuracy when these pairings are strongly implicitly associated, or impair 
performance if these pairings are unrelated or weakly implicitly associated. 
The measurement of implicit attitudes relies on stimuli that represent the attitude 
object(s) and valence (i.e., positive and negative) to which participants will respond. 
Selecting stimuli to represent many social groups is typically quite simple, and this 
becomes an easy task. For example, in the case of gender, age, or ethnicity, photos of faces 
of individuals that belong to the social category is a representation of the category itself, 
because these categories are readily identified visually (e.g., a Caucasian face is easily 
differentiated from a picture of a non-Caucasian face; see Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). Moreover, some of these categories can be easily represented by well-chosen, word 
stimuli by using names that are associated with specific groups from ethnicity (e.g., 
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LATOYA vs. LINDA), gender (e.g., JACK vs. SALLY), and even age (e.g., DORIS vs. 
DEBBIE). However, this is not the case for all social categories.  
Selecting stimuli to represent gay men or lesbians in an implicit attitude measure 
can be a challenge. A person’s sexual orientation cannot be reliably identified from a 
person’s physical features (Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010), thus using pictures 
of gay people as stimuli is largely futile. Similarly, there are no typically ‘gay’ names, or 
pronouns, and too few (non-derogative) nouns denoting the category (e.g., gay, lesbian) to 
allow the use of such words as stimuli. As a result, researchers have used images, largely 
comprising symbols (i.e., interlocking symbols of the same-gender) and pictures of same 
sex couples (i.e., either in romantic or non-romantic poses, photos of same-sex marriage, 
etc.) both of which are not equivalent to other implicit attitude measures (e.g., an equivalent 
measure of gender would be to have women represented by images of high heels and tears), 
and potentially less a measure of implicit attitudes to gay people than it is to the broader 
issues associated with this group (e.g., marriage equality).  
In this dissertation, I will argue for the interpretation of typical implicit measures of 
anti-gay attitudes as assessing the nebulous construct of homosexuality1 rather than 
specifically measuring attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. I will first argue that the 
typical stimuli represent a superordinate construct of homosexuality which includes gay 
people, but also the broad and social issues associated with this category (e.g., same-sex 
marriage, political activism, sexual behaviours, and even HIV/AIDS stigma). Moreover, 
because the stimuli include a range of images, inclusion or exclusion of any specific image 
                                                 
1 Throughout this dissertation, “attitudes towards homosexuality” will refer to attitudes towards the social 
category, including attitudes towards gay people but also (likely) encompassing a wider range of related 
constructs, as will be argued throughout. 
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(e.g., same-sex wedding cake-toppers) can affect which aspects of the broad concept are 
being assessed, which is likely to produce inconsistency in the findings of specific studies. 
Based on this criticism, it is the fundamental aim of this thesis is to present an alternative, 
namely, the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes.  
1.3 The Current Research Project: General Aims and Hypotheses 
This dissertation will present the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-
gay attitudes. The empirical component of this dissertation is divided into two sections; the 
first section presents the initial evidence for the person-based approach and the second 
section presents empirical research that uses the person-based approach when exploring the 
relationship between anti-gay attitudes and religion. The evidence for the person-based 
approach is provided by addressing four main research questions: 
1. Can contextual variation be used to make the gender or sexual orientation of a 
target salient, which would facilitate assessment of implicit person-based 
gender attitudes and implicit sexual orientation attitudes toward the same 
target?  
2. Does this person-based approach measure implicit anti-gay attitudes that are 
different to those measured using typical stimuli?  
3. What individual difference factors predict implicit person-based anti-gay 
attitudes? 
4. Can contextual variation be used to prime a relevant attitudinal context that 
differentially affects implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes?  
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1.4 Structure of Thesis 
Following this introduction and overview chapter, I present three theoretical 
chapters: first, a general overview of the history of the conceptions of homosexuality in 
psychology and related disciplines; second, a comprehensive review of empirical studies of 
explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes; and finally, a summary of key issues in implicit 
anti-gay attitude measurement including the presentation of the person-based approach to 
measurement. The following two empirical chapters present initial evidence (referring to 
questions 1 and 2 above) and are followed by an interim discussion and a brief theoretical 
chapter introducing the social psychology of religion, which will then allow an empirical 
exploration of the relationship between religion and implicit person-based anti-gay 
attitudes. The final empirical chapters explore this relationship while addressing questions 3 
and 4 above. Finally I will close with a general discussion and conclusions.  
1.4.1 Theoretical and review chapters 
Chapter 2 (A Brief History of Sexual Orientation: Theoretical Frameworks and 
Definitions) discusses key terms and definitions used in research on attitudes toward gay 
men and lesbians and a background on the historical context in which these terms and 
definitions evolved. The chapter presents the history of the inclusion and treatment of 
homosexuality as a diagnosable condition in the psychiatric literature, as well as the little-
known processes that led to the various reclassifications of this diagnosis in the psychiatric 
and psychology nomenclatures. This review is important because much of the history about 
how gay men and lesbians have been considered by the mental health professions still has 
implications for how sexual orientation is viewed and treated today (including the ongoing, 
albeit rare, treatment of homosexuality as an illness despite its exclusion from medical 
 8 
nomenclatures). Thus, it is important in understanding contemporary issues around gay 
attitudes2.  
Chapter 3 (Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians) introduces the concept of dual 
attitudes and their measurement, and reviews the literature that has applied the concepts to 
anti-gay attitudes and sexual prejudice. The chapter provides an overview of research on 
explicit and implicit attitudes towards gay men and lesbians, including a comprehensive 
review of the demographic and ideological factors that lead to explicit reports or implicit 
demonstrations of positive or negative attitudes.  
Chapter 4 (Presenting the Person-Based Approach) presents an overview, rationale, 
and the protocol of the person-based approach. In particular, this chapter outlines the 
limitations of traditional approaches to the measurement of implicit anti-gay attitudes, 
which have used category-based representations of gay men and lesbians. After introducing 
the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), this chapter provides a 
detailed account of the protocols of the person-based approach, highlighting the way in 
which this approach attempts to address the named weaknesses of the traditional account.  
1.4.2 Empirical chapters 
1.4.2.1 Evidence of the person-based approach 
Chapter 5 (Studies 1 and 2: Initial Evidence for the Person-Based Approach) 
presents two studies, which are used to provide the initial evidence for the use of this 
                                                 
2 Chapter 2 is a truncated version of a manuscript in press in Sensoria: A Journal for Mind, Brain, and 
Culture. This forms part of a special edition on the intersection of gender and sexual orientation.  
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approach3. The first study uses a homogenous community sample of straight females. The 
second study uses participants sampled from key groups (e.g., gay men, lesbians, and 
straight men and women – a participant gender by participant sexual orientation design). 
Chapter 5 provides compelling support for the person-based approach to the measurement 
of implicit anti-gay attitudes as measured with stimuli that are faces of gay people, rather 
than symbolic representations of the social category. Following this, Chapter 6 (Study 3: 
Comparing Typical and Person-Based Representations) presents an experiment that 
provides an empirical comparison of the person-based approach and the traditional 
approach to the measurement of implicit anti-gay attitudes. The findings of this study reveal 
that these two approaches provide very different results. Acknowledging the importance of 
having replicated the findings presented in Chapter 5, the conclusions highlight the 
important and unique contribution of the person-based approach to the implicit anti-gay 
attitudes literature. Chapter 7 (Discussion: Evidence for the Person-Based Approach) is a 
summary and interim discussion chapter, which reviews the strengths and limitations of the 
person-based approach, and provides an argument for its utility in the implicit measurement 
of attitudes toward gay men and lesbians.  
1.4.2.2 Person-based anti-gay attitudes and religion  
It has been famously suggested that religion can have paradoxical effects on 
attitudes; it can either promote tolerance and acceptance, or result in non-tolerance and 
prejudice (Allport, 1954; see also Allport and Ross, 1967). In the specific case of attitudes 
toward gay men and lesbians, the relationship between religion and anti-gay attitudes tends 
to be negative. That is, more religious people tend to hold stronger negative attitudes 
                                                 
3 The three experiments presented in empirical chapters 5 and 6 are currently being considered for publication 
with the Journal of Sex Research. 
 10 
towards gay men and lesbians as demonstrated consistently across several decades of 
research (Whitley, 2009). However, there is a relatively limited range of empirical studies 
exploring the relationship between religion and implicit anti-gay attitudes. Furthermore, the 
existing literature is only includes experiments using the traditional approach (i.e., 
category-based) to the measurement of implicit anti-gay attitudes. Chapter 8 (Literature 
Review: Religion and Religiosity) discusses the relationship between religion (whether 
measured as a categorical religious affiliation or when measured as a continuous individual 
difference factor) and anti-gay attitudes in detail.4    
Chapter 9 (Study 4: Predictors of Implicit person-based Gay Attitudes) presents an 
exploration of demographic factors and religiosity dimensions as predictors of explicit and 
implicit person-based attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. In this fourth study, I 
explored the predictive ability of factors that are known correlates of negative attitudes 
toward gay men and lesbians (i.e., being male, Christian, older, and straight), and of 
individual differences in religion (i.e., religiosity). This was achieved by using a Multiple 
Regression Analysis (MRA) that included known predictors in the first step and religiosity 
variables in the second step (i.e., religious fundamentalism, intrinsic and extrinsic religious 
orientations, and quest)5. Separate MRAs were conducted for explicit and then implicit 
anti-gay attitudes, revealing that explicit attitudes were stably predicted, yet neither 
demographic nor religiosity factors predicted implicit person-based attitudes.  
Chapter 10 (Study 5: Religious Priming and Person-Based Attitudes) explores the 
effects of religious priming on subsequent implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. 
                                                 
4 Parts of chapter 8 have been used in a book chapter on the social psychology of religion (Anderson, 2015).  
5 The third empirical chapter (i.e., chapter 9) is currently under review for publication in Personality and 
Individual Differences. 
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Specifically, grounded in social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), this fifth study used 
religious distracter stimuli to prime religious concepts while participants were responding 
to an implicit measure of person-based anti-gay attitudes6. The religious prime led to 
subsequent positive implicit attitudes towards gay people from Atheist, but not Christian 
participants.  
Chapter 11 (General Discussion and Conclusion) presents a full discussion on the 
evidence and application of the person-based approach and re-visits the highlights of the 
empirical chapters within this dissertation. After reviewing the findings, the limitations and 
conclusions of each study are conferred, before presenting the general implications and 
future directions of the dissertation in its entirety.  
 
  
                                                 
6 The fourth empirical chapter (i.e., chapter 10) is currently being considered for publication in Social 
Psychology and Personality Science. 
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Chapter 2 – A Brief History of Sexual Orientation: Theoretical Frameworks and 
Definitions 
______________________________________ 
Every orientation presupposes a disorientation… 
- Hans Magnus Enzensberger (b. 1929) 
 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, sexuality was conceptualised in 
highly heteronormative terms which were strongly influenced by religious discourse, even 
when claiming to be based in science or medicine (Bayer, 1987). In the late nineteenth 
century research using scientific principles began to inform understandings of sexuality. 
Although this meant a lessening of religious influence, this research was still largely framed 
by religious social values. As a result, researchers who attempted to report findings that 
deviated from the heteronormative expectations often faced negative consequences 
including social exclusion and professional isolation (Lenzer, 2003). Interestingly, even 
after research began to explore alternative sexual orientations, the assumption remained that 
homosexuality7 (or any variation from heterosexuality) was aberrant and, thus, was treated 
as pathological (see Hooker, 1956).  
In this chapter I will briefly discuss the work of two pioneers whose work still 
informs contemporary sexuality research and research into related issues. Specifically, I 
will discuss the work of: Alfred Kinsey (June 23, 1894 – August 25, 1956) who is widely 
considered the first sexologist and published work that liberated the existing conservative 
thought on the frequency and range of sexuality and sexual behaviour; and the work of 
Evelyn Hooker (née Gentry, September 2, 1907 – November 18, 1996) whose substantial 
                                                 
7 The APA6 publication manual (2009, P. 74) suggests the term gay instead of homosexual. Throughout the 
thesis I have retained homosexual/homosexuality when appropriate for context (i.e., discussion of the 
historical treatment), or when referring to previous studies (if the researchers had used homosexual instead 
of gay). In all other cases I have used the preferred term gay. 
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body of research that cumulatively provided evidence that there are no detectable 
differences in the mental adjustments of gay and straight men. After reviewing the work of 
these pioneers, I will detail the evolution of the terminology around attitudes towards non-
heterosexual orientations. 
2.1 A Tribute to Early Researchers 
2.1.1 Alfred Kinsey  
Alfred Kinsey (1894 – 1956) was trained as a biologist and zoologist but is best 
known for his famous Kinsey reports. 
2.1.1.1 The Kinsey Reports.  
The Kinsey reports entitled Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male (Kinsey, 
Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948) and Sexual Behaviour in the Human Female  (Kinsey, Pomeroy, 
Martin, & Gebhard, 1953; see also Gebhard & Johnson, 1979)  are widely considered to be 
pivotal in the scientific research of sexuality. Specifically, they are believed to be the first 
research to candidly explore human sexuality via personal interviews (5300 males and 5940 
females, respectively) and, although they have been heavily criticized, paved the way for 
future research into sexuality.  
The Kinsey Reports challenged widely held beliefs about sexuality, including views 
about pre-marital sex, masturbation, homosexuality, and female orgasm (Christensen, 1971; 
Pomeroy, 1972). Regarding the breadth of sexual experience, Kinsey and colleagues (1948) 
shocked readers by reporting that 37% of all men have at least once had same-sex physical 
contact to the point of orgasm, and that approximately 10% of males had been more or less 
exclusively homosexual for a period of at least three years in their lives (Kinsey et al., 
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1948).  Similarly, Kinsey and colleagues (1953) reported that 28% of females had actively 
engaged in homosexual experiences by the age of 45 (Kinsey et al., 1953). These figures 
revealed that, while same-sex sexual practice was less common than opposite-sex sexual 
practices, it was  more common than had been previously thought, especially given that 
such acts were typically labelled as sexual perversion (Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & 
Gebhard, 1949). As a result, Kinsey and colleagues (1949) posited that the problems 
associated with sexuality are actually a matter of adjustment between the individual and 
society, rather than a pathology which affects individuals.  
Kinsey and colleagues’ (1949, 1955) research drew heavy criticism from scientific 
circles including concerns about the over-representation of certain minority groups in the 
sample (Bowman et al., 1956) and statistical techniques used during analyses. For example, 
the findings reported in Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male came from a sample 
comprising 25% prison inmates and 5% male prostitutes. Another issue was that the report 
also classified couples who had lived together for at least a year as being married.  
However, Kinsey’s most vocal critic was the statistician John Tukey who was highly 
critical of Kinsey’s reliance on samples of convenience, especially the use of snowballing 
techniques (i.e., people who knew each other). In particular, a concern about this 
recruitment practice was that socially related participants, in comparison with more 
representative samples, likely resulted in estimates that misrepresent the actual frequency of 
(especially unusual or infrequent) sexual practices. In fact, Tukey famously (and very 
publically) said that “a random selection of three people would be better than a group of 
300 chosen by Mr. Kinsey” (as cited in Leonhardt, 2008).   
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Another criticism of Kinsey’s recruitment practice was that he failed to consider 
volunteer bias (Christensen, 1971). That is, that the data gathered from people who 
volunteer to participate in discussions of taboo topics is unlikely to be similar to the data 
that would be collected from a general population, or from those who would have been 
reluctant to discuss the intimate details of their sex lives. Support for this criticism was 
demonstrated by Maslow and Sakoda (1952) who tested Kinsey's volunteers and concluded 
that Kinsey's sample was unrepresentative of the general population , as it included an over-
representation of certain social groups (i.e., as mentioned, prison inmates and prostitutes). 
Kinsey argued that a probabilistic sample was not appropriate, since many disclosures 
during the data gathering process would have led to “certain loss of social prestige” and 
“legal ramifications” (Kinsey et al., 1955, p. 812).  
In response to the claims of critics, staff at the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research 
more recently undertook processes to remove biased data (Gebhard & Johnson, 1979). For 
example, all material derived from prison populations in the original samples were removed 
and then the data was re-analysed. The results of this re-analysis revealed that none of 
Kinsey's original estimates were significantly misrepresented. As a result, they claim that 
data collected from populations comprising prisoners or male prostitutes, and those who 
willingly participated in research on taboo sexual topics had the same response tendencies 
as the general population. For example, the original data suggested that 37% of men have 
had at least one homosexual experience. After removing data contributed by those in 
prison, the data was adjusted to slightly higher than 36%, and the 10% figure of men who 
were "more or less exclusively homosexual” for at least three years, came to 9.90% for 
white, college-educated males and 12.70% for those with less education (Duberman, 1977).   
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Although heavily criticised, Kinsey’s controversial work on male and female sexual 
behaviour was ground breaking. The major contribution of this work was that it challenged 
widely held beliefs about sex and sexuality. It also provided the first scientific evidence that 
homosexuality was sufficiently common as to potentially belong to the normal range of 
human sexual behaviours. More importantly, these studies provide a foundation for a line 
of scientific enquiry into sex and sexuality that, by extension, paved the way for research 
into attitudes towards these topics and this dissertation.    
2.1.1.2 The Kinsey Scale. 
Even in the early years of researching sexual orientation, there was a tendency to 
assume an underlying dichotomy (e.g., straight or gay) as the appropriate method for 
quantifying this variable, rather than a continuous variable (i.e.,  from solely same-sex 
sexually attracted to solely other-sex sexually attract via bisexual and/or asexual). 
However, Kinsey and colleagues suggested a new way of considering sexuality:  
“Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual...  
It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories.  
Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated  
pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects.  
The sooner we learn this concerning human sexual behaviour the sooner we shall  
reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex. . . .”  
    (Kinsey et al., 1948, p. 639) 
  
Kinsey and colleagues (1948) argued that sexual orientation should not be 
categorized, instead sexual orientation could be conceptualised on a spectrum that is 
continuous, fluid, and expected to change across the lifespan. His wish to emphasize the 
continuity of the gradations between straight and gay orientations resulted in the 
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development of a new classification system which he argued is best assessed using “a 
seven-point scale [which] comes nearer to showing the many gradients that actually exist” 
(Kinsey et al., 1948, p. 656). The Kinsey scale ranges from 0 (exclusively heterosexual) to 6 
(exclusively homosexual) with a midpoint of 3 which reflects bisexuality or an equal 
attraction to both same and opposite sex individuals. The Kinsey scale has contributed to 
current understandings of sexuality, and while used in sexual identity research more than 
the research of attitudes, it adds to the growing body of research that a homosexual 
orientation is a normal variation of sexual attraction. 
2.1.2 Evelyn Hooker 
Even though the Kinsey reports demonstrated that the range of sexuality and sexual 
practices was much more diverse than socially accepted, it was still widely believed that 
homosexuality was pathological. Even ten years after the release of the first Kinsey report, 
legal penalties for homosexual behaviour were common and harsh (e.g., Szasz, 1965). 
Moreover, psychiatric diagnoses of homosexuality described this condition as a severe and 
pervasive emotional disorder (see Anderson & Holland, 2015b).  
The status of homosexuality as a diagnosable psychiatric disorder may reflect the 
fact that all studies conducted on a homosexual population at the time used samples in 
therapy, or from prisons, mental institutions, or the disciplinary ward of the armed services. 
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that homosexuality was conflated with mental health. 
However, not all professionals agreed. For example, Evelyn Hooker was a pioneer in this 
area and published the first empirical research that ultimately led to removal of 
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"homosexuality" from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Hooker, 
1957; see also Hooker, 1956, 1965a, 1965b, 1969).    
 Hooker’s (1957) study The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual investigated 
whether 30 gay and 30 straight men who were functioning normally in society differed 
significantly in their psychological adjustment as measured by three projective tests 
(Rorschach Inkblot Test, Rorschach, 1942; Thematic Apperception Test [TAT], Murray, 
1943; Make-A-Picture-Story [MAPS] Test, Shneidman, 1947).  The two groups were 
matched for age, IQ, and education. The data was examined by three independent expert 
clinicians who were unaware of the subjects' sexual orientation and revealed that the judges 
could not distinguish between the two groups based on the test results, which allowed 
Hooker to conclude that homosexuality is not a clinical condition (Hooker, 1958, 1961, 
1963).  
Hooker's findings have since been replicated by many other investigators using a 
variety of research methods. Freedman (1971) used Hooker's basic design to compare data 
from lesbian and straight women using objectively-scored personality tests rather than 
projective tests. Consistent with Hooker’s findings, he found no significant differences 
between the personality-profiles of lesbian and straight women. Consequently both Hooker 
and Freedman argued that medicalisation of homosexuality was the result of subjective 
prejudice, rather than empirical evidence.  
Current research has been strongly influenced by the arguments of Evelyn Hooker, 
ultimately leading to the 1973 removal of homosexuality from the psychiatric and 
psychology nomenclature. This reclassification of the DSM-III-R (American Psychological 
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Association [APA], 1968) was considered by some to be a progressive step that liberated 
this sexual minority (e.g., see Spiegel, 2007). However, the opposing school of thought 
posited that homosexuality was a threat to the basic family unit, and undermined the 
scientific authority of psychiatry (Spitzer, 1973, 1974). In combination, the contributions of 
Kinsey and Hooker are fundamental to our current understandings of homosexuality and 
homosexuals, and thus the attitudes that straight (and gay) people have towards them.   
2.2 Evolution of definitions 
2.2.1 Defining non-heterosexuality 
It is commonly suggested that the category of ‘homosexual’ did not exist previously 
as it does in the current sexual discourses of the 21st century (Boswell, 1980; Foucault, 
1976) as same-sex sexual contact was simply considered a part of the range of usual sexual 
practices. Herek argued that it was only after the 1870 publication by Westphal (cited in 
Herek, 1991a) on “contrary sexual sensations” that the concept of a sexual orientation was 
born. Thus, the notion that a sexual orientation is something to be explored, celebrated or 
repressed is a relatively modern one.  
The term homosexual  is first thought to have entered English scientific literature in 
the 1895 translation of Richard von Krafft-Ebing's 1886 Psychopathia Sexualis, an early 
study on sexual practices (as cited in Halperin, 1990). The original text is believed to be a 
seminal medical text on sexual deviance and perversion which referred to homosexuality as 
an ‘antipathic sexual instinct’. Prior to this term, same-sex sexual activity had been 
described by a variety of terms. One very early term was the German word ‘urning’ which 
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was used in the 1860s to describe a male body with a female psyche, who was attracted to 
men instead of women (Kennedy, 1997).   
The first English medical textbook on ‘homosexuality’ was called Sexual Inversion 
(Ellis, 1897, 1933). This text used the terms inversion and intersex8 interchangeably to refer 
to same-sex sexual activity. These terms then dominated the literature for several decades. 
In the early twentieth century Freud (1953) introduced the term “Psychosexual 
hermaphroditism” because of his presumption that gay individuals to have the neurological 
or hormonal physiology of the opposite sex . The final term worthy of mention that 
dominated the scientific discourse was the word ‘homophile’. The term was coined by the 
German psychoanalyst Karl-Günther Heimsoth in his 1924 doctoral dissertation "Hetero- 
und Homophilie" (Heimsoth, 1924; see also Hancock, 1998). Although the term 
homosexual was widely used by this stage in the literature, homophile had less negative 
clinical associations and came to common use throughout the 1950s and 1960s by 
homosexual organisations and publications. In essence, this phrase was the preferred 
terminology by the group it referred to. However, the frequency of its use decreased until 
its occasional contemporary use as slang terminology for a straight individual who 
champions for the civil rights of gay people (Meeker, 2001). 
The lifespan of the concept of homosexuality has been relatively short, and has 
undergone rapid development. The APA 6th edition Publication Manual has suggested that 
the term homosexuality is problematic because of the historical and contemporary 
associations with “negative stereotypes, pathology, and the reduction of people’s identities 
                                                 
8 The contemporary use of the word intersex refer to a discrepancy between the external genitals and the 
internal genitals (i.e., the testes and the ovaries; Donohue, 2011). 
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to [only] their sexual behaviour” (APA, 2009, p. 75; see also American Psychiatric 
Association, 2009). As such, the APA advocates for the use of the terms gay men, lesbians, 
bisexual men, and bisexual women to refer to individuals who self-identify this way, and 
the term gay to refer to the shared identity of culture of individuals who collectively 
identify this way.  
2.2.2 Attitudes toward gay men and lesbians 
Interestingly, the trajectory of the terminology describing attitudes towards gay men 
and lesbians mirrors the debate around the terminology describing this group. That is, 
although some progress has been made, there is still a lack of consensus about the best term 
for use in scientific dialogue about this topic. Specifically, consistent with the pervasive 
conceptualisation of homosexuality as an aberration (medical or otherwise), attitudes 
towards acts of homosexuality and the people who engage in them has been consistently 
negative. So much so, that the consistently negative attitudes (i.e., prejudice) have also 
earned their own terminology. For example, prejudice toward gay people has been called 
homoerotica (Churchill, 1967; see also Muscarella, 2000), anti-homosexualism (Hacker, 
1971), homosexphobia  (Morin & Garfinkle, 1978), and homonegativism (Hudson & 
Ricketts, 1980, evidence taken from Herek 1991b; for full discussion of terminologies, also 
see Herek 2000; Anderson, Papadopolous, Chapman, Hinton, & James, 2015). Several 
terms have received particular attention in the psychology literature, and these will now be 
discussed. 
The most common term for prejudice toward gay men and lesbians is homophobia, 
which was originally defined as the “dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals” 
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(Weinberg, 1972, p. 4). This is still commonly used in some research disciplines (including 
medicine, education, and politics), but has been criticized in the psychology literature as 
being out-dated and inaccurate (e.g., Herek, 1984b). For example, Herek (Herek, 1984b, 
2004; Herek & McLemore, 2013), a leading psychological researcher in this field, argues 
that there are several important issues with this term, the first of which is that the literal 
meaning of homophobia is “fear of sameness”. He also argues that the homophobia reflects 
three assumptions that actually fuel the prejudice. First, that this prejudice is primarily a 
fear. Second, that the fear is appropriately directed toward dysfunctional individuals, and 
finally that it occurs in response to aberrant individuals, rather than towards a healthy and 
normal social category. A further consideration is that this term was widely used at the time 
when being gay or lesbian was considered a disorder and is, consequently associated with 
the erroneous medicalisation of gay and lesbian sexuality (see Shields & Harriman, 1984). 
Although these assumptions are implied through the terminology, they are not supported by 
empirical data (Fyfe, 1983; Herek, 1984b, 1986; Meyer & Dean, 1998). 
Another common term for prejudice towards gay men and lesbians is heterosexism, 
which has been defined as an “ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes 
any non-heterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek, 
1990, p. 316). This term was introduced to make prejudice against gay men and lesbians 
comparable to other prejudices (e.g., sexism, racism, ageism, etc.). One way the term 
homophobia differs from heterosxism is that the former has been used to describe 
individual’s attitudes toward gay people, while the latter has been used to describe 
institutional- or cultural-level attitudes. For example, Australian instances of heterosexism 
include the laws that prevent marriage, adoption, and IVF access for gay people (Tomazin, 
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2014), laws that allow discrimination in the workplace against gay people based on 
religious grounds (Koziol, 2014; Sammut, 2014 ), and laws that allow religious hospitals 
and community welfare organisations to discriminate against gay patients, clients, and 
employees (Lawrie, 2014 ).  
Herek has spent much of his academic career advocating for the replacement of 
homophobia with the term sexual prejudice (Herek, 2000a), which he conceptualises as 
negative attitudes toward any individual on the basis of their sexual orientation (gay, 
bisexual, or straight). He argues that, unlike homophobia and heterosexism, sexual 
prejudice is descriptive of the attitude without implying an underlying motive or the origin 
of the attitude (Herek, 2004). He also argues that the use of this term links the study of anti-
gay attitudes with an existing literature on prejudice toward other targets.  An alternative to 
sexual prejudice is sexual stigma - defined as an inferior status that society collectively 
assigns to any identity, behaviour, or relationship that is non-heterosexual in nature (Herek, 
1991b, 2007, 2009a). This stigma becomes a shared knowledge of homosexuality’s 
devalued status within the dominant culture, which has been reinforced throughout the 
history of sexuality. The aims of the current thesis are to identify attitudes toward gay 
people and to distinguish these from attitudes towards the broader construct of gay, thus I 
have decided not to adopt sexual prejudice or sexual stigma (nor the relatively outdated 
homophobia or heterosexism). Rather, I will refer specifically to the gender of the attitude-
target (i.e., attitudes toward gay men, or attitudes towards lesbians). When appropriate to 
simultaneously refer to attitudes towards gay men and lesbians, I will refer to these 
attitudes as attitudes toward gay people. When these attitudes are negative, I will refer to 
them as anti-gay attitudes (consistent with some literature; e.g., Cannon, 2005; Goodnight, 
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Cook, Parrott, & Peterson, 2013; Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Haslam & Levy, 2006; 
Hatzenbuehler, Dovidio, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Phills, 2009; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2004).  
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Chapter 3 Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians 
______________________________________ 
What's unnatural is homophobia. Homo sapiens is the only species in all of nature that 
responds with hate to homosexuality… 
- Alex Sanchez (2008, p.65)  
 
3.1 Anti-gay Attitudes 
Racism has dominated psychological research on prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; 
Bogardus, 1927; Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; 
Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008). However, since the declassification of homosexuality in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R) in 1973 (APA, 
1987; Spitzer, 1973, also see the previous chapter)  prejudice research has been extended to 
include the study of negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians (e.g., Breen & 
Karpinski, 2013; Elliss, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2003; Gabriel & Banse, 2006; Gelbal & 
Duyan, 2006; Herek, 2000a, 2004; Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; Larsen, Reed, & 
Hoffman, 1980; Morrison & Morrison, 2003; Steffens, 2005; Steffens & Wagner, 2004). 
This research has found that, while there has been more than 40 years since the 
declassification of homosexuality, gay men and lesbians still face considerable prejudice as 
well as behavioural discrimination (e.g., Herek, 1984b; Herek & McLemore, 2013; 
Krajeski, 1996; Loftus, 2001). 
One problem of research on attitudes toward gay men and lesbians is that these 
attitudes have been found to vary with social norms of equality and egalitarianism. For 
example, when experimentally inducted with egalitarian norms, participants reported more 
positive attitudes towards gay men and lesbians (Falomir-Pichastor, Berent, Mugny, & 
Faniko, 2015), and to endorse biological theories of homosexuality (Falomir-Pichastor & 
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Hegarty, 2014) than when inducted with either a discriminatory norm, or not inducted at all 
(i.e., a control group). This is consistent with the general trend for the explicit expression of 
prejudice to be increasingly socially undesirable and politically incorrect (e.g., Pereira et 
al., 2009), but makes findings very difficult to interpret because it becomes unclear whether 
attitudes are actually less negative or just that negative attitudes are less expressed. 
Consequently, the measurement of prejudice has become increasingly complex requiring  
an understanding of the contribution of complex factors such as social norms and 
motivations (e.g., to control prejudiced responses) as well as the introduction of measures 
which are less affected by presentation strategies (e.g., implicit measures; see Fazio & 
Olson, 2003 for discussion).  
Currently, the overall outcomes from research on anti-gay attitudes seem to have 
been relatively unaffected by egalitarian social values in the same way that other attitudes 
have (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Rudman, 
2011). This seems to be because the expression of prejudice towards gay men and lesbians 
seems more legitimate, defensible, or even acceptable, especially among people who 
believe sexual orientation is chosen (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009; Herek, 1984b, 
2000a). However, it is possible that this will not always be true and, for this reason, 
research on anti-gay prejudice will be well-placed by incorporating both explicit and 
implicit anti-gay attitudes. Moreover, consistent with theorising which posits that explicit 
and implicit attitudes are distinct but related constructs (Nosek & Smyth, 2007) which  
have different antecedents and consequences (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) both implicit and explicit anti-gay attitudes will play 
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an essential role in the development of a nuanced understanding of anti-gay prejudice. 
Empirical evidence for these concepts will now be reviewed.  
3.2 Dual Pathways to Anti-gay Attitudes 
3.2.1 Explicit anti-gay attitudes 
 Research has found consistently negative explicit attitudes toward gay men and 
lesbians (Fox, 2009; Gabriel & Banse, 2006; Herek, 1987, 2000a, 2000b, 2009b; Herek & 
McLemore, 2013). Herek (2007) suggests there are five socio-demographic determinants of 
these anti-gay attitudes. Namely, age, gender, education, religion, and previous contact with 
gay people are strong contributors to attitudes towards both gay men and lesbians. The 
literature provides substantial empirical evidence to support his claim. Perhaps the most 
tenacious example is the finding that men tend to express anti-gay attitudes more than 
women (e.g., Dolinski, 2010; Mata, Ghavami, & Wittig, 2010; Nagoshi et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that straight men who know fewer gay men are more likely to 
demonstrate anti-gay attitudes (Goodnight et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2009). Studies have 
also shown that African Americans, relative to European Americans, reported more 
negative attitudes toward gay people (Lemelle & Battle, 2004; Lewis, 2003; Vincent, 
Peterson, & Parrott, 2009). The other determinants as suggested by Herek are also 
persistently reported throughout the literature: older age (Herek, 2000a), religion (both 
identifying as religious relative to identifying as non-religious, and higher levels of 
religiousity [see Chapter 8, for a review], Whitley, 2009), and educational influences (i.e., 
lower education levels are correlated with anti-gay attitudes; Ohlander, Batalova, & Treas, 
2005), have consistently been linked with more negative attitudes towards both gay men 
and lesbians. Finally, higher levels of previous contact with gay men or lesbians have been 
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shown to be consistent related to positive attitudes, and arguably a strong intervention 
against anti-gay attitudes (Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Smith et al., 2009; Techakesari, Louis, 
& Barlow, 2015).  
Beyond the socio-demographic predictors of anti-gay attitudes, it has been argued 
that certain cultural components can contribute to anti-gay attitudes. For example, 
relationships have been empirically established between anti-gay attitudes and cultural 
lifestyle (e.g., lower social and socio-economic status is correlated with anti-gay attitudes; 
Slootmaeckers & Lievens, 2014). Similarly, involvement in some (especially typically 
masculine) extracurricular activities and sporting cultures has been found to increase  men’s 
anti-gay attitudes (i.e., males who participated in core sports [football, baseball, etc.] were 
more than three times as likely to report anti-gay attitudes; Osborne & Wagner, 2007). 
Research has, however, found that anti-gay attitudes are decreasing for some 
demographic groups. In particular, members of certain religious orientations (Rowatt, 
LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009) and political orientations (Lewis & Gossett, 
2008)  have shown trends of less negative attitudes. Specifically, Democrats, and less 
religious individuals have become much more supportive of same-sex marriage, while the 
attitudes of Republicans, Protestants, and African-Americans are unchanged over the last 
two decades (Rowatt et al., 2009). Research examining workplace attitudes also argue that 
attitudes toward gay people in the workplace are also becoming increasingly positive 
(Bernstein & Kostelac, 2002; Levitt & Klassen, 1976; Seidman, Meeks, & Traschen, 
1999)9. For example, an American poll reported a substantial increase in the percentage of 
                                                 
9 The finding that attitudes toward gay people are becoming increasingly positive in the workplace may 
actually be driven by the fact that the norms and legislations around reporting these attitudes are rapidly 
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straight people who reported a preference for affirmative action opportunities for gay men 
and lesbians. Specifically, respondents reported in increase from 56% in 1977 to 88% in 
2003 (Loftus, 2001).  
There is also evidence that anti-gay attitudes are prevalent in Western society, and 
that these attitudes are meaningfully related to discriminatory behaviours. For example, 
previous correlational work has examined whether fears of being perceived as gay impacted 
the attitudes and behaviours of straight Australians. Results indicated that choices of what 
subjects to study, sports to play, ways of interacting with other males, and displays of 
emotion are shown to be related to anti-gay attitudes (Lewes & White, 2009). Experimental 
work has revealed a similar pattern of results; Morrison and Morrison (2003) found that 
individuals who reported explicit anti-gay attitudes were less likely to sit beside individuals 
wearing T-shirts with pro-gay slogans. Interestingly, where given the opportunity, these 
individual would justify their seating choice with reasons that non-prejudicial in nature 
suggesting at least some motivation to not express prejudice. In contrast to the research so 
far reviewed, there is a small body of research that contends that anti-gay attitudes are not 
becoming more progressive (see Embrick, Walther, & Wickens, 2007 for a discussion).   
The consequences for gay men and lesbians of explicit anti-gay attitudes take a 
variety of forms. Herek (2009a) found that an internet survey revealed approximately 20% 
of gay male and lesbian respondents had experienced a person or property crime as a result 
of their sexual orientation. Studies have also found that various methods of discrimination 
are increasingly being used to exclude gay men and lesbians from the workplace (Embrick 
                                                                                                                                                    
changing; this could be a desirable responding effect rather than a legitimate decrease in anti-gay workplace 
attitudes. 
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et al., 2007, a famous [albeit recently repealled] example is the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy 
on service by gays and lesbians in the United States military; Willis, 2012). As a result, 
individuals who seek to conceal their homosexual sexual orientation in the workplace  has 
increased across a diverse range of work settings (Smith, Oades, & McCarthy, 2013; Willis, 
2010, 2011) . Finally, in a study regarding the medical treatment of gay people, Röndahl 
(2009) found that both the patients and their partners felt discriminated against by nursing 
staff in clinical settings, after disclosing their sexual orientation. He also found that 
negative attitudes of nursing staff increased after the disclosure (see also Eliason, 
DeJoseph, Dibble, Deevey, & Chinn, 2011 and Ellis & Kitzinger, 2008, for similar findings 
in samples of psychology students; Röndahl, Innala, & Carlsson, 2004).  
Gay people also experience the internalisation of heterosexist social norms (Allen & 
Oleson, 1999; Meyer & Dean, 1998; Newcomb & Mustanski, 2011; Ross & Rosser, 1996). 
Internalised anti-gay attitudes are found to be related to same-sex relationship problems, 
both generally and among coupled participants (Frost & Meyer, 2009), and mental health 
issues (Williamson, 2000). While research into this domain is important with very serious 
implications for this population, it is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be 
reviewed in detail here (for a non-exhaustive overview of this area, see Newcomb & 
Mustanski, 2011; Ross & Rosser, 1996; Warriner, Nagoshi, & Nagoshi, 2013; Williamson, 
2000, etc.)  
3.2.2 Implicit anti-gay attitudes 
The most common form of implicit anti-gay attitudes is a stronger implicit 
association between GAY-BAD and STRAIGHT-GOOD, compared to the reverse pairing 
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(i.e., GAY-GOOD and STRAIGHT-BAD) as measured by the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998).  As with explicit anti-gay attitudes of 
straight participants, implicit anti-gay attitudes have been found to be generally be negative. 
For example, using the homosexuality-IAT, Banse, Seise, and Zerbes (2001) found straight, 
but not gay, participants demonstrated strong implicit anti-gay attitudes as measured by an 
IAT that assessed the implicit associations between HOMOSEXUAL10 (e.g., photographs 
of same-sex couples) and HETEREOSEXUAL (e.g., photographs of opposite sex couples), 
and GOOD and BAD . In addition, they found participants were able to fake positive 
explicit attitudes, but not implicit attitudes toward homosexuality. Discrepancies between 
explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes were accounted for by motivation to control 
prejudiced responses (Banse et al., 2001, Study 2). Taken together, these findings provided 
the first evidence for the known group and construct validity of IAT-measured implicit 
anti-gay attitudes.  
De Houwer and De Bruycker (2007) replicated Banse and colleagues’ (2001) findings 
using the same version of the IAT. Since then, investigations of implicit anti-gay attitudes 
have almost exclusively relied on the use of the homosexuality-IAT (Banse et al., 2001; 
Boysen, Vogel, & Madon, 2006; Cochran, Mays, Alegria, Ortega, & Takeuchi, 2007; 
Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007; Jellison et al., 
2004; Jonathan, 2008; Lemm, 2006; Steffens, 2005; Steffens & Buchner, 2003; Steffens & 
Wagner, 2004; Vilaythong, Lindner, & Nosek, 2010), or the single-category IAT (Breen & 
Karpinski, 2013) and typically demonstrated consistent moderate to strong implicit anti-gay 
attitudes. 
                                                 
10 The terms GAY and STRAIGHT are currently preferred, as evidenced by the APA6 publication manual 
(2009). However, when researchers have previously conducted work in this domain and used the terms 
HOMOSEXUAL and HETEROSEXUAL, I will also use these so I can accurately describe their work. 
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Steffens and Buchner (2003) used a Homosexuality-IAT to measure implicit 
attitudes towards gay men. In this procedure, they represented the category GAY by 
presenting two male names intended to indicate a gay couple [e.g., Christian + Felix], while 
HETEROSEXUAL was represented by the presentation of a male and a female name 
indicating a straight couple [e.g., Julia + Sven]). They found that, while explicit attitudes 
towards gay men were positive and stable across situations, implicit attitudes measured 
through the IAT were negative.  
Dasgupta and Rivera (2006) assessed whether implicit anti-gay attitudes and sexual 
orientation-based discrimination was moderated by conscious processes (i.e., egalitarian 
beliefs and behavioural control). Specifically, they asked straight participants to interact 
with a male confederate who they believed to be gay. The results revealed that, if conscious 
egalitarian beliefs or behavioural control processes are deactivated, then those who had 
stronger implicit anti-gay attitudes displayed more discriminatory behaviours than those 
who had weaker implicit anti-gay attitudes. This was interpreted as evidence that implicit 
prejudice produces biased behaviour when conscious processes are inhibited consistent 
with findings for racial prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989).  
Rohner and Björklund (2006) used a homosexuality-IAT to explore implicit 
attitudes and self-presentation concerns. They used picture stimuli to represent sexual 
orientation (i.e., pictures of two individuals involved in romantic situations such as kissing 
or getting married; homosexuality was represented with both male-male and female-female 
individuals and heterosexuality was represented with opposite-sex individuals). Self-
presentation was manipulated by telling half of the participants that the study concerned 
attitudes to sexual orientation (i.e., socially sensitive topic), and the remaining participants 
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that the study concerned attitudes to age (i.e., a less sensitive topic). The age-instruction 
group reported more explicit anti-gay attitudes that the sexual orientation-instruction group. 
However, the manipulation did not affect the correlation between the explicit and implicit 
attitudes. They interpreted these findings as being problematic for the argument that the low 
correlations between implicit and explicit attitude measures are primarily due to self-
presentation concerns. Indeed, contemporary arguments on divergence between explicit and 
implicit attitudes revolved around postulations of dual processes (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000), although a series of theoretical and 
methodological explanations are available (for a discussion, and some evidence, see 
Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). 
In sum, early studies on implicit anti-gay attitudes revealed substantial support for 
the homosexuality-IAT using a range of stimuli. Specifically, these findings are evidence of 
good psychometric properties and that IAT-measured implicit attitudes are less susceptible 
to faking than explicit measures (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Steffens, 2004). In addition, 
further evidence for implicit anti-gay attitudes as measured by the homosexuality-IAT is 
found from large-scale studies conducted by project implicit, hosted by Harvard University 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/). This website collates large amounts of data from a 
website that hosts the IAT, and allows for large-scale analyses of attitudes toward a variety 
of social targets, including gay people (Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007). Across six years, the 
website collected data from over 2.5 million participants from a variety of locations, which 
included a widely range of demographically heterogeneous participants. This study found 
evidence that negative explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes can be found across the 
population. In fact, 68% of the sample demonstrated stronger implicit associations between 
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HETEROSEXUAL+GOOD, and HOMOSEXUAL+BAD, compared to 
HETEROSEXUAL+BAD, and HOMOSEXUAL+GOOD. This is consistent  with the 
majority of implicit anti-gay attitude findings  which reveal moderate to strong levels of 
implicit anti-gay attitudes (Boysen et al., 2006; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; De Houwer & 
De Bruycker, 2007; Lemm, 2006; Steffens & Buchner, 2003).  
Two studies have published substantially inconsistent results. First, Breen and 
Karpinski (2013, Study 1) used a single category IAT to assess implicit anti-gay attitudes 
and found neutral implicit anti-gay attitudes (i.e., participants had neither positive nor 
negative associations toward GAY as represented by symbols e.g., same-sex wedding cake 
toppers). However, when they used separate blocks to measure attitudes toward gay men 
and lesbians (Study 2) they found that implicit attitudes toward gay men were neutral (i.e., 
ambivalent associations with symbols representing the category of GAY MALE), and 
implicit attitudes toward lesbians that were positive (i.e., positive associations with symbols 
representing the category of LESBIAN). This result is consistent with Steffens (2005) who 
was the first to measure implicit attitudes toward  gay men and lesbians in separate blocks 
of a homosexuality-IAT using words to represent the respective categories. She found that 
female responses to a homosexuality-IAT in Germany were as positive toward lesbians as 
toward heterosexual targets (although male participants demonstrated negative implicit 
attitudes toward lesbians, and all participants demonstrated negative implicit attitudes 
toward gay men).  
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Cullen and Barnes-Holmes (2008) published a review of studies of implicit anti-gay 
attitudes11. They found that implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians differed as a 
function of participant’s sexual orientation. Specifically gay men and lesbians demonstrated 
positive implicit attitudes. In contrast, straight participants consistently demonstrated 
implicit anti-gay attitudes. The authors interpreted these results as demonstrations of 
implicit in-group “pride” and out-group “prejudice” for both gay and straight groups.   
In its entirety, research on implicit anti-gay attitudes is relatively limited, but is 
largely consistent in its findings. First, implicit attitudes tend to be negative, and predicted 
by factors that predict other forms of implicit prejudice (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). 
Second, as with other forms of prejudice, implicit attitudes have important behavioural 
outcomes (Jellison et al., 2004). Finally, empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
proposition that explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes related but distinct constructs 
(Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007).  
3.3 Remaining Challenges for the Field 
Research on anti-gay attitudes is built on the twin literatures of explicit and implicit 
anti-gay attitudes, and for this reason is propelled and constrained by developments in the 
field of explicit/implicit cognition. For example, some debate still lingers about the 
psychometric properties (e.g., Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008), the interpretation of reaction time 
data (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004), the interpretation of the evidence (Blanton et al., 2009), 
and even the exact nature of implicit cognitions (e.g., Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 
2006). However, there is a substantial empirical support the meaningful use of explicit and 
                                                 
11 These authors defined these implicit attitudes as implicit homonegativity; a concept they defined as 
relatively unconscious attitudes toward homosexuals that are beyond volitional control. 
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implicit measures of anti-gay attitudes, including several theoretical frameworks (e.g., 
Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000), meta-analyses (e.g., 
Hofmann et al., 2005; Lenton, Bruder, & Sedikides, 2009), data providing evidence of 
sound psychometric properties (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Williams & Kaufmann, 2012), and knowledge 
about the relationship between explicit and implicit measures (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Beach, 2008; Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Rohner & Björklund, 2006). 
To date, research on implicit anti-gay attitudes has not received the same conceptual 
and empirical attention as other implicit attitudes, for a variety of reasons. First, there are 
simply fewer researchers undertaking anti-gay attitudes research than other forms of 
attitude research. Second, there are unique challenges in measuring anti-gay attitudes. 
Addressing the latter of these is the primary goal of this dissertation and in doing so, I will 
present an alternative method of representation that other researchers in this domain can 
consider adopting in situations where they are interested in measuring implicit attitudes 
toward gay men and lesbians specifically as gay people rather than as members of the 






Chapter 4–Attitudes: Conceptual Understanding and Measurement 
______________________________________ 
The problem is getting at the truth; unlike geologists, attitude researchers cannot whip out 
a measuring tape and wrap it around a rock. 
- Laurie Rudman (2011, p.1) 
 
 
4.1 Background to Implicit Measures 
The effectiveness of self-report measures in sensitive domains such as attitudes 
toward gay people has been called into question (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003). Consequently, 
researchers of these topics have sought to measure attitudes without interference from 
conscious control or intentions. One popular approach is to use measures that assess 
implicit attitudes (for a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003). Implicit attitudes are argued to 
be automatic because they are outside of conscious awareness (Bargh, 1989, 1994; Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1998). They have also been argued to be non-conscious (Blair, 2001; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Quillian, 2008) or involuntary (Banse et 
al., 2001; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002) although the use of these terms has been contested. 
The debate around the non-conscious nature of implicit attitudes is ongoing (Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007; Rudman, 
2011) and while contributing to this discussion is beyond the primary goals of this 
dissertation, it is worth noting the growing body of literature supporting the psychometric 
properties of implicit measures (Banse et al., 2001; Cunningham et al., 2001; Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; Williams & Kaufmann, 2012) and their usefulness 
(particularly pertaining to evidence suggesting that implicit attitudes often predict attitude-
related behaviours better than explicit attitudes; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). 
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As argued in Chapter 1, the measurement of implicit anti-gay attitudes comes with 
unique challenges that are not faced when measuring implicit attitudes to categories that are 
associated with visible physical features (Freeman et al., 2010) or in pronouns or names. 
Thus, researchers into these issues have needed to generate alternative methods of 
representation. The major aim of this chapter is to outline an alternative method of 
representation that is person-based. I will first provide an overview of the apparatus and 
stimuli typically used in implicit anti-gay attitudes research. I will then outline the 
limitations of traditional approaches to implicit anti-gay attitude measures (i.e., those that 
have used typical category-based representations of gay men and lesbians) before outlining 
the protocol and advantages of the person-based approach, and discussing how this 
approach addresses the named weaknesses of the traditional account. 
4.2 Implicit Measures of Association 
Although there are a range of implicit measures, I will limit the discussion to the 
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and the GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) as these have been 
the most commonly used in implicit anti-gay attitude research. Although other tools exist 
that could be used (e.g., the EAST, De Houwer, 2003; and sequential priming techniques, 
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Powell & Fazio, 1984), they are not central 
to the arguments of this chapter. 
4.2.1 The implicit association test 
Many implicit measures have been developed in recent years, yet the IAT is the 
most popular (De Houwer et al., 2009; Fazio & Olson, 2003). The IAT involves the 
presentation of single stimulus on a computer screen (paper and pencil versions have also 
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been validated; Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Khan, & Nosek, 2008). Each stimulus belongs to one 
of the four targets (i.e., two categories and two attributes), which are paired so that one 
category and one attribute are each assigned to a single key. Each time a stimulus is 
presented, participants are asked to press the key to which it has been assigned. The essence 
of this task is that when the categories and attributes assigned to the same key are highly 
compatible, making the correct response to stimuli representing these is very easy. In 
contrast, when categories and attributes assigned to the same key are incongruous, this 
makes the task very difficult. Consequently, the IAT effect is the name given to the finding 
of significantly faster response times for congruent compared to incongruent pairings. In 
cases of implicit prejudice, the IAT effect is usually found when minority groups (e.g., 
race, sexual orientation, weight) are paired with a negative attribute and the majority group 
is paired with a positive attribute.  
The typical homosexuality-IAT (Banse et al., 2001) pairs the categories GAY and 
STRAIGHT, as represented by symbols or pictures (e.g., same-sex wedding cake toppers or 
pictures of same-sex couples) with the attributes GOOD and BAD. Each trial presents a 
positive or negative word, or (for example) a picture of a gay or straight couple on a black 
background. In the GAY-GOOD blocks, participants press the letter ‘E’ if either a positive 
word or a picture of a gay couple is presented. Alternatively, participants press the letter ‘I’ 
if a negative word or a picture of a straight couple is presented. In the GAY-BAD block, 
the attributes are reassigned to the other key following a short practice block where 
participant learn this new assignment by classifying only valence stimuli. The IAT effect 
for implicit anti-gay attitudes is the difference in performance (i.e., a latency-based score) 
for the critical blocks (note: the assigned key is counterbalanced across critical blocks). 
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There is now a sizable body of literature which provide support for the IAT as a 
valid and reliable measure of attitudes (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). For example, 
previous research has empirically demonstrated that IAT scores are meaningfully related to 
attitude-relevant behaviours (Greenwald et al., 2009; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Ziegert 
& Hanges, 2005; although these findings have been challenged, e.g., Blanton et al., 2009), 
individual differences and group membership (Greenwald et al., 1998) and, under certain 
conditions, to the related explicit attitude (Nosek, 2005; for a meta-analysis on explicit-
implicit relationship effect sizes, and a discussion of theoretical explanations for the lack of 
quantifiable relationships, see Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). 
However, the IAT has several methodological and conceptual limitations (De Houwer, 
2002; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Williams & 
Kaufmann, 2012). 
Potentially the most concerning limitation of the IAT is that it provides a single 
index for each relative implicit attitude. For example, in the homosexuality-IAT, implicit 
anti-gay attitudes manifest as a stronger implicit association between STRAIGHT-GOOD 
and GAY-BAD, compared to STRAIGHT-BAD and GAY-GOOD. As a result, (e.g., 
Rudman & Heppen, 2003), it is unclear whether respondents were demonstrating implicit 
negativity towards the category of gay, implicit positivity towards the category of straight, 
or a combination of both. The IAT has also been criticised based on grounds of construct 
(Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) and internal validity (McFarland 
& Crouch, 2002; Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001), and evidence has also been presented 
which suggests that the IAT is more susceptible to deliberate distortion of responses than 
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originally believed (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). These problems have stimulated researchers 
to look for alternative measures that could be used instead of or in addition to the IAT. 
4.2.2 The go/no-go association task (GNAT) 
The GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) is similar to the IAT; participants rapidly 
classify stimuli presented one at a time that represent concepts or attributes. However, 
unlike the IAT, each GNAT uses only a single target concept and target attribute to which 
participants respond with a single key (a “go” response). Any stimulus presented that does 
not represent the target category or attribute is not responded to (a “no go” response), 
allowing the trial to elapse. Stimuli are presented in rapid succession, with a response 
deadline of, typically, 600-800ms. Participants typically receive feedback after each trial.  
There are several important differences between the IAT and the GNAT. First, 
while the IAT asks participants to respond to four presented targets (i.e., two categories and 
two attributes), the GNAT requires participants to respond to only one target category and 
attribute, and to ignore other stimuli (i.e., typically a second category and attribute). This is 
achieved by the use of a response deadline in the GNAT which also means that GNAT 
responses are less subject to strategy (e.g., intentionally slowing responses) than those of 
the IAT. Finally, the GNAT is scored using the Signal Detection Theory parameter of d′ 
(e.g., Green & Swets, 1966) based on the number of correct responses to target and 
distracter stimuli. In this way, scoring of the GNAT relies on response accuracy whereas 
scoring of the IAT relies on response latency.   
Here is a concrete example of this contrast: the homosexuality-IAT would assign 
GAY and BAD to one key, and STRAIGHT and GOOD to another key in the congruent 
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block, and GAY and GOOD, and STRAIGHT and BAD in the incongruent block. In 
contrast, GNAT measured implicit anti-gay attitudes would use GAY and BAD as targets 
in the congruent block and GAY and GOOD as targets in the incongruent block. Thus, 
while the interpretations of IAT effects are comparative, the interpretation of the GNAT 
effect is a simple association between GAY and GOOD compared to GAY and BAD. It is 
also a methodological strength of the GNAT that the use of a single key response removes 
issues of handedness and the need to counterbalance blocks to address this issue.  
The GNAT was introduced a mere three years after the IAT, yet the sheer 
popularity of the IAT seems to have eclipsed and restricted the use of this and several 
subsequent implicit measures. However, the GNAT has gained strong support due to both 
its methodological advantages as well as its psychometric properties (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 
2014; Ingram, 2014; Williams & Kaufmann, 2012). For these reasons, I have chosen to use 
the GNAT in this dissertation.  
4.3 Designing a GNAT 
When assessing implicit attitudes to any target, it is typical to use a two-block 
GNAT to assess the implicit associations between the target and the attributes GOOD and 
BAD (i.e., one attribute per block). Distracter stimuli are used to ensure that there are equal 
numbers of target-present and target-absent trials. In addition, distracters include both 
distracter category stimuli and distracter attribute stimuli to ensure equal numbers of each 
type (i.e., category – typically nouns or pictures; attribute – typically adjectives) are 
presented so as to ensure similarity between targets and distracters in comparable blocks. 
For this reason, consideration of categories and attributes, and the examples of each that 
will be used as stimuli is given much consideration.  
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4.3.1 Stimuli selection 
A growing body of literature exists that demonstrates the importance of stimuli 
selection (Anderson & Antalíková, 2014; De Houwer, 2001; Govan & Williams, 2004; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Steffens, Kirschbaum, & Glados, 2008; Steffens & 
Plewe, 2001). Stimuli selection research has shown that poor stimuli choice can allow 
specific and especially non-typical exemplars to affect findings. For example, Bluemke and 
Friese (2006), who explored whether individual stimuli that is consistent with its category 
can influence the magnitude or direction of an IAT effect. For example, a race-IAT effect 
would usually reveal demonstrations of attitudes that WHITE is usually preferred to 
BLACK, however not all white stimuli are liked (e.g., Charles Manson [a convicted 
murderer] is white but disliked). Following this logic, they argued that evaluations of 
generic categories and evaluations of specific stimuli that represent them are conceptually 
distinct from each other. For example, an individual might like vegetables (the generic 
category) but dislike broccoli (a specific exemplar), and also dislike enokitake mushrooms 
(a non-typical exemplar). Thus, although they may sometimes converge, attitudes towards 
vegetables should be conceptualised as different from both attitudes toward broccoli and 
attitudes toward enokitake mushrooms.  
Empirical evidence has revealed that typical IAT effects can be reversed as a 
function of specific stimuli that are incongruent with their category. For example, Govan 
and Williams (2004) explored the effects of congruent and incongruent stimulus-
associations in an IAT. First, they replicated the seminal IAT finding (i.e., pairings of 
FLOWERS+GOOD and INSECTS+BAD, and the reverse) with typical stimuli. 
Specifically, in this condition, flowers were represented by words such as ROSE or TULIP, 
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while insects were represented by words such as WASP or BEE and the expected IAT 
effect was demonstrated (an implicit preference for flowers relative to insects).  In the 
second condition, they reversed the valence of the specific stimuli used to represent each 
category. In this condition, flowers were represented by words such as POISON IVY, while 
insects were represented by words such as BUTTERFLY which led to a reversal in the 
valence of the IAT effect.  
Taken together, these findings provided evidence that stimuli selection for measures 
of implicit attitudes is important. To date, however, this issue has yet to be fully considered 
in the specific case of measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
4.3.2 Selecting stimuli when measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes 
Research on implicit gender and ethnicity attitudes have used picture (faces of male 
vs. female/black vs. white individuals) or word (male or female names, gendered pronouns, 
names that stereotypically belong to an ethnic group) stimuli that are representative of the 
attitude-object’s social group. These studies have delivered robust findings (for an ongoing 
debate on effect sizes, see Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2014; Greenwald et al., 2009; 
Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013, 2015). The social category of gay, 
unlike racial, gender, age, and weight social categories, is not easily or reliably detectable 
from the physical features of group members (e.g., a picture of a non-familiar individual 
belonging to each of these social categories could be correctly identified; Bargh, 1988; 
McArthur & Baron, 1983). As a result, stimuli selection for use in a GNAT assessing 
implicit anti-gay attitudes is difficult. Although deliberate identification of sexual 
orientation has been found to occur with an accuracy level slightly above chance (e.g., 
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Freeman et al., 2010), this would not be sufficient to allow the use a pictures of unfamiliar 
gay individuals as stimuli in an implicit measure of anti-gay attitudes.  
Researchers of implicit anti-gay attitudes have attempted to overcome these issues 
by using a variety of stimuli representing the category, including pictures of same-sex 
couples in neutral or non-romantic (e.g., Cochran, Peavy, & Cauce, 2007; Lemm, 2006; 
e.g., Nosek et al., 2005; Rowatt et al., 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) or romantic poses 
(e.g., Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007; Jellison et 
al., 2004), names of hypothetical same-sex couples (e.g., PETER + JACK; Steffens & 
Buchner, 2003, Experiment 1), words stereotypically associated with the category (Steffens 
& Buchner, 2003, Experiment 2) , and category nouns (e.g., HOMOSEXUAL; Cárdenas & 
Barrientos, 2008; Lemm, 2006, Experiment 1). I argue that these stimuli represent a range 
of related issues from the broad category of gay (e.g., inclusive of political and social 
issues, HIV stigma, etc.) to the rather specific issue of gay relationships, but they are 
unlikely to measure attitudes to gay people. For example, in the case that pictures of same-
sex wedding cake decorations are used as stimuli to represent gay people, two primary 
issues can be identified – first, the stimuli are not of gay people (but of caketoppers), and 
second that although these pictures might represent GAY in the broader sense they more 
specifically represent gay marriage.12 Attitudes towards gay marriage tend to be driven (for 
example) by political allegiance and specific notions religious fundamentalism, whereas 
attitudes towards gay people tend to be driven (for example) by political orientation and 
                                                 
12 Although speculative, it could be argued that when same-sex wedding cake decorations are used as 
stimuli, they most likely evoke attitudes towards same-sex marriage. At a secondary level, these stimuli 
might evoke attitudes towards gay people – however, they equally might facilitate the measurement of 
attitudes towards cake toppers/decorations. This example demonstrates the need for precise and 
meaningful selection of stimuli in implicit measures. 
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notions of moral and religious violations (e.g., Baunach, 2011). While the findings from 
research using these stimuli sets have contributed to the literature on anti-gay attitudes, a 
new approach seems warranted to allow anti-gay attitude research to be integrated with 
implicit gender and implicit ethnicity research.  
4.3.2 Implicit contextual variation  
Implicit contextual variation (Mitchell et al., 2003) is a technique that allows a 
social category to be made salient through the use of distracters.  For example, individuals 
belongs to several social categories (e.g., age and race and gender etc.; Crisp & Hewstone, 
2000a, 2000b, 2007), and while these differ in chronic salience (Bargh, 1994; Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Nelson, 2005), it is possible to 
increase the salience of a particular social category by introducing a contrast (e.g., for a 
single target,  gender can be made salient by the presentation of opposite gender distracters, 
whereas race can be made salient by the presentation of distracters from a different racial 
group;  Mitchell et al., 2003). 
Mitchell and colleagues (2003) proposed contextual variations as a method for 
assessing implicit attitudes to a single set of people on the basis of their various social 
category memberships. It is, however, worth noting that the effects of context on explicit 
attitudes had been widely reported previously (e.g., Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & 
Chassin, 2003), although implicit attitudes were widely considered to be inflexible 
(DeCoster, Banner, Smith, & Semin, 2006). Mitchell and colleagues were specifically 
interested the differential effect of different social categories13 on implicit attitudes which 
                                                 
13 Mitchell and colleagues (2003) referred to this as category distinctiveness; In this dissertation, I refer to this 
as social category salience. 
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was achieved by either manipulating the category labels used (between experimental 
blocks) in the instructions of the GNAT14 or by manipulating the distracter stimuli (but 
holding the target constant) between different experimental blocks. They were interested in 
the category salience of ethnicity (BLACK vs WHITE) and its intersection with occupation 
(ATHLETE vs POLITICIAN) and with gender (FEMALE vs MALE; see table 1 for a 
synopsis of this series of experiments).  
Across five experiments, they observed that implicit attitudes changed as a function 
of the salient social category elicited by contextual variation. For example, they found that 
evaluations of the same individuals on the basis of their gender could be completely 
reversed when the evaluation reflected ethnicity (see Table 1). In combination, this series of 
studies both (a) demonstrated evidence for implicit contextual variation and (b) 
demonstrated the importance of stimuli selection, particularly for distracter stimuli (when in 
practice are supposedly ignored by the participant). The work of Mitchell and colleagues 
(2003) has laid the framework for the person-based approach to the implicit representation 
when measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes, which will now be outlined. 
                                                 
14 These category labels are also present during practice and experimental trials; I have also used this 
technique to successfully demonstrate implicit contextual variation to the extent that the same stimuli elicit 
substantially different results when labelled as MUSLISM compared to when they are labelled as 
IMMIGRANT (Anderson & Antalíková, 2014). 
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Table 1 
Summary of Studies by Mitchell et al., (2003)  




Names of liked Black 






Implicit attitudes were positive toward liked Black 
athletes and negative towards disliked White 
politicians when occupation was salient, but were 
reversed when ethnicity was salient. 
Study 2 Race-IATs Names of liked Black and 
disliked White targets 
(race-IAT 1) and disliked 
Black and liked White 





Implicit attitudes were more negative toward black 
than white targets; however, the effect was 
demonstrably more negative towards disliked black 
targets than black liked targets. This suggests that 
implicit attitudes are sensitive to specific 




Names of liked Black 






Implicit attitudes were positive toward liked Black 
athletes and negative towards disliked White 
politicians when occupation was salient, but were 
reversed when ethnicity was salient. 
Study 4 Gender-GNAT 
and race-
GNAT 







Expected main effects of race and ethnicity. However, 
Implicit attitudes were negative toward (black) females 
when race was salient, but were positive when gender 
was salient. Conversely, implicit attitudes were 
positive toward (white) males when race was salient, 
but were negative when gender was salient. 
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Study 5 Gender-GNAT 
and race-
GNAT 





The major findings of Study 4 were replicated, 
although with slightly smaller effect sizes (as 
expected, Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). 
Notes: Study 3 also contained a cola IAT, but as this was not relevant to implicit contextual variations, it has been excluded from this 
table; Studies 1-3 elicited implicit contextual variations by manipulating the target labels. Studies 4-5 elicited implicit contextual 
variations by manipulating the distracter stimuli. 
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4.4 The Person-Based Approach to Implicit Anti-Gay Attitudes 
The person-based approach to implicit anti-gay attitudes builds on the work of 
Mitchell et al. (2003) implicit contextual variation. Consistent with implicit race, gender, 
and age attitudes, the person-based approach  to implicit anti-gay attitudes uses pictures of 
faces as targets and distracters, however,  sexual orientation is made salient by 
manipulating the distracter stimuli (i.e., the stimuli that the participant does not responding 
to). For example, a typical gender attitudes GNAT might use a picture of Sean Hayes15, a 
well-known gay man, as a target stimuli with pictures of famous females as distracter 
stimuli (see figure 1a). In this case, the salient social comparison between the target and 
distracter stimuli is gender. However, if the same picture of Sean Hayes is used as a target, 
but distracter stimuli are famous straight males (see figure 1b), the gender comparison is no 
long available, and thus sexual orientation is the salient social category.  
 
Figure 1. An example of stimuli used in the person-based approach: Sean Hayes presented 
as a target in a gender salient block with female distracter (1a) and as a target in the sexual 
orientation salient block with a straight male distracter (1b). 
 
                                                 
15 In any experimental block, a minimum of 6 stimuli should be used (Nosek & Banaji, 2001); in this example 
the reference is to the face of Sean Hayes as a single stimulus, but it should be noted that this stimulus is one 
in a set of 6 stimuli all belonging to the same gender and sexual orientation categories. 
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Thus, the person-based approach allows targets that are known for their sexual 
orientation to be evaluated distinctly on the basis of either their sexual orientation or 
gender. Thus, theoretically the attitudes towards the same targets may be qualitatively 
different (Kite & Deaux, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2003).  
There are several conceptual advantages of the person-based approach to implicit 
anti-gay attitudes. First, this approach permits demonstration of the distinct gender-based 
and sexual orientation-based attitudes for the same target (see Chapter 5). In addition, this 
approach ensures that the attitudes measured relate directly to gay people, albeit famous 
gay people, rather than just to the broader concept gay or associated social issues (e.g., gay 
rights, gay marriage; see Chapter 6). A further advantage is that the use of face stimuli 
increases the comparability of the findings of implicit anti-gay research and other implicit 
prejudice findings. Finally, researchers interested in the measurement and applications of 
anti-gay attitudes have an alternative to the previous category-based methods of 
representation.  
In addition to conceptual advantages, there are procedural advantages to the person-
based approach. As this technique use the GNAT, issues of handedness, counterbalancing, 
and the relative (vs. individual) attitude index are addressed. In addition, the use of faces of 
famous gay people as stimuli in this method of representation is efficient, eliminating the 
need for a learning phase. This is achieved by selecting stimuli that are either piloted (e.g., 
recognised as famous and gay; as per this dissertation) or personalised (so that each 
participant rank a list of well-known people and then stimuli ranked highest by that 
participant are used in experimental blocks, as per Mitchell et al., 2003). However, this 
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does mean that all attitudes measured are to famous or known gay people, and these 
attitudes may be more favourable that attitudes to unknown or unfamiliar gay people  as is 
the case more generally with famous compared to non-famous people (e.g., Dasgupta & 
Rivera, 2008). 
 Of course, the option of introducing participants to novel non-familiar targets 
during a learning phase would eliminate any fame effects (which are discussed at length in 
Chapter 7). The names or the faces of these novel stimuli could then be used, and such 
approaches have successfully in previous research (Mitchell et al., 2003; Phelan & 
Rudman, 2011; Rudman, McLean, & Bunzl, 2013; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & 
Nauts, 2012)16. This would improve the internal validity of the findings, or at least refine 
any interpretation confounds that may result from the interaction of the targets’ sexual 
orientation and fame, but at the cost of the participants’ cognitive resources and time. In 
addition, it is questionable that learning stimuli representing gay and straight begin as 
equivalent (Lick & Johnson, 2013). As a result, attitudes toward these categories affect 
learning and then also the measurement of these attitudes raising other confounds. These 
issues are discussed in Chapter 7. 
In summary, by using faces of well-known male and female individuals who are 
straight or gay, the current study can expand the previous work of Mitchell and colleagues 
(2003) and explore implicit attitudes towards male and female targets as a function of their 
gender and sexual orientation by making these group memberships salient through the 
context provided by the distracter stimuli. The upcoming empirical studies hypothesise that 
                                                 
16 I am currently collaborating on empirical research to explore for differences between person-based implicit 
attitudes elicited from well-known target stimuli compared to novel stimuli (i.e., after a learning phase) which 
will allow a discussion on halo effects (Anderson, Antalíková, et al., 2015) . 
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gender based attitudes should be the same toward gay and straight targets (of the same 
gender) when gender is the salient social category, but that when the attitudes are based on 
sexual orientation, the attitudes will be qualitatively different (see Figure 2 for a visual 
representation). 
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 Gender based attitudes  
(towards straight targets) 
Gender based attitudes  
(towards gay targets) 
Sexual orientation based attitudes 
(towards gay targets) 
Female 
target 
   
    
Male 
targets 




Figure 2. Visual representations of implicit contextual variation techniques as used in the person-based approach to measurement 
(Note: larger images represent target stimuli, smaller images represent distracter stimuli). 
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Chapter 5 – Studies 1 and 2: Initial Evidence for the Person-Based Approach 
______________________________________ 
Why do our labels for social categories possess such extraordinary power? 
- Rothbart and Taylor (1992, p.11)   
Title 
A Person-Based Approach: Gender vs. Sexual Orientation-Based Implicit Attitudes 
Abstract 
The current study presents the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-gay 
attitudes. I propose that by varying distracter stimuli, contextual variation (Mitchell et al., 
2003)can be used to assess implicit attitudes toward the gender or the sexual orientation of 
the same target. In Study 1, 51 straight women demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
person-based approach for assessing implicit gender and sexual orientation based attitudes 
using the Go/No Go Association Task (GNAT: Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Consistent with 
previous findings, implicit gender attitudes were more positive toward female than male 
targets, however, this finding was reversed when sexual orientation-based attitudes were 
assessed. Study 2 explored effects of group membership (i.e., gender and sexual 
orientation) for a sample of straight men, lesbians, and straight women (n = 24 per group), 
who completed person-based gender and sexual orientation GNATs. Implicit attitudes were 
found to vary as a function of participants’ sexual orientation and gender, demonstrating 
evidence for in-group biases among women, and out-group sexual orientation based 
prejudice. Taken together, these results provide evidence for the validity and meaningful 




Implicit anti-gay attitudes research has found that, much like explicit anti-gay bias 
research, straight men have more negative implicit attitudes than straight women (Cullen & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2008). Moreover, when gay person’s gender is also considered, men tend 
to be even more negative toward gay male targets than lesbian targets (Dasgupta & Rivera, 
2008; Nosek et al., 2005; Steffens, 2005). However, evidence for gender-specific implicit 
anti-gay attitudes is less well established as implicit anti-gay attitudes are often assessed as 
“gay” attitudes (i.e., toward the category of gay, rather than toward gay men or lesbians; 
(i.e., toward the category of gay, rather than toward gay men or lesbians;Banse et al., 2001; 
Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Boysen et al., 2006; Gabriel et al., 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & 
Bloom, 2009) rather than as separate implicit attitudes. This is likely because of the 
difficulty in finding stimuli to represent gay men or lesbians as highlighted in Chapters 3 
and 4.  
To briefly restate, one of the main challenges facing implicit anti-gay attitudes 
researchers: how can we select stimuli that visually represent GAY in order to be able to 
validly measure implicit anti-gay attitudes? This issue includes whether or not 
measurement should be measured toward both gay men and lesbians as a single anti-gay 
attitude, as well as more generally definitional concerns (e.g., what, if any, is the role of gay 
rights activism in implicit anti-gay attitudes)17.  
As previously discussed, implicit measures of race-, gender-, and age-based 
prejudice, can use words or physical features uniquely associated with target groups. In 
                                                 
17Generally, more recent research treats implicit attitudes toward gay men as a separate construct from 
implicit attitudes toward lesbians. For a review see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, or a review by Cullen and 
Barnes-Holmes (2008).  
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contrast, implicit anti-gay bias is more difficult and, for this reason, researchers have used 
symbols and pictures that represent the category (e.g., Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Tsang & 
Rowatt, 2007) or pictures of same-sex individuals displaying affection toward each other 
(e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007). However, as 
demonstrated by these examples it is possible that while symbol and picture stimuli evoke 
the construct of gay, they also reflect other concepts. For example, the rainbow flag is 
associated not only with homosexuality but also with gay pride for those who 
understanding its meaning. In contrast, same-sex cake toppers require no interpretation, but 
are likely to connote gay marriage rather than just homosexuality. Finally, a photograph of 
two men or women embracing or kissing requires a degree of the sexual explicitness to be 
distinguished from friendship, and may be inherently confronting because of its intimate, 
rather than homosexual nature. For this reason the choice of stimuli representing the gay 
category is critical to this research and failure to consider this issue may be a source of 
inconsistent findings. 
One solution to the problem of symbol and image stimuli used in previous implicit 
anti-gay research is a person-based approach based on Mitchell and colleagues (2003) 
contextual variation (see Chapter 4 for discussion) This approach circumvents several 
major weaknesses of previous approaches including stimulus familiarity (e.g., participants 
needn’t be familiar with symbols such as ♀♂) and confounding factors (e.g., gay pride, gay 
marriage), and has the benefit of assessing implicit anti-gay bias as the response to people 
rather than an abstract category. 
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5.1.2 The current research 
Adapting the contextual variation approach (Mitchell et al., 2003), I explored the 
implicit evaluations of men and women as a function of their gender (i.e., implicit gender-
based attitudes) and their sexual orientation (i.e., implicit sexual orientation-based 
attitudes). This was achieved by using distracter stimuli that differed from the target stimuli 
either in terms of gender (creating gender-salience), or in terms of sexual orientation (but 
not gender, thus creating sexual orientation-salience). In doing so, implicit person-based 
anti-gay attitudes were assessed.  
5.2 Study 1 
5.2.1 Rationale and hypotheses 
To explore the use of the contextual variation GNAT as a person-based measure of 
implicit anti-gay attitudes, a sample of straight women were recruited. This approach was 
taken to limit the effects of extraneous factors (i.e., the homogeneity of the sample 
eliminated potential inter-group confounds) as this initial study was principally concerned 
with demonstrating the usefulness of this approach. 
Assessment of implicit gender attitudes toward famous straight men and women, 
and famous gay men and lesbians was undertaken by using targets of one gender and 
distracters of the opposite gender. Implicit anti-gay attitudes toward famous gay men and 
lesbians were assessed by using targets and distracters of the same gender who were well 
known as being either gay or straight. In addition, participants’ explicit anti-gay attitudes 
were assessed by having participants complete the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay men 
scale (ATLG; Herek, 1984a).  
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I hypothesized that there would be low levels of explicit anti-gay attitudes toward 
both gay men and lesbians consistent with previous research which has found that women 
tend to report relatively positive attitudes (Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Dasgupta & Rivera, 
2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007; Herek, 2009a; Morrison & Morrison, 2003; Morrison, 
Morrison, & Franklin, 2009; Whitley, 2009). In addition, and consistent with previous 
findings (e.g., Richeson & Ambady, 2001; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004), I predicted that 
when measuring implicit gender-based attitudes, female targets would be evaluated as more 
implicitly positive than male targets, regardless of their sexual orientation (i.e., WOMEN-
GOOD>WOMEN-BAD, demonstrated by a positive d′ difference score), whereas male 
targets would be evaluated as more implicitly negative than female targets (i.e., MEN-
GOOD<MEN-BAD, demonstrated by a negative d′ difference score). In contrast, when 
measuring implicit sexual orientation-based attitudes, I predicted that lesbian and gay male 
targets would be evaluated as more implicitly negative than straight targets, consistent with 
general findings of the implicit anti-gay attitudes literature (Banse et al., 2001; Dasgupta & 
Rivera, 2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007). Finally, I predicted that there would be a modest 
relationship between measures of implicit and explicit anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007). Together, these findings will 
provide evidence that contextual variation by same- or opposite-sex distracters allows the 






5.2.2.1 Participants.  
Participants were 51 straight women (Mage = 22.50 years, SDage = 3.02 years) from 
an online sample of convenience, recruited via social networking sites. Seven participants 
did not disclose their age. Participants whose performance on the implicit measure was 
equal to or less than chance (d′ ≤ 0) were excluded from analyses (n = 2). The sample size 
exceeds that used in previous research to validate original homosexuality-IAT (e.g., Banse 
et al., 2001). 
5.2.2.2 Measures. 
  5.2.2.2.1 Explicit measure. The Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale 
(ATLG; Herek, 1984a) comprises 10 items, each measuring explicit attitudes toward 
lesbians (ATL; e.g., “Lesbians just can’t fit into our society”) and gay men (ATG; e.g., 
“Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school”). Participants responded to 
items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The scales demonstrated 
high levels of reliability in the current sample (ATL α = .91; ATG α = .89; ATLG α = .93). 
5.2.2.2.2 Implicit measure.  A 12-block GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) assessed 
implicit associations between male and female targets, and positive and negative attributes. 
Four blocks assessed implicit gender-based attitudes toward straight women and men, four 
blocks assessed implicit gender-based attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, and four 
blocks measured implicit sexual orientation-based attitudes toward lesbians and gay men 
(See Table 2). 
 61 
Stimuli representing the categories male and female and the attributes positive and 
negative were used as both targets and distracters. Eight photographs of faces of famous 
gay males (e.g., Carson Kressley), lesbians (e.g., Ellen DeGeneres), straight males (e.g., 
Matt Damon), and straight females (e.g., Sarah Jessica Parker) represented the categories. 
Using celebrities who are easily recognized for both their gender and their sexual 
orientation permitted manipulation of the target factor (i.e., gender or sexual orientation) 
using contextual variation. For this reason, photograph stimuli were selected on the basis of 
being correctly identified by 90% of a pilot sample as being a celebrity and either straight 
or gay. Eight positive-meaning words (e.g., HAPPY) and eight negative-meaning words 
(e.g., AWFUL) were selected from a list of valence terms on the basis of similar word 
length and frequency (i.e., positive terms: average length = 5.0, average frequency = 76.0; 
negative terms: average length = 4.7; average frequency = 93.2; Francis & Kucera, 1982). 
All stimuli are presented in Appendix A. 
Implicit associations are calculated using the procedure recommended by Nosek and 
Banaji (2001). Specifically, scores for each block are calculated using the signal detection 
theory index of d′ (e.g., Green & Swets, 1966) based on the ratio of correctly identified 
targets (i.e., participants pressed the spacebar key when a target photograph or word was 
presented) and incorrectly identified distracters (i.e., participants pressed the spacebar key 
when a distracter photograph or word was presented). The estimated reliability for blocks 
was good (MRaSSH = .72, SDRaSSH = .04 ) ranging from  RaSSH = .62 to RaSSH = .76 using 
the method described by Williams and Kaufmann (2012). For ease of interpretation, a 
single implicit attitude index was calculated for each target (e.g., GAY MEN) by 
subtracting the d′ for negative blocks (e.g., GAY MEN-BAD) from positive blocks (e.g., 
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GAY MEN-GOOD) so that positive scores indicate positive implicit attitudes and negative 
scores indicate negative implicit attitudes.  
5.2.2.3 Procedure.  
A link to the online study was posted on Facebook. Participants followed the link to 
the studies website where they could read an information letter about the purpose and 
methods of the study. If they chose to participate, participants indicated their informed 
consent before providing demographic information (i.e., age, gender, and sexual 
orientation) and completing the explicit anti-gay bias measure. Finally, participants then 
completed the 12-block GNAT.  
For each block, participants were instructed that they would see a picture or word 
presented briefly in the centre of the computer screen to which they should respond by 
pressing the spacebar key (i.e., a “go” response) if the word or picture represented either 
target (i.e., category or attribute) named in the top left and right corners of the screen. 
Alternatively, participants were asked to make no response (i.e., a “no-go” response) if the 
word or picture did not belong to either of the named targets. Prior to each block, 
participants were presented with a complete set of target category stimuli (i.e., 
photographs) and were told that target label (e.g., “MEN” and “GOOD”) for that block 





GNAT blocks as a Function of Target and Distracter Categories (Studies 1 and 2) 
Factor measured Sexual orientation Target category Distracter Target valence 
Gender-based attitudes  
(towards straight targets) 
Straight Straight male Straight female Positive 
Straight male Straight female Negative 
Straight Straight female Straight male Positive 
 Straight female Straight male Negative 
Gender-based attitudes  
(towards gay targets) 
Straight Gay male Straight female Positive 
 Gay male Straight female Negative 
Straight Gay female Straight male Positive 
 Gay female Straight male Negative 
Sexual orientation-based 
attitudes 
Gay  Gay male Straight male Positive 
 Gay male Straight male Negative 
Gay Gay female Straight female Positive 
  Gay female Straight female Negative 
 64 
Each block comprised 20 practice trials and 80 experimental trials including equal 
numbers of “go” trials (i.e., target) and “no-go” trials (i.e., distracter). Each trial had a 
response deadline of 600ms, separated by an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 200ms. Word 
stimuli were presented in white 24-point uppercase Arial font. Image stimuli were 
presented in a white 10cm x 10cm frame. All stimuli were presented against a black 
background screen. Feedback followed every trial with a green “O” following correct 
responses, and a red “X” following incorrect responses. The order of GNAT blocks was 
randomized to limit order effects across the sample.  
5.2.3 Results 
5.2.3.1 Explicit Attitudes.   
Distributions for ATL and ATG scales were positively skewed, so Natural Log 
transformations were applied. Raw scores are reported for ease of interpretation, but 
statistical analyses were performed on transformed data. Explicit attitudes toward both gay 
men (M = 2.46, SD = 0.27) and lesbians (M = 2.60, SD = 0.24) were relatively low, and did 
not differ significantly (p = .22). Negative explicit attitudes towards gay men and lesbians 
were to be highly and positively correlated (r = .92, p < .001). 
5.2.3.2 Implicit Attitudes.  
Implicit gender attitudes revealed the predicted implicit associations between 
women and positive, and men and negative. This pattern of results was repeated for gay 
men and lesbians, but only when gender was salient. Interestingly, the pattern was both 
strongly attenuated and reversed when gay men and lesbians were evaluated on the basis of 




Figure 3. Mean (and standard error) d′ difference scores for female and male targets (Study 
1) 
 
A repeated-measures factorial ANOVA was used to explore implicit attitudes 
toward female and male targets using within-subject factors of target gender (2: female 
targets, male targets) and GNAT variation (3: gender-salient straight targets, gender-salient 
gay targets, sexual orientation-salient gay targets). Analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between target gender and the GNAT variation F(2, 86)=23.27, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.35.  
Post-hoc tests revealed that female targets were significantly more implicitly 
associated with positive than male targets when gender was salient, regardless of the sexual 
orientation of the target, i.e., straight targets t(54) = 5.12, p < .001, gay targets t(45) = 5.31, 
p < .001. This pattern was found to be reversed for sexual orientation-salient blocks with 
gay males being significantly more implicitly associated with positive than lesbians, t(47) = 
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5.2.2.3 Explicit-implicit correlations. There were few correlations between 
explicit and implicit measures; explicit measures were only related to gender-based implicit 
attitudes towards gay targets. No other correlations reached significance (ps > .10) 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3. 
5.2.4 Discussion 
Consistent with predictions, implicit gender attitudes toward women were positive and 
implicit gender attitudes toward men were negative (i.e., toward straight targets and gay 
targets when their gender was salient). Interestingly, this difference was attenuated and the 
pattern reversed for lesbian and gay male targets when sexual orientation was salient. This 
was partially inconsistent with the predictions. Specifically, gay male targets were slightly 
implicitly associated with positive which is inconsistent with previous research (Banse et 
al., 2001; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007). However, the finding that 
lesbians were slightly implicitly associated with negative was consistent with predictions. 
The lack of significant relationship between implicit and explicit results was inconsistent 
with previous results (e.g., Nosek, 2007), though not inconsistent with the wider literature 
which has demonstrated that implicit-explicit relationships are frequently limited by factors 
ranging from conceptual distinctness to method variance (e.g., Nosek & Smyth, 2007, see 
also Chapter 3). In the current study, it seems likely that the lack of significant correlation 




Correlation coefficients for the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes 
scores (N =51). 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Explicit attitudes 
1. ATL -       
2. ATG .92** -      
Implicit attitudes - straight targets 
3. Straight women -.11 -.14 -     
4. Straight men .03 .02 -.04 -    
Implicit attitudes - gender salient gay targets 
5. Lesbian women -.22* -.20* .12 -.13 -   
6. Gay men .23* .20* -.10 .17* -.27* -  
Implicit attitudes – sexuality salient gay targets 
7. Lesbian women -.01 -.06 .02 -.03 .17 .01 - 
8. Gay men -.08 -.08 .11 -.13 -.07 .01 .03 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .001. Significant correlations are presented in boldface. ATL = 
attitudes towards lesbians; ATG = attitudes towards gay men. 
 
 
Given the homogenous straight female sample, it is possible to conclude that the 
results of Study 1 demonstrate a simple in-group bias effect (i.e., in-group is significantly 
more implicitly positive than all out-groups). However, this explanation does not easily 
account for the finding that women’s implicit negativity toward men (i.e., when gender was 
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salient) was significantly reduced toward gay men (i.e., when sexual orientation was 
salient). This finding is particularly striking when considering that this finding is reflecting 
a change of attitudes being measured toward the same set of targets. One possible account 
of this finding is offered by implicit inversion theory (Kite & Deaux, 1987) which is 
derived from classic theories of sexuality (e.g., Ellis, 1915; Freud, 1953), and posits that 
gay people are more similar to straight opposite-gender people than straight own-gender 
people. Consequently, the implicit positivity toward gay men, and the negativity toward 
straight men and lesbians observed in the data of an all straight female sample may have 
resulted from this perceived similarity (i.e., sexual orientation-based in-group; straight 
women perceived themselves as more similar to gay men than straight men and lesbians). 
Interestingly, this interpretation accounts for the current findings quite neatly, but seems 
unlikely to hold for any other group. For example, previous implicit gender attitudes 
research has found that straight men are also implicitly more positive to women than men 
(e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). Similarly, it seems naïve to expect that lesbians would 
be implicitly positive toward straight men when there is little evidence from previous 
literature that even straight men show this in-group bias (e.g., Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 
1991). Thus, a more cautious and less theory-laden interpretation is preferred at this stage. 
Specifically, at this point, I observe that straight women are simply more implicitly positive 
toward women than men (both straight and gay [when their gender is salient]), and less 
implicitly anti-gay toward gay men than lesbians (when their sexual orientation is salient).  
The value of the person-based approach to implicit gender- and sexual orientation-
based attitudes is apparent when considering the current findings in the context of previous 
research. For example, the current finding reveals it is important to evaluate attitudes 
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toward gay men and lesbians separately, which is only possible with certain stimuli (e.g., 
cake toppers, gender symbols). Consequently, the person-based approach is well-suited to 
this task, as it is able to assess both implicit sexual orientation- and gender-attitudes toward 
either gay men or lesbians. It even can even differentiate the gender-based attitudes from 
the sexual orientation-based attitudes of the same target (e.g., Ellen DeGeneres compared to 
John Travolta vs. Ellen DeGeneres compared to Sarah Jessica Parker). Secondly, these 
findings demonstrate that it is possible to implicitly evaluate gay men and lesbians as 
people, rather than just the abstract categories of gender and anti-gay bias18. This results in 
a unique pattern of implicit associations which reveal that men may face more implicit 
negativity than gay people, at least from straight women. Finally, a person-based measure 
of implicit anti-gay bias has the potential to address inconsistent findings from various 
approaches and stimuli by eliminating confounding influences (e.g., attitudes to gay 
marriage, gay pride, and public displays of affection).  
5.3 Study 2 
5.3.1 Rationale and hypotheses  
The first study provided evidence for the usefulness of the contextual variation 
approach to measuring implicit person-based anti-gay bias, and demonstrated the variability 
of implicit gender- and sexual orientation-based attitudes as a function of (distracter-based) 
context. The next step was to fully explore the role of in-group bias in these implicit 
evaluations.  For example, would any group other than straight women (i.e., lesbian, 
straight men, or gay men) demonstrate an implicit gender or sexual orientation-based in-
                                                 
18 This finding also extends to evaluations of straight men and women, however, the use of faces to measure 
gender attitudes is standard in the literature. Conversely, these findings presented here pertaining to gay men 
and lesbians are a novel addition to the literature. 
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group bias, and do results provide any further evidence for implicit inversion theory? To 
address this question, Study 2 replicated the method used in Study 1, using gay men, 
lesbians, and straight men and women samples (i.e., gender by sexual design). 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004) and the 
findings of Study 1, I predicted all participants would demonstrate more implicit positivity 
toward females than toward males and more implicit negativity toward gay men when 
gender is salient then lesbians when gender is salient. In addition, I tentatively predicted 
implicit attitudes toward gay male and lesbian targets when sexual orientation is salient 
would be generally consistent with implicit anti-gay bias, such that neither target will be 
strongly implicitly positive even for gay male and lesbian participants (e.g., Banse et al., 
2001; Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006, 2008; Jonathan, 2008; Lemm, 
2006; Steffens, 2005). However, based on the findings of Study 1, I predicted straight 
female and gay male participants would demonstrate more implicitly positive attitudes 
toward gay male targets when their sexual orientation is salient than toward lesbian targets 
when their sexual orientation is salient. Similarly, I tentatively predicted that lesbian 
participants will demonstrate an in-group effect resulting in more implicit positivity toward 
lesbian targets when sexual orientation is salient from this group than from other participant 
groups, consistent with previous research (e.g., Banse et al., 2001).  
5.3.2 Method 
5.3.2.1 Participants.  
Participants were 24 straight women (Mage = 24.08 years, SDage = 4.68 years), 24 
lesbians (Mage = 25.27 years, SDage = 6.70 years), 24 straight men (Mage = 24.67 years, SDage 
= 5.85 years), and 24 gay men (Mage = 24.78 years, SDage = 4.44 years). Participants were 
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recruited from social networking sites to participate in this online, anonymous research. 
Thirty-two of these participants did not disclose their age. No participants were excluded 
for poor (i.e., at or below chance) performance on the GNAT. The sample size was based 
on previous research matching the sample size used to validate original homosexuality-IAT 
(Banse et al., 2001).  
5.3.2.2 Measures and Procedure.  
Using the same procedure as Study 1, participants read an information letter and 
provided informed consent before completing measures.  
5.3.3 Results 
5.3.3.1 Explicit Attitudes.  
Distributions for ATL and ATG scores were positively skewed so Natural Log 
transformations were applied. The sample reported relatively positive explicit attitudes 
toward both gay men and lesbians. For ease of interpretation, untransformed means and 
standard deviations are reported in Table 4. 
A mixed-design factorial ANOVA was used to explore explicit attitudes toward gay 
male and lesbian targets using the within-subjects factor target (2: lesbian, gay male) and 
the between-subjects factors of participant gender (2: female, male) and participant sexual 
orientation (2: straight, gay). The expected main effects were found for participant gender 
F(1, 92) = 13.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, and sexual orientation F(1, 92) = 19.70, p < .001, ηp2 
= .18. Specifically, males reported more anti-gay attitudes than females, and straight 
participants reported more anti-gay attitudes than gay participants (p’s < .001). No 
significant interaction was found between participant gender and participant sexual  
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Attitudes towards Gay Men and Lesbians as a 
Function of Participant’s Gender and Sexual Orientation (Study 2) 
 ATL (α = .93) ATG (α = .90) 
 M SD M SD 
Female participants     
    Straight  2.94 0.50 2.79 0.57 
    Gay 2.57 0.27 2.48 0.20 
Male participants     
    Straight 3.31 0.67 3.41 0.70 
    Gay 2.70 0.39 2.71 0.42 
Note: (ATLG αtotal = .96) 
 
orientation (p = .11), however, analyses revealed a significant interaction between the 
target and participant gender F(1,92) = 13.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .13 such that each gender 
demonstrated more explicit negativity towards gay people of their own gender. 
Specifically, male participants reported more negative explicit attitudes towards gay men 
than towards lesbians while female participants reported more negative explicit attitudes 
towards lesbians than towards gay men. No interaction was found between the target 
gender and the participants’ sexual orientation (p = .62), and no higher-order interaction 
existed (p = .09). The explicit attitudes toward gay men and toward lesbians were highly 
correlated (r = .84, p < .001). 
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5.3.3.2 Implicit Attitudes.  
As predicted, female targets evaluated on the basis of their gender were implicitly 
associated with positive attributes by all participants. Interestingly, gay male targets 
evaluated on the basis of their sexual orientation were also implicitly associated with 
positive by all participants, albeit less strongly than female targets. These findings were 
consistent for both straight and gay male participants who demonstrated positive implicit 
attitudes toward gay male targets evaluated on the basis of their sexual orientation and 
negative implicit attitudes toward gay male targets evaluated on the basis of their gender. 
However, only gay male participants demonstrated positive implicit associations toward 
straight male targets when gender was salient. Means and standard deviations for implicit 
attitudes are presented in Figure 4.  
A mixed-design factorial ANOVA was used to explore implicit attitudes toward 
female and male targets using as a function of participant in-group bias using the within-
subjects factors of target (2: female targets, male targets) and GNAT variation (3: gender-
salient straight targets, gender-salient gay targets, sexual orientation-salient gay targets), 
and the between-subjects factors of participant gender (2: female, male) and participant 
sexual orientation (2: straight, gay). As in Study 1, analysis revealed a main effect of target 
gender, F(1,92) = 64.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, which was complicated by a  significant 
interaction with GNAT variation F(2,92) = 59.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .39.  
However, as a four-way interaction was found F(2,184) = 3.98, p = .02, ηp2 = .04 
(corrections were made using a Huynh-Feldt adjustment due to violations of sphericity), 
only this result was interpreted. Post hoc analyses revealed that participant sexual 





Figure 4. Mean (and standard error) d′ difference scores toward female and male targets on 
the basis of gender or sexual orientation (M and SE d′ scores) for (a) straight female, (b) 
straight male, (c) lesbian, and (d) gay male participants (Study 2). Error bars represent ±1 











































































































male participants (p = .07), and participant gender difference for straight participants 
F(2,102) = 12.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, but not gay participants (p = .31) was the basis for 
this complicated effect. Specifically, after correcting for multiple comparisons, t-tests 
revealed that straight female participants demonstrated significantly more positive implicit 
attitudes toward women than men when gender was salient (i.e., regardless of the sexual 
orientation of the target; straight targets t(23) = 6.95, p < .001 and gender-salient gay 
targets t(23) = 5.48, p < .001). This effect also existed for lesbian participants (straight 
targets t(23) = 5.67, p < .001 and gender-salient gay targets t(23) = 6.66, p < .001). 
However, straight women also demonstrated an implicit positivity toward gay male targets 
and implicit negativity toward lesbian targets t(23) = -2.90, p = .01. In contrast, lesbian 
participants demonstrated no significant difference in implicit positivity toward gay males 
and lesbians (i.e., p = .41).  
Implicit attitudes of men were attenuated relative to the implicit attitudes 
demonstrated by women. However, like women, men demonstrated significantly more 
implicit positive attitudes toward straight female targets than to male targets t(48) = 3.86, p 
< .001. No other differences reached significance (i.e., all p’s > .48). Interestingly, male 
participants’ performance did not differ significantly as a function of their sexual 
orientation (all p’s > .12).  
5.3.3.3 Implicit-explicit correlations.  
Correlation analyses were conducted separately for gay men, lesbians, and straight 
men and women. No significant correlations were found between measures for straight 
women (all p’s > .31). For lesbian participants, explicit attitudes toward gay men were 
negatively correlated with implicit attitudes toward gay men when sexual orientation was  
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Table 5    
Correlation coefficients for the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes 
scores for female participants (Ns =24 straight women, 24 lesbians). 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.  
 Explicit attitudes 
1. ATL - .68** -.02 -.02 -.32 -.01 -.18 -.06 
2. ATG .77** - .11 -.23 -.17 -.17 -.18 -.03 
 Implicit attitudes - straight targets 
3. Straight 
women 
-.02 .04 - -.03 -.09 .03 -.04 -.02 
4. Straight men .04 -.21 -.11 - -.25 .30* .13 -.09 
 Implicit attitudes - gender salient gay targets 
5. Lesbian 
women 
-.27 -.12 -.02 -.25 - -.32* .23 -.24 
6. Gay men .05 -.15 .05 .32* -.47* - .04 .06 
 Implicit attitudes – sexuality salient gay targets 
7. Lesbian 
women 
-.15 -.20 -.18 .11 .28 -.04 - -.03 
8. Gay men -.13 -.05 .08 -.04 -.27 .10 -.12 - 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .001. Significant correlations are presented in boldface. ATL = 
attitudes towards lesbians; ATG = attitudes towards gay men. Coefficients presented below 
the diagonal pertain to straight female participants; coefficients presented above the 
diagonal pertain to lesbian participants. 
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salient, r = -.41, p = .05 (i.e., negative explicit attitudes were related to negative implicit 
attitudes when sexual orientation was salient). The correlation coefficients for female 
participants are presented in Table 5. 
For straight men, explicit attitudes toward gay people were negatively correlated 
with implicit attitudes toward women when gender was salient (straight female targets: 
ATG r = -.43, p = .04; ATL r = -.51, p = .01; lesbian targets: ATG r = -.40, p = .05; ATL r 
= -.46, p = .02). Finally, for gay men, explicit attitudes toward lesbians were negatively 
correlated with implicit attitudes toward gay men when gender was salient, r = -.45, p = 
.0319. The correlation coefficients for male participants are presented in Table 6. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Consistent with predictions and previous research (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 
2004), all participants demonstrated implicit positivity toward female targets when gender 
was salient. This finding provides an example of the “women are wonderful” effect (Eagly 
& Mladinic, 1994), rather than evidence for an in-group bias among female participants. No 
in-group gender-based bias was found for straight men participants, however, small in-
group positivity biases were observed for gay men and lesbian participants on both gender 
and sexual orientation. That is, gay men demonstrated implicit positivity toward straight 
male targets when gender was salient, and gay male targets when sexual orientation was 
salient. Similarly, lesbians demonstrated implicit positivity toward all female targets 
regardless of the salient factor. It is interesting to note that gay male participants were  
                                                 
19 Given that the explicit and implicit measures are scored in different directions (i.e., a higher implicit 
attitude score represents a positive attitude, while a higher negative explicit attitude score represents a 
negative attitude), all correlations presented here actually represent attitudes in the same direction. 
Specifically, in all cases, negative explicit attitudes were related to negative implicit attitudes. 
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Table 6   
Correlation coefficients for the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes 
scores for male participants (Ns =24 straight men, 24 gay men). 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  8. 
 Explicit attitudes 
1. ATL - .61** -.02 .08 .14 .32 .31 .03 
2. ATG .89** - -.21 .31 .29 .18 .21 -.18 
 Implicit attitudes - straight targets 
3. Straight 
women 
-.36 -.26 - .04 .09 -.06 -.23 .13 
4. Straight men .10 .13 -.52* - -.07 -.26 -.04 -.33 
 Implicit attitudes - gender salient gay targets 
5. Lesbian 
women 
-.47* -.50* .31 -.18 - .09 .10 -.20 
6. Gay men .31 .41* -.01 .20 -.31 - .13 .15 
 Implicit attitudes – sexuality salient gay targets 
7. Lesbian 
women 
-.05 -.15 .11 .03 .39 -.16 - .10 
8. Gay men .15 .01 .07 -.13 .03 .12 -.12 - 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .001. Significant correlations are presented in boldface. ATL = 
attitudes towards lesbians; ATG = attitudes towards gay men. Coefficients presented below 
the diagonal pertain to straight male participants; coefficients presented above the diagonal 
pertain to gay male participants. 
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implicitly negative toward gay male targets when gender was salient, although there is no 
clear interpretation of this finding. 
The findings of Study 2 provide limited support for the predictions of general anti-
gay bias. Specifically, implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbian targets were 
significantly less positive than toward straight female targets, although they were more 
positive than toward straight male targets. What is clear, however, is that the person-based 
sexual orientation-based attitudes observed in Study 2 were far more neutral than is 
typically observed with implicit measures of abstract (i.e., not person-based) anti-gay bias 
(Banse et al., 2001; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007). This finding 
suggests that implicit person-based anti-gay bias may be far less negative than the abstract 
or category-based anti-gay bias (e.g., Herek & McLemore, 2013). 
Finally, few significant correlations existed between implicit and explicit measures. 
Specifically, a positive relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes toward gay male 
targets was found for lesbian participants suggesting that they hold congruent attitudes (i.e., 
negative explicit attitudes were related to negative implicit attitudes). In contrast, straight 
male participants demonstrated consistently negative correlations between and explicit anti-
gay bias and attitudes toward women when gender was salient suggesting that stronger 
implicit “women are wonderful” effect is related to higher levels of explicit anti-gay bias.  
Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1 providing further evidence 
that the person-based method provides a unique approach for assessing implicit attitudes to 
a social category, even when there are no unique visible features associated with that social 
category (e.g., Freeman et al., 2010). Moreover, these results demonstrate consistencies 
(e.g., attitudes toward women when gender is salient) as well as important patterns of 
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variability reflecting gender- and sexual orientation-based group memberships which are 
frequently overlooked in research on gender attitudes and anti-gay bias.cERS 
5.4 General Discussion 
Two studies present the implicit person-based measure of attitudes toward gender 
and sexual orientation. Study 1 demonstrated that implicit attitudes to the same targets did, 
indeed, vary as a function of the target’s gender and sexual orientation, while Study 2 
revealed implicit gender- and sexual orientation-based attitudes as a function of 
participant’s own gender and sexual orientation.   
Specifically, explicit attitudes were predictably low, consistent with previous 
findings (Herek & McLemore, 2013). Unexpectedly, the findings revealed little evidence of 
implicit (person-based) anti-gay attitudes (i.e., strong negative implicit associations), 
especially toward gay male targets, although moderate implicit anti-gay attitudes were 
found towards lesbians. This latter finding is seemingly consistent with previous implicit 
anti-gay findings (e.g., Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Steffens, 2005).  Finally, the findings of 
Study 2 also revealed important effects of participant’s own gender and sexual orientation 
(e.g., consistent with positive in-group biases for gay participants).  
The findings of the current studies are distinct from previous empirical findings 
(e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Gabriel et al., 2007; Jonathan, 2008; 
Rowatt et al., 2009; Steffens & Buchner, 2003). I argue that this is because the person-
based approach assesses implicit anti-gay bias to gay people and previous research, which 
has used symbols or images (see Chapter 4.3 for a thorough discussion of stimuli used in 
previous research), has assessed a much broader construct of GAY and associated issues 
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(e.g., gay marriage). Future research should directly compare these approaches within a 
single study to further examine the potential different outcomes of these approaches.  
As previously discussed (see Chapter 4), I acknowledge the potential limitation of 
using of famous people as targets. Specifically, that famous gay men and lesbians, just like 
famous straight men and women, differ from non-famous targets in several important ways 
(e.g., fame, wealth, power). However, due to the use of famous people as both targets and 
distracters, this factor should equally affect both straight and gay targets.  For example, it is 
possible that all of the attitudes measured here may tend toward positivity due to the use of 
famous targets (i.e., halo effects; Thorndike, 1920) which should not differentially affect 
the attitudes toward gay or straight targets. Furthermore, by examining gender- and sexual 
orientation-based attitudes toward the same target (e.g., Ellen DeGeneres), I was able to 
compare these results to previous research and found that the implicit gender attitudes for 
gay and straight targets were comparable with previous findings (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 
2004). Specifically, the implicit negativity found toward straight male targets is consistent 
with previous research for non-famous targets (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004), which 
suggests that any effect driven by the fame of the targets is of limited concern.  
The findings of the current research suggest that person-based measures of gender 
and sexual orientation based attitudes should not be undertaken without considering both 
factors, or at least considering factor salience during interpretation of the results. This is 
because every person target has both a gender and a sexual orientation that can 
(independently) strongly attenuate, or even reverse, implicit attitudes.  
The current study has three implications. First, the findings demonstrate that gay 
men and lesbians are distinct enough to caution the use of unisex representations of GAY 
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which has been common in some previous implicit anti-gay bias research (Banse et al., 
2001; Boysen & Vogel, 2008; Boysen et al., 2006; Cochran et al., 2007; Gabriel et al., 
2007; Inbar et al., 2009). This effect is even more obvious once a participant’s own gender 
and sexual orientation are also included, suggesting this is an important consideration for 
researchers. Thus, the second implication of these findings is that participant factors such as 
participants’ own sexual orientation and gender should at least be reported, and where 
possible, recruitment should be inclusive (i.e., representation of participants across gender 
and sexual orientation). The final implication of the current findings is that there is still 
substantial research to be undertaken to continue to refine the measurement of implicit 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. 
What is clear from the current research is that the person-based approach overcomes 
several important methodological challenges in measuring anti-gay attitudes to gay men 
and lesbians. Moreover, this approach allows researchers to assess implicit attitudes toward 
gay people as a function of their gender (i.e., gay men ore lesbians), making it more 
applicable for researchers who are interested in this person-based prejudice. This also 
reduces the difficulty interpreting findings, especially inconsistent findings that may reflect 
slight differences in the selection of symbols or images. In sum, there is strong evidence for 
the usefulness of the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-gay bias, as well as 




Chapter 6 –Study 3: Comparing Typical and Person-Based Approaches  
______________________________________ 
If you can’t measure something, you can’t understand it. If you can’t understand it, 
you can’t control it. If you can’t control it, you can’t improve it.   
- H. J. Harrington (1999, p.19) 
Title 
Category and Person-Based Approaches Reveal Opposite Patterns of Attitudes.  
Abstract 
Implicit measures of anti-gay attitudes routinely use pictorial representations (e.g., 
same-sex wedding cake-toppers). These representations are clearly relevant to the 
target category GAY, but are also relevant to much broader constructs (e.g., gay 
marriage). In this chapter, I compare the person-based measure of implicit anti-gay 
attitudes to typical, category-based measure of implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
Participants completed measures of explicit anti-gay attitudes, and measure of 
implicit anti-gay attitudes using typical and person-based stimuli. Results revealed 
an interaction between implicit attitudes towards gay men and lesbians (i.e., target 
gender) and stimuli type (i.e., typical or person-based). Specifically, typical stimuli 
elicited positive implicit associations with lesbians and negative implicit 
associations with gay men consistent with previous research using this approach. 
This pattern was reversed for person-based stimuli consistent with the research 
presented in this thesis. These findings are interpreted as evidence that the person-
based approach reflects implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, and raises 




Attitudes toward the concept of GAY (and associated attitude-relevant constructs, 
such as gay marriage, same-sex behaviour, etc.) are conceivably different to attitudes 
toward an individual who is gay but is not politically active, or may not be involved in a 
romantic relationship. This may be because attitudes toward social categories such as GAY 
are likely to be socially entrenched (see Herek, 2004), and may reflect value violations and 
deviation from majority views, behaviours, or expectations. However, a gay person may not 
bring to mind these concepts. As such, attitudes towards gay people could be qualitatively 
different to attitudes toward the social category.  
Findings which stem from the contact hypothesis literature (i.e., prejudice reduction 
as a function of a conditional contact between majority and minority group members; 
Allport, 1954)  would provide evidence that attitudes toward GAY PEOPLE may be 
different to attitudes toward the category of GAY. For example, Herek and Capitanio 
(1996) conducted a large scale probability survey to explore attitudes toward gay men and 
lesbians, and found that frequency of contact with gay individuals led to a significant 
reduction in reported anti-gay attitudes. This highlights the importance of disclosing one’s 
sexual orientation (as gay) as a feature that could facilitate negative attitude reduction. As a 
result, these findings suggest that contact affects people’s attitudes toward gay people, but 
does not extend to the superordinate construct of GAY. 
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6.1.2 Typical stimuli used to represent of gay men and lesbians in implicit 
measures of anti-gay attitudes 
Implicit anti-gay attitude research has measured associations between valence (e.g., 
good or bad) and the category GAY as represented by visual symbols (e.g., ♂♂ ), mainly 
by using the homosexuality-IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). Banse et al. (2001) were the first 
to use the homosexuality- IAT. In their study, the category of straight was represented 
using 10 pictures of opposite-sex couples, and the category of gay (i.e., a mixture of gay 
men and lesbians) was represented using 5 pictures of pairs of men and 5 pictures of pairs 
of women (none of the couples were depicted in romantic positions). Following the IAT 
protocol discussed in previous chapters, the results of this study revealed the expected IAT 
effect from straight male and female participants, but not gay male or lesbian participants, 
and this was taken as evidence of the measure’s known-group validity.  
Since then, research using the IAT to explore implicit anti-gay attitudes has used a 
variety of different stimuli to represent the categories of gay men and lesbians. As 
discussed, implicit measures commonly represent gay men and lesbians with pictures of 
same-sex couples. Some studies used individuals of the same gender in neutral poses (e.g., 
Cochran et al., 2007; Lemm, 2006; Nosek et al., 2005; Rowatt et al., 2006; Tsang & 
Rowatt, 2007). However, the non-romantic depiction of couples in these stimuli raises 
questions about the nature of their relationship. To counter this, other studies have used 
same-sex couples in romantic poses (e.g., Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006, 2008; Gabriel et al., 
2007; Jellison et al., 2004). This seems a logical improvement in refining the attitude-target 
being represented by such stimuli, however, representations of gay couples (who are 
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actively transgressing social norms) are qualitatively different to a representation of a gay 
individual.  
Other stimuli used in representing gay men and lesbians in the literature include the 
names of hypothetical same-sex couples (e.g., Peter + Jack; Steffens & Buchner, 2003, 
Experiment 1), words stereotypically associated with the category (e.g., 'drag queen'; 
Steffens & Buchner, 2003, Experiment 2), and word-based stimuli involving the category 
itself (e.g., HOMOSEXUAL; Cárdenas & Barrientos, 2008; Lemm, 2006, Experiment 1). 
Gay men and lesbians have also been represented using visual stimuli representative of the 
category, such as interlocking gender symbols or same-sex wedding cake toppers, etc. 
(usually in conjunction with pictures of same sex couples; e.g., Cochran et al., 2007; 
Gabriel et al., 2007; Inbar et al., 2009; Jonathan, 2008; Lemm, 2006; Rowatt et al., 2006; 
Tsang & Rowatt, 2007).  
6.1.3 Rationale and hypotheses 
While the stimuli used in previous research arguably represent the broad range of 
issues associated with the social category of GAY, there is little to suggest that they are a 
good measure of attitudes toward gay people. Thus, there is reason to be cautious when 
interpreting the findings of research using these stimuli. Moreover, the range of stimuli 
provides a potential explanation for the few inconsistent finding which include neutral 
implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, (Breen & Karpinski, 2013, Study 1), and 
positive implicit attitudes toward lesbians (Breen & Karpinski, 2013, Study 2; Steffens, 
2005).  That is, due to the use of specific stimuli, certain aspects of the broader construct of 
GAY may be emphasised. 
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In Chapter 5, I presented the person-based approach, which elicits implicit attitudes 
toward gay individuals by comparing associations toward famous gay men and lesbians 
relative to associations toward famous straight men and women (see also Chapter 4). The 
strength of this approach lies in the idea of varying the context in which the association is 
measured. In the case of attitudes towards a well-known gay male, one can measure 
attitudes toward Sean Hayes as an individual who is male (if the comparison context is 
Portia de Rossi) or as an individual who is gay (if the comparison context is Justin 
Timberlake).  
The findings presented in Chapter 5 are inconsistent with the majority of previous 
findings that have used typical stimuli. Specifically, previous research has found moderate 
to strong implicit anti-gay attitudes (Banse et al., 2001; Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008), 
and anti-gay attitudes toward gay men and not lesbians (Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Steffens, 
2005). These latter findings are more consistent with gender-based attitudes (e.g., Chapter 
5; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004) and in direct contrast to the findings of the person-based 
approach which found positive implicit  attitudes toward gay men and negative implicit 
attitudes toward lesbians (when their sexual orientation, but not their gender, was made 
salient). Taken together, these findings were interpreted as evidence that implicit attitudes 
toward gay people (person-based) may be different to attitudes toward the idea of GAY 
(category-based). However, such a conclusion requires direct comparison of the person-
based versus category-based representations of GAY. The current study measures implicit 
gay attitudes using both forms of representation, in order to compare them directly.  
I expect implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians that are measured by the 
person-based approach to be qualitatively different to those measured by the category-
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based approach. Specifically, I hypothesise that person-based representations will elicit 
more positive implicit attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians (replicating the 
findings of Chapter 5, Studies 1 and 2). Conversely, I hypothesise that category-based 
representations will elicit more positive implicit attitudes toward lesbians than toward gay 
men (in line with the existing literature; Banse et al., 2001; Breen & Karpinski, 2013, Study 
2). Due to the characteristics of the sample (i.e., young students) I expect low levels of 
explicit anti-gay attitudes. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-three student participants (Mage = 25.03 years, SDage = 10.74, 50 women) were 
recruited from the participating university. Ten participants (15.87%) were excluded from 
analyses after identifying as non-heterosexual (6 bisexual females, 3 gay men, and 1 lesbian 
woman). Two participants (3.17%) were excluded from analyses for performing below the 
level of chance accuracy on the implicit measure. The final sample comprised 51 straight 
students (Mage = 24.94 years, SDage = 11.38 years, 42 women). All participants were eligible 
for research credit in an undergraduate psychology unit in exchange for their participation.    
6.2.2 Materials 
6.2.2.1 Implicit Anti-Gay Attitudes.  
An 8-block GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) assessed implicit attitudes toward gay 
targets. Specifically, four blocks assessed implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians 
using category-based representations of gay men and lesbians, and a further four blocks 
measured implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians using a person-based approach to 
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implicit measurement (see Table 7). The design of this study was fully within-subjects, and 
blocks were presented in randomized fashion. 
In blocks using the category-based approach, target stimuli were 24 pictures of 
couples in romantic poses, representations of marriage, and gender symbols. Eight of these 
represented the category of heterosexual20, eight represented the category of gay men, and 
eight represented the category of lesbian (selection was based on stimuli used in previous 
research e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Breen & Karpinski, 2013). In blocks using the person-
based approach, the stimuli were Chapter 5 were again used (i.e., eight photographs each of 
famous gay men, lesbians, straight men, and straight women. All stimuli were matched for 
attractiveness, likeability, and recognisability both of their celebrity status and their sexual 
orientation. Image stimuli were presented in a white 10cm x 10cm frame. The target 
attribute stimuli (i.e., a list of eight words with a positive valence and a list of eight words 
with a negative valence) were the same as those used in Chapter 5. Word stimuli were 
presented in white 24-point uppercase Arial font. All stimuli were presented against a black 
background screen. The administration and scoring protocol of the GNAT used in Chapter 
5 was followed again in this study. 
                                                 
20 Stimuli representing the category of heterosexual necessarily uses a combination of genders, because 
typically used stimuli requires the stimuli to have one male and one female present. Interestingly, the 
person-based approach could be used to counter-act this and measure implicit attitudes towards 
heterosexual (but sexual orientation salient) male or female targets. 
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Table 7 
GNAT Blocks as a Function of Target and Distracter Categories (with Stimuli Examples) 
GNAT Block Target stimuli Distracter 
Category-based GAY MALE+GOOD Symbols representing gay males (e.g., 
same-sex wedding cake toppers) 
Symbols representing heterosexuality  
(e.g., traditional wedding cake toppers) 
GAY MALE+BAD Symbols representing gay males  Symbols representing heterosexuality 
LESBIAN+GOOD Symbols representing lesbians Symbols representing heterosexuality 
LESBIAN+BAD Symbols representing lesbians  Symbols representing heterosexuality 
Person-based GAY MALE+GOOD Famous gay male faces (e.g., Sean 
Hayes) 
Famous straight male faces (e.g., Justin 
Timberlake) 
GAY MALE+BAD Famous gay male faces Famous straight male faces 
LESBIAN+GOOD Famous lesbian faces (e.g., Ellen De 
Generes) 
Famous straight female faces (e.g., Sarah 
Jessica Parker) 
 LESBIAN+BAD Famous lesbian faces Famous straight female faces 
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6.2.2.2 Explicit Anti-Gay Attitudes.  
The Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (ATLG; Herek, 1984a) 
comprises 10 self-report items explicitly measuring attitudes toward lesbians (ATL; e.g., 
“Lesbians just can’t fit into our society”) and 10 self-report items explicitly measuring 
attitudes toward gay men (ATG; e.g., “I think male homosexuals are disgusting”). 
Participants endorsed their responses on a nine-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). After reverse scoring appropriate items, an 
average score is calculated. Higher scores indicate more explicit anti-gay attitudes. 
The Index of Homophobia (IHP; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) comprises 25 Likert-
type items explicitly measuring emotional reactions when thinking about or interacting with 
gay men and lesbians (e.g., “I would feel nervous being in a group of homosexuals”). This 
scale does not separate the gender of the targets. Participants endorsed their responses on a 
nine-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). After 
reverse scoring appropriate items, an average score is calculated. Higher scores indicate 
more negative affective responses toward gay men and lesbians. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The study was advertised on the University’s online research participation system. 
Participants read an information letter about the purpose and methods of the study, and 
indicated their informed consent before being directed to a webpage to provide 
demographic information (i.e., age, gender, religious affiliation, and sexual orientation) and 
complete the explicit anti-gay attitudes measures, followed by the 8-block GNAT. 
Participants were then thanked for their time and debriefed. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Implicit anti-gay attitudes 
Figure 5 presents the mean implicit attitude scores toward gay men and lesbians as a 
function of the type of representation used (category-based vs. person-based). Implicit 
attitudes toward lesbians were more positive than implicit attitudes toward gay men when 
using a category-based approach. However, this pattern of results was reversed when 
stimuli represented gay men and lesbians using a person-based approach. 
A mixed-design factorial ANOVA was used to analyse implicit anti-gay attitudes 
using the within-subject factors of GNAT type (2: category-based, person-based) and target 
(2: gay male, lesbian). No main effects were found (p’s > .07). There was a significant 
interaction between the GNAT type and target variables, F(1, 40) = 13.64, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.25. Post-hoc tests revealed that when using a category-based representation, implicit 
attitudes toward lesbians were significantly more positive than implicit attitudes toward gay 
men, t(41) = -2.31, p = .03. However, when using a person-based representation, implicit 
attitudes toward lesbians were significantly more negative than implicit attitudes toward 
gay men, t(41) = 2.74, p = .01. Implicit attitudes toward lesbians were also significantly 
more negative when measured using a person-based representation than when using a 
category-based representation, t(41) = 4.05, p < .001. There were no differences in implicit 




Figure 5. Mean (and standard error) d′ difference scores toward lesbian and gay male 
targets for category-based and person-based representations (Study 3). Error bars represent 
±1 SE. 
6.3.2 Explicit anti-gay attitudes 
Self-reported anti-gay attitudes in the sample were low, with attitudes toward 
lesbians (ATL; M = 2.91, SD = 1.43) reported as slightly (but not significantly) less 
negative than attitudes toward gay men (ATG; M = 3.00, SD = 1.69, p = .41). Affective 
attitude ratings were more negative (IHP; M = 3.83, SD = 1.03), with the average score 
being slightly below the scale midpoint. Correlation coefficients and reliabilities for each 
measure are reported in Table 7. Bivariate correlations revealed that all explicit anti-gay 
attitude measures were strongly and positively correlated (all p’s < .001). Conversely, none 
of the blocks of implicit measurement were correlated to each other (p’s > .13). Affective 





























Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Measures of Anti-Gay Attitudes.  
 
 Explicit Measures Implicit Measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Explicit Measures       
1. ATL (.91)      
2. ATG .82** (.89)     
3. IHP .61** .71** (.86)    
Implicit Measures       
4. Gay men (category-based) -.10 -.07 -.06    
5. Lesbians (category-based) -.03 -.02 -.23 .02   
6. Gay men (person-based) -.10 -.22 -.36* .17 .19  
7. Lesbians (person-based)  -.24 -.23 -.26 -.01 .24 .13 
Note: *p < .01; **p < .001. Alpha Cronbach coefficients are presented in parentheses. 
Higher implicit attitude scores represent positive implicit attitudes; higher 





toward gay men (i.e., negative IHP scores were related to negative implicit [person-based] 
attitudes). Implicit person-based attitudes were more strongly correlated with their same-
gender explicit counterpart than category-based implicit attitudes (e.g., implicit person-
based attitudes toward gay men correlate with explicit attitudes toward gay men, but not 
lesbians, more strongly than category-based implicit attitudes).  
6.4 Discussion 
The current study compared person-based and typical measures of implicit anti-gay 
attitudes towards gay men and lesbians. As predicted, using typical stimuli, lesbians were 
moderately implicitly associated with positive (e.g., Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Steffens, 
2005) and gay men were moderately implicitly associated with negative consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Steffens & Buchner, 2003). In contrast, the 
person-based approach elicited the predicted reversed pattern of results, though the implicit 
associations were weaker, consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 5. 
Finally, as expected, the sample showed low levels of explicit anti-gay attitudes. I 
also found that reported attitudes toward gay men were slightly more negative than those 
toward lesbians, although this difference was not significant (e.g., Dolinski, 2010; Nagoshi 
et al., 2008) and self-reported negative attitudes were higher when measured as affective 
expectancy (i.e., IHP; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) than when measured as endorsements to 
attitudinal items (i.e., ATL, ATG; Herek, 1984a). This is likely to be a function of social 
desirability; if participants are aware that endorsing global negative attitudes reflects poorly 
on them and conflicts with social norms (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002), then 
the logical response is to attenuate their responses. However, this might not extend to more 
automatic affective responses. This finding might be a result of participants being better 
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rehearsed at identifying their own affective responses, such as feelings of discomfort. 
Furthermore, participants may feel that affective responses are more valid to report than 
attitudes (which are governed more directly by social norms). Overall, the findings of this 
study support my hypotheses. 
While the findings for typical stimuli is consistent with previous research (e.g., 
Banse et al., 2001; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Nosek et al., 2005), they are also generally 
consistent with implicit gender findings (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004) which may 
suggest gender attitudes are influencing implicit attitudes to gay men and lesbians measured 
by broadly associated stimuli. In contrast, the person-based approach ensures sexual 
orientation is salient and leads to an attenuated but reversed pattern of results which are 
consistent with implicit inversion theory (Kite & Deaux, 1987), which suggests that gay 
individuals are more similar to heterosexual people of the opposite gender than 
heterosexual people of the same gender. Thus, gay men (like straight women) are implicitly 
associated with positive, and lesbians (like straight men) are implicitly associated with 
negative (e.g., Richeson & Ambady, 2001; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). 
Implicit attitudes measured with the person-based approach to the representation of 
gay men were negatively correlated to the affective self-report measure of anti-gay 
attitudes. The lack of correlation between most implicit and explicit attitudes is consistent 
with previous research what has demonstrated limited relationship between these related 




6.4.1 Limitations and implications 
As is often the case with anti-gay attitudes research, the current study may lack 
generalizability as a function of the sample (i.e., students, self-selected, disproportionately 
more females). However, this is not unusual for this literature and is a likely explanation for 
the low levels of anti-gay prejudice (e.g., education and being female has been found to be 
related to politically liberal views, egalitarian values, and positive attitudes toward gay men 
and lesbians (e.g., Steffens, 2005). This is likely exacerbated by the recruitment strategy 
which allowed participants volunteer to participate in this research, suggesting they were 
unconcerned by the topic. Nonetheless, while these factors are likely to have constricted the 
range of observed prejudice, they are unlikely to compromise the key finding; namely, that 
there is a clear and meaningful difference between implicit anti-gay attitudes measured 
using typical and person-based approaches. 
6.4.2 Conclusion 
The findings of this study are that a person-based approach to measuring attitudes 
toward gay men and lesbians elicits dramatically different results to the typically used 
category-based representations. In other words, the measured construct depends strongly on 
the stimuli used to represent it, highlighting the importance of stimuli selection in the 
measurement of implicit anti-gay attitudes. For this reason, if researchers are interested in 
the implicit evaluation of the broad construct of GAY, then category-based representations 
of implicit anti-gay attitudes can be used. However, the interpretation of the results of such 
a measure should be carefully interpreted within this framework. Conversely, researchers 
who are interested in implicit attitudes toward gay people may prefer to use a person-based 
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approach to measuring implicit attitudes. Furthermore, the person-based approach allows 
for a simpler interpretation of any findings as implicit sexual orientation-based attitudes. 
The findings of the current study highlight the importance of stimuli selection in 
understanding implicit anti-gay attitudes (Freeman et al., 2010). These findings 
demonstrate that implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes are replicable and differ 
meaningfully from the findings based on typical stimuli. As a result, I cautiously raise the 
question of whether the existing literature may have only been measuring an overly 
inclusive version of implicit anti-gay attitudes. For these reasons, the person-based 




Chapter 7 –Discussion of Initial Evidence 
__________________________________ 
7.1 Introduction and Overview  
As previously stated, the main aims of this thesis were twofold: first, to present 
initial evidence for an alternative measure of implicit anti-gay attitudes that uses contextual 
variation techniques (Mitchell et al., 2003); and second, to demonstrate the use of this new 
method by exploring the relationship between implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes and 
religion. The first major aim of the thesis was concretely operationalised in the first chapter 
with the following two questions: 
1. Can contextual variation be used to make the gender or sexual orientation of a 
target salient, which would facilitate assessment of implicit person-based 
gender attitudes and implicit sexual orientation attitudes toward the same 
target?  
2. Does this person-based approach measure implicit anti-gay attitudes that are 
different to those measured using typical stimuli?  
 
These questions were addressed by evidence from three studies. The first study 
demonstrated that contextual variation can elicit (toward the same targets) distinct gender- 
and sexual orientation-based. Notably, the gender-based attitudes were consistent with 
previous research, while the sexual orientation-based attitudes were unique which was 
interpreted as evidence for the important contribution of implicit person-based attitudes to 
the anti-gay literature. The second study showed that the pattern of implicit person-based 
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attitudes to gay men and lesbians is largely consistent across gay male, lesbian, and 
heterosexual male and female participants with variations reflecting important social group 
memberships. Finally, the third study provided evidence that these person-based anti-gay 
attitudes are distinct from category-based anti-gay attitudes as predicted.  
Each study will be reiterated here in brief, followed by a discussion of the strengths 
and limitations of these findings and the approach.  
7.1.1 Review of Studies 1 and 2 
Two studies were used to explore the potential for implicit contextual variation 
(Mitchell et al., 2003) to demonstrate that gender-based and sexual orientation-based 
implicit attitudes could be measured for the same famous gay male and lesbian targets. 
Consistent with the contextual variation techniques, the category was made salient through 
the manipulation of the distracter stimuli. For example, the use of male distracters when the 
targets were lesbians allowed gender attitudes to be measured whereas the use of 
heterosexual female distracters when the targets were lesbians allowed sexual orientation-
based attitude to be measured; the lack of a gender comparison left sexual orientation as the 
remaining relevant evaluative social category. In Study 1, the implicit person-based anti-
gay attitudes of a homogenous sample of heterosexual females were assessed. Specifically, 
participants completed six GNAT blocks (three for each target gender; see Figure 2, p.60), 
that were designed to measure implicit gender attitudes towards straight men and women 
(i.e., baseline), implicit gender attitudes towards gay men and lesbians (i.e., attitudes 
towards gay individuals, but with gender as the salient social category), and finally implicit 
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anti-gay attitudes using the person-based approach (i.e., attitudes towards gay individuals 
but with sexual orientation as the salient social category).  
The study replicated the well-known finding of positive attitudes towards female 
targets and negative attitudes towards male targets (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1994; Rudman 
& Goodwin, 2004). Specifically, implicit associations were demonstrated between straight 
female targets and positive attributes, and between straight male targets and negative 
attributes. Importantly, when gay male and lesbian targets were presented with gender as 
the salient social category (i.e., when the distracter stimuli were the opposite gender to the 
targets, allowing a gender comparison), the pattern of gender attitudes of heterosexual 
targets and gay targets was the same. That is, lesbian targets were implicitly associated with 
positive attributes, and gay male targets were implicitly associated with negative attributes. 
However, when sexual orientation was salient, the same set of gay targets the pattern of 
results was strongly attenuated but reversed. It is important to note that this reversal in the 
pattern of results occurred as a function of manipulating the distracter targets in the task. 
That is, the same set of pictures (e.g. famous lesbians) elicited positive attitudes when the 
distracter stimuli were pictures of males but negative attitudes when the distracter stimuli 
were pictures of heterosexual females. 
Using the same method, Study 2 showed that pattern of implicit attitudes found in 
Study 1 were generally replicated across samples of gay men, lesbians, and heterosexual 
men and women, however, with a few important variations. First, the attitudes elicited 
using contextual variations appears to be strongest with female participants; gay and 
heterosexual male participants demonstrated attenuated levels of implicit attitudes towards 
all targets. This finding could be explained by the suggestion of Rudman and Goodwin 
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(2004) that men lack a mechanism that stimulates automatic own group preferences. This 
explanation would also be consistent with the results from Studies 4 and 5 by Mitchell and 
colleagues (2003) who used only female participants. Second, there was evidence that 
lesbian participants extend the female in-group bias to include sexual orientation. 
Specifically, lesbian participants demonstrated the in-group bias (i.e., stronger 
FEMALE+GOOD than FEMALE+BAD implicit associations) to female targets across all 
blocks, regardless of whether they were straight or lesbians. 
In summary, these two studies provide initial evidence that the person-based 
approach is able to assess the two intended facets of these stimuli (i.e., gender and sexual 
orientation), allowing these important and often intertwined attitudes to be separated. It is 
important to recognize that this effect (i.e., the reversal patterns of the valence of attitudes) 
appears to be stronger for women, or attenuated for men. This appears to be evidence that 
the automatic in-group bias of female targets (as suggested by Rudman & Goodwin, 2004) 
extends to lesbian women. Furthermore, the findings of these studies demonstrate that 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians are distinct, and differ as a function of the gender 
and sexual orientation of the attitude-holder, and for these reasons they should be assessed 
separately. Thus, in response to the first major aim of this thesis, the evidence suggests that 
the person-based approach can indeed use contextual variations to make gender or sexual 





7.1.2 Review of Study 3 
Although the first two studies provided evidence that contextual variation can be 
used to disentangle implicit attitudes towards the gender of a target from the implicit 
attitudes towards the sexual orientation of a target, the question still remained of whether 
the observed attitudes towards the sexual orientation of targets in this study would be any 
different from the observed attitude towards sexual orientation found in studies using 
category-based approaches (e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Gabriel & Banse, 2006; Gabriel et al., 
2007; Steffens, 2005; Steffens & Buchner, 2003, etc.). Thus, the second empirical chapter 
used a within-subjects manipulation to directly compare implicit person-based anti-gay 
attitudes with responses to implicit category-based anti-gay attitudes. Although implicit 
attitudes in this sample were relatively weak, they varied widely as a function of the 
method of representation used. When responding to category-based stimuli, participants 
implicitly evaluated lesbians as more implicit positive than gay men. However, when 
responding to person-based stimuli, participants implicitly evaluated lesbians as less 
positive than gay men (i.e., a reversed pattern of results), consistent with the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2. Thus, in response to the second major aim of the thesis, the evidence 
suggests that the person-based approach does indeed measure implicit gay attitudes that are 
different from those elicited by typically used stimuli. 
In summary, Studies 1 and 2 revealed that implicit attitudes towards a gay target 
diverged as a function of the salient social category being measured (e.g., gender- or sexual 
orientation-based attitudes) when assessed using the person-based approach. Study 3 
provided evidence that implicit category-based anti-gay attitudes (i.e., toward the social 
category of GAY) differ from implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes (i.e., towards gay 
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people). In fact, the former more strongly conform to pattern of the gender-based attitudes 
than sexual orientation implicit person-based attitudes. This shows, at the very least, that 
the two approaches measure something different from each other, though further research 
will be needed to understand the implication of these findings. 
7.2 Issues of Stimuli Selection  
The evidence presented for the person-based approach has produced some exciting 
findings, but has also raised questions that need addressing. These questions largely result 
from potential confounds inherent in the stimuli used in the person-based approach, and in 
particular their fame-status. In the use of famous faces raises three stimuli-specific potential 
confounds: (a) halo effects driven by the celebrity status of the stimuli, (b) a stereotype-
congruence bias, and (c) stimuli recognition issues. Before doing so, it is worth noting that, 
although stimuli used in this thesis were pre-tested to ensure equivalence on several 
important dimensions (including fame, attractiveness, and likeability), they were piloted in 
isolation and not in the context of social category salience. Given that the stimuli were used 
in experiments in a fashion that made their gender or sexual orientation salient, it might 
have made more sense to pilot them under the same conditions. However, the present 
studies showed that attitudes towards the stimuli vary as a function of category salience 
(which is achieved by manipulating the distractor stimuli) despite the fact that the target 
stimuli did not change. For example, the set of stimuli that are well-known gay men elicited 
negative implicit attitudes when their gender was salient, and the same set of stimuli elicited 
positive implicit attitudes when their sexual orientation is salient. Thus, given that the 
stimuli do not change, this over-sight when pre-testing the stimuli is unlikely to account for 
the observed experimental results.  
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7.2.1 Fame-based halo effects 
The first potential confound of using pictures of famous gay and straight people as 
stimuli in the person-based approach is famous gay men and lesbians, just like famous 
straight men and women, differ from non-famous gay or straight targets in several 
important ways. Apart from their fame, which has the potential to produce halo effects (i.e., 
a response bias in which the global opinion of someone is based on one element; e.g., 
Thorndike, 1920), famous people are more familiar than non-famous people (also consider 
mere exposure effects, see Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989), and they are also 
likely to be substantially wealthier, more powerful, more attractive, and better-liked (i.e., 
higher status).  
Research has shown that stereotypically attractive faces of both genders elicit more 
positive evaluative responses than non-attractive faces (Van Leeuwen & Neil Macrae, 
2004). Bearing in mind that famous people are more likely to be attractive than non-famous 
people, this may impact the implicit evaluations of famous stimuli. Moreover, Dasgupta 
and Greenwald (2001) demonstrated the effect of positive and negative fame on implicit 
attitudes. They used well-liked African Americans and disliked Caucasian Americans (e.g., 
Michael Jordan and Ted Bundy), and then they used well-liked Caucasian Americans 
disliked African Americans (e.g., John F. Kennedy and Mike Tyson). They found that 
using well-liked African Americans and disliked Caucasian Americans weakened implicit 
racial bias in an IAT both immediately after exposure, and after a 24-hour period.  
Both of the findings discussed above demonstrate the effect of stimuli that differ in 
attractiveness or valence. This is not the case with the person-based approach, which uses 
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straight men, straight women, gay men, and lesbian individuals who have equal levels of 
fame as stimuli, essentially controlling for fame. Thus, while it is possible that fame-based 
halo effect may attenuate negative implicit associations, there is no reason to assume that 
this would not occur equally for each of the straight male and female, and gay male and 
lesbian stimuli. As a result, any effect of fame should not have systematically influenced 
the findings with the exception of reducing the overall negative implicit associations. 
However, as can be seen from Studies 1 - 3, strong negative implicit associations were 
found for famous straight and gay men when gender was salient is consistent with previous 
research for non-famous targets (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). That is, the implicit 
positive attitudes towards females and negative attitudes towards (famous) males, which 
suggests that the potential for halo effects is of limited concern.  
7.2.2 Stereotype-congruence bias 
A second potential confound of the fame stimuli is that of a stereotype-congruence 
bias (i.e., stereotypes of gay men being creative and dramatic; (see Clausell & Fiske, 2005). 
As such, it is stereotype-congruent for gay men to pursue artistic vocations (e.g., acting, 
singing, dancing) in which being creative and dramatic is not only acceptable, but would be 
advantageous (e.g., Niedlich & Steffens, 2015). Thus, gay men who were famous for being 
actors and singers are stereotype-congruent stimuli. In contrast, the stereotypes of lesbians 
reflect competitive and goal-oriented pursuits (Brambilla, Carnaghi, & Ravenna, 2011; in 
line with implicit inversion theory, see Kite & Deaux, 1987), which means the use of 
famous lesbian actresses, were less stereotype consistent stimuli. It is unclear if there are 
relevant stereotypes for heterosexual men and women. However, it is possible that the 
stereotype-consistency disparity for gay men and lesbian stimuli may have produced a 
 107 
difference in fluency that could partly explain the unexpected negative implicit person-
based attitudes towards lesbians (e.g., Rubin, Paolini, & Crisp, 2010). However, given that 
the implicit gender-based attitudes towards these same famous lesbian targets were 
reversed (when compared to their sexual orientation based attitudes), this would, again, 
appear to be of limited concern.    
7.2.3 Stimuli recognition versus task performance 
Male participants in Study 2 demonstrated attenuated implicit associations, which 
could be driven by the accuracy and frequency of stimuli recognition (as a function of the 
fame of the stimuli). For example, there may be gender differences in length of time spent 
being exposed to famous individuals, or levels of motivation to be familiar with famous 
individuals. Thus, the gender differences in attitudes reported in Study 1 could be group-
based bias (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004), or alternatively the attenuated results of the male 
participants could arguably be attributed to females being more familiar with famous faces 
than males. However, three factors suggest this may not be the case. First, stimuli were 
piloted with a sample of men and women who were asked to identify whether the person 
was famous or not, and whether they knew them as being straight or gay. Only stimuli that 
were correctly identified by > 90% of the sample were used. Second, participants were 
shown the faces of all target stimuli prior to each experimental block. Finally, empirical 
research has also shown that there are no gender differences in name or face recognition of 
famous individuals (Rizzo, Venneri, & Papagno, 2002). Thus, it seems more likely that the 
attenuated results of male participants reflect strong task performance on both positive and 
negative blocks resulting in smaller difference (i.e., attitude) scores. A speculative 
explanation to this could be in gender differences in the amount of time spent playing video 
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games, on average males spend more time than females playing video games both as adults 
and as children (Cassell & Jenkins, 2000; Kafai, Heeter, Denner, & Sun, 2008). This 
suggests that they may be better rehearsed at, and be more familiar with learning about, 
tasks that are similar to implicit measures.   
7.3 Future Direction and New Challenges 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible to introduce participants to novel, ordinary 
targets during a learning phase of the experiment, which would address all of the issues 
resulting from the use of famous stimuli. The names or the faces of these novel stimuli 
could then be used, and have been used in domains such as attitudes towards politicians 
(green vs. not green; Rudman et al., 2013), males (feminist [vs. nonfeminist] men; Rudman 
et al., 2012), and even towards affirmative action (vs. merit based) companies (Phelan & 
Rudman, 2011). However, these approaches are less efficient than the person-based 
approach, due to the use of a learning phase. In summary, while there are some fame-based 
issues with using well-known individuals as stimuli, the evidence presented so far suggests 
that the person-based approach is a useable methodology that is meaningfully different 
from existing techniques. As more evidence for the person-based approach accumulates, 
researchers using this approach can refine any interpretation confounds that may result 
from the interaction of the targets’ sexual orientation and fame.  
7.4 Conclusions from the Initial Evidence 
The evidence presented across these three studies suggests that the person-based 
method of representation is a good alternative to existing methods of representation. The 
limitations of this method are few and of limited concern while its advantages are 
numerous. For example, there is compelling evidence that the person-based method is able 
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to elicit demonstrably different attitudes towards a target’s gender from the same target’s 
sexual orientation, and that this occurs only as a function of the contextual variation of the 
salient social category. This cannot be achieved by typical category-based stimuli. 
Moreover, these attitudes are qualitatively different from those elicited by category-based 
attitudes. The person-based approach allows the stimuli to more closely align with those 
used in other implicit attitude research (i.e., the use of a single face to represent the 
evaluated construct). Finally, this approach is efficient in that participants do not need to 
complete a stimuli learning phase (as would need to occur with non-familiar stimuli) which 
is time consuming, cognitively depleting, and likely to have a high rate or error.  
Thus far, the findings from the person-based approach have been replicated across 
three studies and different samples, demonstrating their ability to be replicated. In each 
case, the measure has demonstrated good to excellent reliability. In combination, the 
evidence suggests that the person-based approach provides a unique methodological 
alternative when assessing implicit attitudes to a social category, even when there are no 
unique visible features associated with that social category (e.g., Freeman et al., 2010). 
Moreover, these results demonstrate consistencies with the existing literature (e.g., positive 
attitudes toward women when gender is salient), but also important patterns of variability in 
attitudes towards gender- and sexual orientation-based group memberships, which are 
frequently overlooked in research into gender and anti-gay attitudes. However, it is worth 
noting that this effect appears to be specific to female participants. 
The first half of this dissertation has aimed to demonstrate the initial evidence for 
the person-based approach. The second half aims to demonstrate its application. 
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Specifically, by exploring the relationship between religion and implicit person-based anti-
gay attitudes I will address two remaining unanswered questions:  
3. What individual difference factors predict implicit person-based gay attitudes? 
4. Can the person-based approach, as used to make social categories salient, also 
be used to create a method-based contextual prime? 
Thus, in Chapter 8, I review the relevant literature on social psychology of attitudes 
and their interplay with religious-relevant factors. In Chapter 9, I will present research that 
explores demographic factors and religiosity dimensions as individual difference predictors 
of explicit and implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. Finally, in Chapter 10, I will 
present research in which I use the contextual variation paradigm to elicit a method-based 
contextual religious prime, again through the manipulation of distracter stimuli to create a 
religious social category that is salient. Following this, Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by 
drawing together all the evidence presented and discussing the advantages and limitations 






Chapter 8 – Literature Review: Religion and Religiosity 
__________________________________ 
The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice. . . .  
The sublimity of religious ideals is offset by the horrors of persecution in  
the name of these same ideals. 
- Gordon Allport (1954, p.413) 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The contribution of religion to social psychological phenomena is complex, with a 
large body of research demonstrating that its specific influence on social attitudes and 
behaviours range from the positive (i.e., increased charitable behaviours; Hernandez & 
Preston, 2010) to the very negative (e.g., the secretariat devide in Ireland; Muldoon, 2004). 
For this reason, researchers who have debated the potential for religion to result in either 
positive (e.g., increasing intergroup tolerance; Hunsberger, 1995) or negative (e.g., 
increasing intergroup hostility; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005) contributions to societal 
attitudes have been frustrated. Even for a given topic (e.g., prejudice), there is a range of 
findings. The literature that is relevant to social attitudes, and specifically anti-gay attitudes, 
will be reviewed in this chapter. However, the definition and issue of measuring religiosity 
will first be discussed. 
8.2 Measuring Religion vs. Religiosity 
The measurement of religiosity, or how to best measure an individual’s religion and 
religious beliefs has plagued psychological research (Allport, 1954; Anderson, 2015; 
Saroglou, 2009). Researchers have often adopted the simplistic categorical measure of 
religious affiliation, used as an independent variable, assessed by asking people which 
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religious category they identify with (e.g., Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Atheist). This is 
problematic because even the use of these labels is not always consistent.  For example, an 
individual who was “raised Catholic” but has no further contact with religion, another who 
attends church several times a week, and another who attends services only at Christmas 
and Easter may report that they are Catholic. What is clear from this example is that there is 
likely to be a very different impact of religion in each of their lives. Consequently, the 
effect of religiosity measured this way is very likely to be inconsistent with no clear 
relationship with any subsequent construct. For this reason, recent contributions to this 
topic suggest that religiosity measured as the frequency or intensity of how the individual 
uses religion in the daily lives might be a more useful variable (Ahrold & Meston, 2010; 
Saroglou, 2009; Whitley, 2009). Returning to the example, using measures of religiosity 
(usually continuous) allows for a different and arguably more meaningful factor for 
consideration in social psychology. 
The distinction between religion or religious affiliation and religiosity was defined 
by early researchers of the psychology of religion (e.g., Allport, 1954; Allport & Ross, 
1967) who recognized that the degree to which people are involved in that religion is more 
important than the religion with which an individual affiliates (Ahrold & Meston, 2010; 
Saroglou, 2009; Whitley, 2009). Further factors were identified to distinguish between not 
just intensity of religious engagement, but also between types of beliefs. For example, 
Religious Fundamentalism (RF) is a factor which is characterised by a tendency to perceive 
religious teachings as unchanging and unfaultable; this religiosity dimension has been 
found to positively correlate with general prejudice (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; 
Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Hunsberger, 1996; 
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Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Rowatt & 
Franklin, 2004; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005; Rowatt et al., 2009) and also with the 
specific case of anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Ahrold & Meston, 2010; Anderson & Koc, 2015; 
Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Whitley, 2009). 
Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualised religiosity differently. Specifically, they 
proposed two religious orientations. Intrinsic orientation is a personal endorsement of 
religious faith and use of religion, and has been found to be generally unrelated to prejudice 
(Allport & Ross, 1967; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), but has been found to be 
correlated with anti-gay attitudes (Herek, 1987; McFarland, 1989). In contrast, extrinsic 
orientation is conceptualised as a utilitarian approach to religion, and has been found to be 
generally correlated with all forms of prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992; Kirkpatrick, 1993) but not with anti-gay attitudes (Ford, Brignall, 
VanValey, & Macaluso, 2009; Whitley, 2009). These finding suggest extrinsically oriented 
individuals who are not motivated by religious doctrine may, consequently, have no reason 
to feel prejudice towards gay people.  However, this may only hold for some religions. For 
example, Anderson and Koc (2015) found that extrinsic religiosity predicted explicit anti-
gay attitudes in Muslims, but that intrinsic religiosity did not. We suggested that, consistent 
with the arguments of Ford and his colleagues (2009) , overarching societal conditions of 
patriarchy and prevailing anti-gay attitudes in Turkey might result in anti-gay attitudes 
among extrinsically oriented individuals being bolstered, rather than attenuated. 
A form of religiosity that is frequent found to be unrelated to prejudice is Quest 
(Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b). Questing individuals tend to view religion as a 
means for searching for meaning in their lives, and incorporate religious doubting into their 
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identity (Batson, 1976). Mak and Tsang (2008) explored the treatment of a sexually 
promiscuous lesbian target compared to a sexually promiscuous straight target as a function 
of the participant’s levels of religiosity. They found no difference in the treatment of the 
target (i.e., a confederate) by individuals who were high in a Questing orientation. 
However, they did find that intrinsically oriented individuals were less likely to help the 
lesbian confederate compared to the straight confederate.  
8.3 A causal relationship between religion and prejudice? 
Allport (1954) summarised the paradoxical potential for religion to lead to pro- and 
anti-social attitudes in his classic observation that it is the role of religion to both “make 
prejudice and unmake prejudice” (p.413). Since then, this relationship has been widely 
debated with conflicting empirical data (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Whitley, 2009). 
When considering the complex role of religion in prejudice research, it can be 
useful to explore the basis for religion-derived beliefs. For example, examination of the 
Christian bible reveals two contradicting messages for how a Christian individual should 
treat others. One message leads to pro-social attitudes and behaviours. For example, the 
biblical proclamations such as “love one another” promotes tolerance and altruism (Jesus, 
John. 13:34, World English Bible). This is also consistent with other biblical passages (e.g., 
“Love your enemies and bless those who curse you”; Jesus, Matt. 5:44, World English 
Bible) but stand in direct contrast to messages that seem to advocate anti-social attitudes 
and behaviours towards certain groups. For example, “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as 
with womankind: it is an abomination” (on gay men; Leviticus. 18:22, King James 
Version) or “Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to 
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teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence” (on women; 1st Timothy 
2:11-5). These latter passages may lead to prejudiced attitudes that seems to be supported 
and condoned by the contemporary Christian religion, which manifest as condemnation of 
homosexuality and a patriarchal exclusivity in some Christian denominations (e.g., Roman 
Catholicism).  
If an individual holds a dogmatic doctrine as central to their beliefs, then there is 
room to understand at a logical level why religious fundamentalists may discriminate 
against others whose behaviours violate their own beliefs (McFarland, 1989). This paradox 
exists in most religions of the world with some variation in how harshly the doctrine 
condemns homosexuality, arguably depending on translations (Ashford, 2013). In 
summary, religious doctrine can send mixed messages about how subscribers to their 
religion are supposed to treat out-group members. 
In the specific case of attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, religion and religious 
beliefs are associated with anti-gay attitudes (Barton, 2010; Hooghe, Claes, Harell, 
Quintelier, & Dejaeghere, 2010; Rowatt et al., 2006; Toulouse, 2002; Tsang & Rowatt, 
2007; Whitley, 2009). One argument for this is that gay men and lesbians have a lifestyle 
that is inconsistent with the teachings of most of the major religions of the world (Pereira et 
al., 2009; Whitley, 2009), with the exception of Buddhism (Detenber et al., 2007; although 
Buddhists have reported beliefs in the controllability of homosexual orientations, see 
Vilaythong et al., 2010). For these reasons, religious affiliation with most major religions, 
and the religiosity factors of RF and an intrinsic orientation has often been found to be 
important predictors of explicit anti-gay attitudes. This has been well documented in 
Christian samples (e.g., Finlay & Walther, 2003; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Herek, 1987; 
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Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Larsen et al., 1980; McFarland, 
1989; Toulouse, 2002). For example, Finlay and Walther (2003) explored the relationship 
between anti-gay attitudes and religious affiliation. They found that Protestants and 
Catholics reported more explicit anti-gay attitudes than non-Christians and those who 
identified as non-affiliated. This result is consistent throughout the literature (Herek, 1987; 
Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Toulouse, 2002).  
The relationship between religiosity and implicit anti-gay attitudes has received 
only limited attention, but is consistent with the findings for religiosity and explicit 
attitudes. For example, Rowatt and colleagues (2006) explored the relationship between 
implicit anti-gay attitudes and religiosity among Protestant students and found that the 
religiosity measure of Christian orthodoxy was correlated with a homosexuality-IAT, as 
well as explicit anti-gay attitudes and scales measuring right-wing authoritarianism and 
impression management.  
More recently, Vilaythong et al. (2010)  explored whether the effects of priming 
religious messages of compassion would influence Christians’ and Buddhists’ implicit 
attitudes toward homosexuality. Participants evaluated five “golden rule” religious 
messages (e.g., “do unto others as you would have them do to you”, Jesus, Luke 6:31) 
attributed to either Buddha or Jesus. Results showed that after reading a Buddha-attributed 
golden rule message, Christian participants exhibited more explicitly negative attitudes 
toward homosexuals than did Buddhist participants who read a Jesus-attributed golden rule 
message. The authors interpreted their results as indicating that messages of compassion 
elicited attitudes of prejudice if the message is from an out-group source. It is noteworthy 
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that no differences in implicit attitudes were found between religious prime conditions for 
either Christians or Buddhists (Vilaythong et al., 2010).  
Traditional Islamic scholars state that Islam also condemns homosexuality based on 
doctrinal interpretations (Jamal, 2001; Siraj, 2009). More specifically, these scholars claim 
that Islamic doctrine views homosexuality as deviant, sinful, and as a revolt against God 
(Abu-Saud, 1990; Yip, 2004, 2008), which leaves no possibility for simultaneous 
identifications as gay and Muslim (Duran, 1993). Although, there have been attempts for 
alternative interpretations of the Qur’an by more contemporary scholars which affords 
inclusivity of gay individuals (Hekma, 2002; Jamal, 2001; Kugle, 2003), the majority of 
Muslim communities do not endorsed these interpretations. Arguably, we can conclude that 
Islam also prescribes anti-gay attitudes. 
To date, there are only a few empirical studies of anti-gay attitudes with Muslim 
samples in the literature. These studies suggest that explicit anti-gay attitudes are prevalent 
and particularly negative (Anderson & Koc, 2015; Duyan & Duyan, 2005; Duyan, Gelbal, 
& Duyan, 2013; Güney, Kargı, & Çorbacı-Oruç, 2004; with the notable exception of 
occasional positive attitudes toward lesbians, Gelbal & Duyan 2006). Further, there are 
even fewer studies exploring implicit anti-gay attitudes, and these are mixed, with one 
finding no difference in implicit anti-gay attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim 
students in Germany (Klocke, 2014), while a second found that, using a community sample 
from Turkey, implicit anti-gay attitudes were much more negative for Muslims than 
Atheists (Anderson & Koc, 2015). Furthermore, there appears to be little concern for 
controlling the explicit expression of these attitudes.  
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Explicit anti-gay attitudes of Muslims have repeatedly been consistently found to be 
predicted by participant and target gender, strength of religious affiliation, and 
interpersonal contact with gay people (Duyan & Duyan, 2005; Gelbal & Duyan, 2006; 
Sakalli, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). Findings for gender revealed that female Muslims reported 
more anti-gay attitudes toward lesbian targets than gay male targets, while male Muslims 
reported equally strong anti-gay attitudes toward both gay male and lesbian targets (Oksal, 
2008). Consistent with previous religiosity-anti-gay findings, Muslims who reported 
stronger affiliation with their religion also reported higher levels of anti-gay attitudes 
(Gelbal & Duyan, 2006). Also consistent with previous research, interpersonal contact 
between heterosexual and gay Muslims was found to predict lower levels of explicit anti-
gay attitudes of these heterosexual Muslims (Sakalli, 2002b; 2002c); this effect did not 
extend to implicit anti-gay attitudes (Anderson & Koç, 2015, Study 2).   
Islam appears to have a particularly strong association with anti-gay attitudes, relative 
to other religions. A study by Hooghe and colleagues (2010) explored the effect of different 
religious affiliation (i.e., Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other 
Christian denominations) on tolerance of homosexuality (i.e., support for gay rights) in 
samples from Belgium and Canada. They found that scores were least tolerant from the 
Islamic participants. Similarly, an inter-faith poll by Jaspal and Siraj (2011) found that 
intolerance was also low from Muslim participants who lived in the United Kingdom. In 
contrast to public acceptance of homosexuality (58%), none of the British Muslim 
participants agreed that homosexuality was morally acceptable. It is also noteworthy that 
one third of the French Muslim respondents reported no intolerance of homosexuality.  
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8.4 Concluding Remarks 
As demonstrated by this brief review, the simplistic conceptualisation of religion as 
religious affiliation is problematic. In contrast, the use of religiosity as measured by factors 
such as RF, intrinsic and extrinsic orientations and Quest, important effects can be observed 
contribution to understandings of the religion-prejudice relationship (for a review, see 
Anderson, 2015). An interesting extension of this research is the effect of specific religious 
teachings, as demonstrated by religious message priming effects on anti-gay prejudice is 
only just beginning, as is the relationship between religious factors (e.g., affiliation, 
religiosity, messages) and implicit anti-gay prejudice.  In fact, there is much work to be 
done, especially to extend the small literature on religion and implicit anti-gay prejudice to 
include implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes.  
The following two chapters undertake the first step. First, I will explore the 
relationship between religion and the person-based approach to implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
In doing so, this research will provide further evidence for the person-based approach as 
well as a demonstration of its applicability. The next chapter in this section will explore 
demographic (including religious affiliation) and religiosity measures as predictors of 
explicit and implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. Taken together, these findings will 
provide evidence for the relationship between individual differences, religion, religiosity 
and implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. These findings will also contribute to the 
argument for the inclusion of religiosity factors in place of simple religious affiliation. 
The final empirical chapter of this thesis will present a study which extends the  
person-based approach to implicit anti-gay attitudes to include a contextual variation 
religious prime. As discussed previously (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), the person-based approach 
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relies on the contextual variation of social category salience through the manipulation of 
distracter stimuli. Thus, this study uses religious distracters that are the same-gender as the 
gay target to produce the sexual orientation salience as well as a religious prime (i.e., in 
blocks where the targets are lesbians, the distracter stimuli are nuns) and to explore effects 
of religious contextual priming on subsequent implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes. In 
combination, these empirical chapters provide groundwork for future exploration of the 
application of implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes and their relationship with 
religiosity.   
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Chapter 9 – Study 4: Predictors of Implicit person-based Gay Attitudes 
______________________________________ 
A person once asked me if I approved of homosexuality. I replied with: “Tell me: when God 
looks at a gay person does he endorse the existence of the person with love, or reject and 
condemn this person?” We must always consider the person. 
- Pope Francis (2014) 
 
Title 
Religious Fundamentalism Predicts Explicit, But Not Implicit Anti-Gay Attitudes.  
Abstract 
 
The current study explores the contribution of demographic and religiosity factors in 
predicting explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes. An Australian community sample 
comprising 75 male and 74 female participants completed measures of religiosity, and of 
explicit and implicit (person-based) anti-gay attitudes. Religious fundamentalism, but not 
religious affiliation, was shown to be a strong positive predictor of explicit anti-gay 
attitudes toward both gay men and lesbians. Unexpectedly, neither demographic nor 
religiosity factors significantly predicted implicit anti-gay attitudes. After showing that RF 
is central to the relationship between religion and explicit anti-gay attitudes, I suggest these 
findings are evidence that, for religious individuals, explicit anti-gay attitudes reflect 
doctrinal proscription. Explanations of the absence of significant relationships between 
implicit anti-gay attitudes, demographics, and religiosity are discussed. 
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9.1.1 Background  
While there is a well-established literature on predictors of explicit anti-gay 
attitudes (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dolinski, 2010; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Finlay & 
Walther, 2003; Frost & Meyer, 2009; Whitley, 2009; for a recent review, see Herek, 2013) 
there is limited research on the predictors or correlates of implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
Previous research has found that, as is the case with explicit anti-gay attitudes, certain 
social groups tend to demonstrate more implicit anti-gay attitudes than others. Namely, men 
compared to women (e.g., Banse et al., 2001; Nosek et al., 2005), the religious compared to 
the non-religious (e.g., Rowatt et al., 2009; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007), and heterosexual 
people compared to gay people, tend to demonstrate higher levels of implicit anti-gay 
attitudes (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). These findings are entirely consistent with those 
for explicit antigay attitudes (see Chapter 3). This suggests that explicit and implicit anti-
gay bias may be more similar than some other prejudices (e.g., explicit vs. implicit racism) 
which are both predicted by and predictive of very different factors (DeCoster et al., 2006; 
Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; Rohner & 
Björklund, 2006; Rudman, 2011).  
9.1.2 The Relationship between Religion and Anti-Gay Attitudes 
Research studying the relationship between religion and social attitudes has 
operationalised religion either as self-identified religious affiliation, or as individual 
difference factors that reflect (e.g., differences in the kinds of beliefs and behaviours 
associated with religion; Ahrold & Meston, 2010; Saroglou, 2009). As already discussed 
(see Chapter 8), the relationship between explicit anti-gay attitudes and religion is well 
established, with negative attitudes being consistently higher for self-identified members of 
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all major religions compared to those who do not self-identify as religious (e.g., Finlay & 
Walther, 2003), including Christianity (e.g., Whitley, 2009), Islam (e.g., Anderson & Koc, 
2015; Duyan & Duyan, 2005), and Judaism (e.g., Dejowski, 1992), but not Buddhism 
(Hunsberger, 1996). In contrast, there is limited research on the role of religiosity in 
implicit anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Rowatt et al., 2009; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) 
Rowatt et al. (2006) found that levels of religious fundamentalism (i.e., a religiosity 
dimension concerned with religious meaning that is drawn directly from doctrine in 
unchangeable is nature; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) correlated strongly with both 
explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes. Tsang and Rowatt (2007) found that found that an 
intrinsic religious orientation (i.e., religious based motivations Allport & Ross, 1967) 
uniquely predicts implicit anti-gay attitudes, even though it has not previously been found 
to predict attitudes toward other targets of prejudice. These studies provided important 
groundwork in this area of research; however, there is empirical work yet to be completed 
in this field.  
9.1.3 The Current Study 
Based on the key findings that religious fundamentalism (e.g., Rowatt et al., 2006) 
and intrinsic religious (e.g., Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) are important predictors of IAT 
measured implicit anti-gay attitudes, this study will include both as predictors of implicit 
person-based anti-gay attitudes. In addition, I will ask people to provide their self-identified 
religious affiliation. In doing so, this study will allow consideration of the ongoing 
controversy about the relationship between religious beliefs and religiosity as predictors of 
anti-gay attitudes and will also contribute to the literature exploring the relationship 
between these factors and implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
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 Importantly, this study will use the person-based approach to measuring implicit 
anti-gay attitudes, whereas the existing literature has reported findings based on category-
based approaches (i.e., stimuli comprising pictures of same-sex couples and gay-relevant 
symbols). This is arguably a multi-faceted and over-inclusive version of homosexuality, 
and is therefore problematic. For example, it might capture attitudes towards gay people, 
but it might also encompass attitudes towards sexual behaviours, same-sex marriage, 
political activism, and displays of public affections.  
There is no previous research on which to build hypotheses that are specific to the 
person-based approach, so predictions for this study are built on existing research that 
provides evidence of constructs that predict explicit and implicit category-based anti-gay 
attitudes. The hypotheses for the current study are as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Consistent with previous findings, I expect low levels of explicit anti-
gay attitudes and moderate implicit anti-gay attitudes.  
Hypothesis 2: Based on existing literature, I expect gender (e.g., Dolinski, 2010), 
sexual orientation (e.g., Allen & Oleson, 1999), age (e.g., Whitley, 2009), and religious 
affiliation (e.g., Lewis & Gossett, 2008) to be predictors of anti-gay attitudes.  
Hypothesis 3: I also expect religiosity dimensions to be predictors of anti-gay 
attitudes. Specifically, I expect religious fundamentalism (Rowatt et al., 2006) and an 
intrinsic religious orientation (Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) to predict negative explicit and 





The sample comprised 73 males (Mage = 20.76 years, SDage = 14.33 years; 29 
heterosexual) and 74 females (Mage = 18.19 years, SDage = 10.78 years; 48 identified as 
heterosexual) who were all volunteers from a community sample. Twenty-seven 
participants failed to disclose demographic details (15.52%). Seventy of the participants 
identified as Christians (male = 36) and 72 participants identified as non-religious (i.e., 
Atheist or Agnostic, male = 36). Only 2 participants identified as Jewish and were excluded 
from analyses. 
9.2.2 Measures  
9.2.2.1 Explicit measures. 
The Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RF; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) 
comprises 20 items about individual beliefs that the fundamental truth about humanity and 
deity is clearly contained in one set of unchanging religious teachings (e.g., “Whenever 
science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong.”). Participants are asked to 
endorse statements on a scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to +4 (strongly agree). 
After reverse scoring appropriate items, an average score is calculated. Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of fundamentalist religious beliefs (α = .93).  
The Quest Scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a) comprises 12 items about an 
individual’s tendency to pursue meaning in life through religious doubts (e.g., “My life 
experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.”). Participants are asked to 
endorse statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
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After reverse scoring appropriate items, an average score is calculated. Higher scores 
indicate a higher level of religious questing (α = .78). 
The Religious Orientation Scale (ROS; Allport & Ross, 1967) comprises two 
subscales that distinguish the practice of religion as a self-contained goal (i.e., intrinsic, 9-
items; e.g., “My religious beliefs are really what lie behind my whole approach to life.”; α 
= .91) from the religious rituals (i.e., extrinsic, 12-items; e.g., “I pray chiefly because I have 
been taught to pray.”; α = .78 Participants are asked to endorse statements on a scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An average score is calculated for 
each subscale, and higher scores indicate a stronger respective religious orientation. 
The Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (ATLG; Herek, 1984a) 
comprises 10 items measuring explicit attitudes toward lesbians (ATL; e.g., “Lesbians just 
can’t fit into our society”; α = .93) and 10 items measuring explicit attitudes toward gay 
men (ATG; e.g., “Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school.”; ATG, α = 
.94). Participants are asked to endorse statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). An average score was calculated for each subscale, with 
higher scores indicating more negative explicit anti-gay attitudes. 
9.2.2.2 Implicit measure. 
The Go/No Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) is a computerised 
speeded classification task that measures implicit associations between a target category 
and a target attribute. The current study used a 4-block GNAT, which assessed implicit 
associations between target categories (GAY MALE and LESBIAN) and target attributes 
(GOOD and BAD). Each block used distracters that were heterosexual and same-gender as 
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the targets (i.e., only sexual orientation salient blocks were administered). For example, in 
blocks where gay males were the target category, straight males were the distracter 
category. Target and distracter stimuli, and administration protocol, were the same used as 
used in Studies 1 – 3 (see Chapter 5 for a full description).  For the current sample, the 
GNAT demonstrated acceptable reliabilities (MRaSSH = .78, SDRaSSH = .11; following 
protocol suggested by Williams & Kaufmann, 2012). 
9.2.3 Procedure  
Participants were recruited by an online advertisement. After giving informed 
consent, participants were directed to the website that hosted the study. Participants 
completed the online battery, which involved providing demographic details, responding to 
the religiosity and explicit anti-gay attitudes measures in a randomised sequence, and 
finally completing the 4-block GNAT. Participants were thanked for their time and 
provided with debriefing information.  
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The ATL, ATG, and RF scales were positively skewed. Natural Log 
transformations were applied to the ATL and ATG scales and a square root transformation 
was applied to the RF scale which corrected problems with normality. Statistical analyses 
were performed on transformed data, but non-transformed means and standard deviations 
are reported for ease of interpretation. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are 
presented in Table 9. The sample reported relatively low levels of religiosity and explicit 
anti-gay attitudes. Although the sample demonstrated relatively neutral implicit attitudes  
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Table 9  
Summary of Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Religiosity Scales and Explicit Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians. 
 Mean SD Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 age gender religion sexuality 
Religiosity Scales 
1. RF 3.41 1.58 -       .10 -.01 .47* .31** 
2. Intrinsic  2.68 1.00 .69** -      .26* .03 .43* .23* 
3. Extrinsic 2.72 0.59 .03 .19* -     .09 .23* .05 .02 
4. Quest 5.33 1.34 -.01 .07 .016 -    .19 -.19 .06 .13 
Explicit attitudes 
5. ATL 2.36 1.53 .69** .42** .01 -.02 -   -.21 -.06 .28** .28* 
6. ATG 2.34 1.72 .73** .43** -.10 -.06 .83** -  -.07 -.18* .31** .32** 
Implicit attitudes 
7. Lesbian -0.10 1.12 -.11 -.07 .04 .04 -.10 -.10  -.18 -.07 -.08 -.04 
8. Gay Male  0.21 0.97 -.15 -.13 -.15 .17* -.04 -.11 .03 -.03 .01 -.05 .01 
Note: * p<.05, **p<.001; RF = Religious Fundamentalism; ATL = Attitudes Towards Lesbians; ATG = Attitudes Towards Gay Men; 
positive correlations indicate the following point-biserial correlations: religion = Christian affiliation; sexual orientation = 
heterosexual orientation; gender = male. Higher implicit attitude scores represent positive implicit attitudes; higher explicit scores 
represent negative explicit attitudes. 
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toward both gay men and lesbians, attitudes ranged from hostile (gay men d′ = -2.91, 
lesbians d′ = -3.62) to positive (gay men d′ = 2.91, lesbians d′ = 2.16). Correlations were 
found between explicit negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, and both RF and 
intrinsic religiosity dimensions. Point-biserial correlations existed between explicit negative 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, and religious affiliation and sexual orientation (i.e., 
were associated with being Christian and/or heterosexual). 
9.3.2 Regression analyses  
We conducted two hierarchical multiple regression analyses (MRA) in order to 
estimate the proportion of variance in explicit and implicit attitudes towards gay male 
targets, and then lesbian targets, that can be accounted for by attitude-relevant demographic 
factors and religiosity dimensions. For each regression, Step 1 included demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, sexual orientation, religious affiliation), and Step 2 included 
religiosity measures.  Prior to interpreting results, data was screened for assumption 
violations. One case in the quest scale was treated as an outlier (z = -3.09, replaced with M  
- 2xSD; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) .  
9.3.2.1 Predicting explicit anti-gay attitudes 
   Table 10 presents the results of the regression analyses conducted for prediction 
of explicit attitudes toward gay men (left) and lesbians (right). For the case of attitudes 
towards gay men, demographic factors accounted for a significant 34.80% of the variance 
in explicit attitudes, F(4, 60) = 8.02, p < .001. On the second step, religiosity factors were 
added to the regression equation, accounting for an additional 27.70% of the variance ΔF(4, 
56) = 10.38, p < .001. In combination, predictor variables accounted for 57.20% (adjusted 
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R2) variance in reported attitudes towards gay men, F(8, 64) = 11.71, p < .001. This was a 
large effect (Cohen’s f2 = 1.67)21.  
For the case of attitudes towards lesbians (right portion of Table 10), demographic 
factors accounted for a significant 29.20% of the variance in explicit attitudes, 
F(4,60)=6.19, p<.001. Addition of religiosity factors to the model, accounted for an 
additional 26.10% of the variance ΔF(4,56) = 8.16, p < .001. In combination, predictor 
variables accounted for 55.30% (adjusted R2) variance in reported attitudes towards 
lesbians, F(8,56) = 8.62, p < .001. This was also a large effect (Cohen’s f2 = 1.24).  
Inspection of the regression coefficients and squared semi-partial correlations shows 
the same pattern of predicting variables existed for attitudes towards both gay men and 
lesbians. In Step 1 of the regression, demographic variables of gender, religious affiliation, 
and sexual orientation predicted explicit attitudes. Specifically, being male, Christian, 
and/or heterosexual predicted negative explicit anti-gay attitudes. In the final step of the 
model, gender and age (and sexual orientation for predicting attitudes toward gay men 
only) remained significant predictors. Interestingly, with the inclusion of religiosity 
measures, religious affiliation ceased to be a significant predictor of explicit anti-gay 
attitudes towards both genders. However, religious fundamentalism was a strong and 
positive predictor of explicit negative attitudes, uniquely accounting for 15.92% of the 
variance in explicit anti-gay attitudes towards gay men, and 16.48% of the variance in 
reported anti-gay attitudes towards lesbians. No other religiosity measures were significant 
predictors in the model. 
                                                 
21 Effect size for multiple regressions in this paper were based on the effects for the overall final model (i.e., 
calculated from the observed R2 after the inclusion of the final step of the MRA), and were calculated using 
software by Soper (2015) based on the work of Cohen (1988) . 
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Table 10 
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Semi-Partial 
Correlations for Each Predictor in Hierarchical Regression Models Predicting Explicit 
Anti-Gay Attitudes with Attitude-Relevant Demographic Factors and Religiosity 
Dimensions. 
 ATG ATL 
 B SE B β sr2 B SE B β sr2 
Step 1         
   Gender 1.28 0.40 0.38** .11 0.33 0.14 0.30** .07 
   Age -0.06 0.02 -0.30** .08 -0.02 0.01 -0.35** .10 
   Religious 
affiliation 
1.20 0.37 0.36** .12 0.39 .013 0.35** .12 
   Sexual     
    orientation 
1.57 0.39 0.48** .18 0.41 0.13 0.37** .11 
Step 2         
   Gender 1.02 0.32 .30* .06 0.27 0.12 0.24* .04 
   Age -0.06 0.02 -.30* .07 -0.03 0.01 -0.36** .10 
   Religious 
affiliation 
0.11 0.32 .03 <0.01 0.07 .012 0.06 <0.01 
   Sexual  
    orientation 
0.78 0.32 .23* .04 0.19 0.12 0.17 .01 
   RF .52 0.11 .58** .30 0.18 0.04 0.60** .16 
   Intrinsic .23 0.19 .14 .02 <0.01 0.07 0.01 <0.01 
   Extrinsic .04 0.24 .01 <0.01 0.10 0.09 0.10 .01 
   Quest -.07 0.10 -.05 .01 0.01 0.04 0.02 <0.01 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.001; significant findings are presented in boldface font. RF = religious 
fundamentalism. Dummy coded variables: Gender (0 = female, 1 = male); Religion (0 = 
non-religious, 1 = Christian); sexual orientation (0 = gay, 1 = straight). Constants for 
explicit attitudes towards gay men: Step 1 = -2.42; Step 2 = -3.64; Constants for explicit 
attitudes towards lesbians: Step 1 = 1.83; Step 2 = 1.02. 
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9.3.2.2 Predicting implicit anti-gay attitudes 
Table 11 presents the results of the regression analyses conducted for prediction of 
implicit attitudes toward gay men (left) and lesbians (right). For the case of attitudes 
towards gay men, demographic factors accounted for a non-significant 3.4% of the variance 
(p = .72). Religiosity factors were then added to the regression equation, accounting for an 
additional non-significant 8.30% of (p = .27). In combination, predictor variables accounted 
for only a non-significant 11.70% (adjusted R2) variance in implicit attitudes towards gay 
men, (p = .50; Cohen’s f2 = 0.13).  
In the case of the model predicting implicit attitudes towards lesbians (right portion 
of Table 11), demographic factors accounted for a non-significant 1.70% of the variance (p 
= .90). Religiosity factors were added to the regression equation, accounting for an 
additional non-significant 0.01% of (Δ, p = .971). In combination, predictor variables 
accounted for only a non-significant 2.60% (adjusted) variance in demonstrated attitudes 
towards lesbians, (p = .92; Cohen’s f2 = .03).  
9.4 Discussion 
The present study explored demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, and religious 
affiliation) and individual differences in religiosity as predictors of explicit and implicit 
anti-gay attitudes. Consistent with previous research, a significant proportion of variance in 
explicit anti-gay attitudes toward gay men and lesbians was predicted by demographic and 
religious affiliation factors. This was the case despite the fact that the sample showed 
relatively low levels of explicit anti-gay attitudes, and that participants were not blind to the 
aim of the study before agreeing to participate.  
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Table 11 
Unstandardized (B) and Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients, and Semi-Partial 
Correlations for Each Predictor in a Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting 
Implicit Anti-Gay Attitudes with Attitude-Relevant Demographic Factors and 
Religiosity Dimensions.  
 Implicit attitudes toward gay men Implicit attitudes toward lesbians 
 B SE B β sr2 B SE B β sr2 
Step 1         
   Gender 0.09 0.28 0.04 <0.01 -0.23 0.32 -0.11 <0.01 
   Age -0.02 0.02 -0.19 0.03 <0.01 0.02 0.02 <0.01 
   Affiliation -0.01 0.26 -0.01 <0.01 -0.18 0.29 -0.08 <0.01 
   Sexual  
   orientation 
0.04 0.27 0.02 <0.01 -0.17 0.31 -0.08 <0.01 
Step 2         
   Gender 0.08 0.29 0.04 <0.01 -0.20 0.35 -0.09 <0.01 
   Age -0.03 0.02 -0.21 0.04 <0.01 0.02 0.02 <0.01 
   Affiliation 0.20 0.29 0.10 <0.01 -0.13 0.35 -0.06 <0.01 
   Sexual 
   orientation 
0.22 0.29 0.11 <0.01 -0.15 0.34 -0.07 <0.01 
   RF -0.12 0.10 -0.23 0.02 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 <0.01 
   Intrinsic -0.01 0.18 -0.01 <0.01 0.01 0.21 0.01 <0.01 
   Extrinsic -0.12 0.22 -0.08 <0.01 0.01 0.26 0.01 <0.01 
   Quest 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 <0.01 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; RF = religious fundamentalism; Affiliation = religious 
affiliation. Dummy coded variables: Gender (0=female, 1=male); Religion (0=non-
religious, 1=Christian); sexual orientation (0=gay, 1=straight). Constants for implicit 
attitudes towards gay men: Step 1 =0.60, Step 2 =0.62; Constants for implicit attitudes 
towards lesbians: Step 1 =0.41; Step 2 =0.44.
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The first step of the regression model explored the role of demographic variables as 
predictors of explicit anti-gay attitudes. As predicted in my second hypothesis, all 
demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, religious affiliation, and sexual orientation) were 
significant predictors, consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Dolinski, 2010; Jellison et 
al., 2004; Whitley, 2009).Interestingly, when religiosity factors were included in the second 
step of this model, religious affiliation ceased to be a significant predictor, supporting the 
proposal that religiosity is more important in the explicit prejudice-religion relationship 
than religious affiliation or alignments. Furthermore, RF was not only a strong predictor, 
but the only religiosity dimension that predicted these attitudes. This partially supports our 
third hypothesis, and is consistent with the findings of Rowatt and colleagues (2006) that 
suggested anti-gay attitudes were related to religious fundamentalism. However, the current 
findings failed to replicate Tsang and Rowatt’s (2007) finding that intrinsic religious 
orientation was related to explicit anti-gay attitudes, or those of the meta-analysis that anti-
gay attitudes are related to all religiosity dimensions except Quest (Whitley, 2009).  
Somewhat unexpectedly, neither demographic factors nor religiosity dimensions 
significantly predicted implicit anti-gay attitudes. Thus, no support was found for our 
second and third hypotheses with regards to implicit anti-gay attitudes. Furthermore, 
measures of explicit and implicit were found to be statistically unrelated. This lack of 
correlation is consistent with previous research, which has found no significant relationship 
between implicit and explicit attitudes to the same attitude object (see Gawronski et al., 
2006; Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007).  
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9.4.1 Explaining the Link between Religion and Anti-Gay Attitudes  
Explicit negative judgements of specific others can be proscribed by religion (e.g., 
bible passages such as “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an 
abomination”; Leviticus. 18:22, King James Version) or may occur as a result of the 
symbolic threat that out-groups pose when they are perceived to violate a religions’ value 
system (e.g., Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Herek, 1987). Both of these explanations can 
account for prejudice toward gay men and lesbians (e.g., Jonathan, 2008). Thus, for those 
who abide by religious teachings, negative attitudes towards homosexuality are permissible 
and even encouraged by various religious teachings. For this reason religious individuals 
may believe anti-gay attitudes might not only be permitted, but expected. 
The processes pertaining to prejudice have been discussed in terms of having 
automatic and controlled components (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine & Monteith, 1999). The 
automatic processes can be defined as non-conscious activations of associations that have 
been embedded within the individual, while the controlled component requires the 
individual's directed and active attention. Controlled processes are easily accessible to 
conscious awareness, require increased cognitive resources, and can be altered with intent. 
Thus, our findings that religious affiliation, and then RF in place of religious affiliation, 
does not predict implicit anti-gay attitudes may be interpreted as evidence that explicit anti-
gay attitudes are rational and premeditated based on doctrinal proscription. Specifically, 
religious individuals might be adopting anti-gay attitudes in order to align with the 
teachings of the religion they subscribe to.  
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The final consideration point for discussion pertains to the use of a person-based 
representation of homosexuality. We have argued that previous research into implicit anti-
gay attitudes (using a variety of category-based stimuli to represent homosexuality) might 
also be measuring attitudes toward related constructs, such as attitudes toward same-sex 
marriage, same-sex behaviours. These related constructs go directly against religious 
teachings. However, the person-based method of representation is argued to elicit responses 
to a nuanced version of anti-gay attitudes, namely, attitudes toward a gay or lesbian person 
rather than toward the amorphous category of homosexual. Importantly, being a gay person 
in itself does not necessarily violate religious teachings. As such, the absence of a 
relationship between implicit person-based anti-gay attitudes and religion could be driven 
by notions of “loving the sinner, hating the sin” (e.g., Mak & Tsang, 2008). If the attitudes 
being measured are toward a gay or lesbian person (who is being represented as an 
individual), then they would not elicit antipathy that is reserved for value-violating 
behaviours. Thus, neither religious affiliation nor religiosity measures should be related to 
person-based anti-gay attitudes.  
9.4.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
The findings of this study may be limited by sampling issues, and the motivations 
behind the participants’ self-selection to be involved with the study. Specifically, the 
sample is not particularly well-understood; demographic questions such as education level, 
political orientation, and levels of previous contact with gay men and lesbians were not 
asked, as they did not directly relate to the religion-relevant hypotheses. Moreover,  
participation was voluntary and participants were not blind to the aim of the study before 
agreeing to participate. As such, the findings of this study are likely to be under-reporting 
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anti-gay attitudes that would exist in the general population. However, the attenuated nature 
of the anti-gay attitudes in this sample has no direct implication for the interpretation of the 
results. A second limitation is that I only measured the anti-gay attitudes of Christians. In 
order to see if the mechanisms driving these attitudes are unique to Christianity, or exist 
with all religions, the current study should be replicated with participants from other 
religions.  
The major limitation of this study is that the findings presented cannot be compared 
to existing research, because a different measure was being used. As such, the null findings 
could be a result of the sample (as discussed above), or it could be driven by the different 
measure (person-based vs. category-based approaches), or even the apparatus used (GNAT 
vs IAT). As such, a crucial next step in this line of research is to collect implicit category 
based anti-gay attitudes and the predictor variables from the same sample and make 
comparisons. Even more ideally would be to collect person-based and category-based 
attitudes in a within-subjects design, at which point more solid conclusions can be drawn.  
9.4.3 Conclusions 
Anti-gay attitudes have changed rapidly. It has been only 41 years since the 
declassification of ‘homosexuality’ as a mental disorder (Mendelson, 2003). Since then, 
there is some evidence that these attitudes are improving (see Herek & McLemore, 2013), 
but there is still unequivocal evidence that both gay men and lesbians still face substantial 
prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Herek, 2007; Herek & McLemore, 2013). This study 
explored the role of demographic factors and religiosity dimensions as predictors of explicit 
(i.e., consciously accessible) and implicit (i.e., consciously inaccessible) person-based anti-
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gay attitudes. Consistent with the existing literature, the sample reported limited explicit 
anti-gay attitudes, and these were predicted as a function of participant age, gender, 
religious affiliation, and sexual orientation. However, the inclusion of religiosity measures 
meant that religious affiliation ceased being a significant predictor, suggesting that 
religiosity is a better predictor of anti-gay attitudes than religious affiliation. Conversely, 
neither demographic variables nor religiosity dimensions predicted implicit anti-gay 
attitudes, a finding which might be specific to person-based attitudes. 
The findings of the current study contribute to the literature in several important 
ways. I am providing evidence that RF is central to the religion-explicit anti-gay attitudes 
relationship, and suggest that fundamentalist religious thinking reflects a doctrine-derived 
motivation to respond in a prejudiced fashion towards gay people. In addition, I am 
interpreting these findings as evidence for a dual construct model of prejudice (e.g., 
(Devine, 1989; Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Wilson et al., 2000), and suggesting that explicit and 
implicit anti-gay attitudes share a target, but that the attitudes are distinct.  
While the findings of this study suggest that religion is central to explicit anti-gay 
attitudes, they also suggest that this is not the case for implicit person-based anti-gay 
attitudes. Given that religion has often been discussed (anecdotally and empirically) as 
driving anti-gay attitudes, these findings are informative and provide a positive direction 
for designing interventions for prejudice and discrimination against gay people (for a 
literature on humanising effects, see Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014). A better understanding of the cognitive processes behind anti-gay 
attitudes is clearly needed, and research that explores predictors of such prejudices would 
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Chapter 10 –Study 5: Religious Priming and Person-Based Attitudes 
______________________________________ 
Some people say the only cure for prejudice is more religion; some say the only cure is to 
abolish religion.  
- Gordon Allport (1954, p.413) 
 
Title 
Religious contextual priming increases positive attitudes toward gay men and 
women for Atheists, but not Christians. 
Abstract  
Religious priming is a method that activates mental representations of religion, 
which has the potential to influence subsequent cognitions and behaviours. Most 
research using religious priming has activated representations of Christian religion 
in Christian individuals. While some research has used inter-faith priming 
research has yet to consider the effects of religious priming on Atheists. The 
current research explored the effect of religious priming on Christian’s and 
Atheist’s attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. A sample of 73 university 
students (Mage = 22.93 years, SDage = 8.07) completed measures of explicit and 
implicit anti-gay attitudes. Both explicit and implicit attitudes were found to be 
relatively positive. The use of religious contextual primes during the measurement 
of implicit attitudes elicited an unexpected increase in positive implicit attitudes 
toward gay male and lesbian targets from Atheist, but not Christian participants. 
These findings are interpreted as preliminary evidence that the religious priming 
has unexpected effects beyond those who subscribe to that religion.   
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10.1 Background 
10.1.1 Religious priming 
The effects of religious priming on the cognitions and behaviours of religious 
individuals is the basis for a substantial and interestingly inconsistent literature (e.g., 
Carpenter & Marshall, 2009; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 
2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). For example, Christian participants who were exposed 
to subliminally presented religious symbols or images demonstrated increased accessibility 
of religion-relevant prosocial constructs and behaviours such as honesty (Randolph-Seng 
& Nielsen, 2007), generosity (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), donation intentions (Pichon, 
Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007), as well as decreased hostility (Rothschild, Abdollahi, & 
Pyszczynski, 2009) and were less likely to give into temptation (Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003; for a recent meta-analysis of religious priming with a focus on 
prosociality, see Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2015). However, religious 
priming has also been found to lead to increases in the accessibility of negative constructs 
such as prejudice toward African-Americans (Johnson et al., 2010), gay men and lesbians 
(Ramsay, Pang, Shen, & Rowatt, 2013), and religious out-groups (Johnson, Rowatt, & 
LaBouff, 2012), as well as increasing anti-social behaviours such as aggression towards an 
ostensible partner (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007). These conflicting results 
suggest there is a complex relationship between religion and positive and negative 
outcomes. 
Most religious priming research has used Christian religious primes, in which 
participants have been primed after either engaging in a sentence unscramble task, or 
through mindset priming (i.e., reflecting on a passage or vignette). Some of this research 
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has shown that these primes affects all participants, regardless of their religious affiliation 
(e.g., Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Johnson et al., 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; Toburen & 
Meier, 2010). For example, LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, and Finkle (2012) explored out-
group attitudes of individuals who were either in the presence of a religious or a non-
religious building. They found that the religious situational prime (i.e., in the presence of a 
religious building) produced more conservative opinions, as well as prejudiced attitudes 
towards all non-Christian groups, regardless of the religious affiliation or personal belief in 
God of the participants. This research demonstrated an instance where a Christian religious 
prime affected all participants. 
Some studies have also examined religious priming beyond Christianity (e.g., 
Ramsay et al., 2013; Vilaythong et al., 2010; Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery, & 
Blascovich, 2005).  For example, Ramsay et al. (2013) recently explored religious value 
violation in a sample of Christians and Buddhists. Specifically, during a lexical decision 
task they primed participants with own-religion relevant words (e.g., Christian words: 
sermon, church, Jesus; Buddhist words: Buddha, enlightenment, temple) or neutral words, 
and found that both Christians and Buddhists responded in the same way, namely, with an 
increase in anti-gay attitudes relative to the control condition. Given that Christianity 
prescribes anti-gay attitudes, while Buddhism does not, these results suggest that religious 





10.1.2 Inter-religion priming 
Recently, religious priming research has begun to explore the effects of priming 
members of one religion with religious representations from a different religion. For 
example, Clobert and Saroglou (2013) recently explored prosociality and implicit prejudice 
in a sample of Christians who had been subjected to supraliminal prime from either Islam 
or Buddhism. They found that participants who were primed with Buddhism displayed 
increased prosocial intentions and decreased implicit prejudice towards an ethnic out-
group. However, the decrease in implicit prejudice was only found among participants who 
highly valued universalism (measured using the eight-items from the Schwartz [1992] 
Value Survey). No effects were found when Islamic concepts as primes.   
Vilaythong et al. (2010) also explored the effects of religious primes from an out-
group religion explicit and implicit anti-gay attitudes and perceived controllability of being 
gay. They primed Christians and Buddhists with variants of the Golden Rule (e.g., the 
Christian variant is “Love thy neighbour as thyself”; Leviticus 19:18), and found that 
Christian participants who were primed with the Golden Rule that had been attributed to 
Buddha (rather than Jesus, or a neutral prime) reported increased explicit anti-gay attitudes 
and perceptions that being gay is a choice. The prime did not affect implicit attitudes. In 
opposition to the findings of Ramsay et al. (2013), they found no effects for Buddhist 
participants.  These findings demonstrate that, at least in certain populations, religious 
priming effects can also be elicited from primes from religious out-group leaders.  
Some research suggests that religious priming tends to amplify the strength of 
people’s existing response tendencies, rather than changing the direction of the attitude, or 
 144 
attenuating its strength. For example, Saroglou, Corneille, and Van Cappellen (2009) 
explored the effect of religious priming on the relationship between religion and 
submission. Participants were exposed to a religious or neutral prime (e.g., religious prime: 
submission, acceptance, obedience; neutral prime [matched for negative valence]: 
conformity, dependant, dominated, influenced), and were then given the opportunity to 
take revenge against a hypothetical individual who had criticised them. The religious prime 
increased religious-submission and conformity only in participants who had already 
reported high levels of personal submission (an individual differences characteristic of 
submissiveness). Similarly, Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) primed concepts of God using 
the scrambled-sentence paradigm during an anonymous version of the dictator game (see 
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994) and found an overall increase in prosocial 
behaviours (as measured by less selfish amounts of money left for the anonymous receiver 
relative to the control condition). Moreover, this effect was more pronounced among 
participants with self-reported belief in God.  
10.1.4 Challenges to the field 
Much of the religious priming literature has observed changes to responses of 
explicit (i.e., consciously accessible) measures or behavioural intentions following 
presentation of a prime (Bargh, 1994; Bargh & Chartrand, 1998; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; 
Klauer & Musch, 2003). However, this research has yet to adequately establish if these 
effects extend to implicit (i.e., non-consciously accessible) cognitions. A single study has 
reported a null effect of a sentence-unscramble religious prime on implicit attitudes. 
However, given the well-established tendency of religious people to demonstrate high 
levels of social desirability (Trimble, 1997), it would be beneficial to further explore the 
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effects of religious priming on measures of automatic associations (see Nosek et al., 2005). 
Therefore, further exploration of religious priming and the different effects of priming on 
explicit and implicit cognitions are needed. 
There has been a little research exploring the effects of religious priming on 
Atheists and that which has been undertaking has been undertaken reveals a difficulty 
identifying and classifying this group. Specifically, individuals who self-identify as non-
religious and individuals who self-identify as Atheists have been merged into a single 
category of ‘non-religious’. For example, Inzlicht and Tullett (2010) defined Atheists as 
individuals who scored two standard deviations below the sample mean on the belief-in-
God scale. However, this meant that some individuals who were being categorised as 
‘Atheists’ had an average score in the belief-in-God scale that was still above the scale’s 
midpoint. Using this classification protocol means that in a particularly religious sample, 
individuals who are still religious, but less religious than others, would be classified as 
Atheist.  
Evidence of the problematic nature of classifying religious affiliation in this way 
was reported by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007; Study 1) found that a religious prime 
affected people who did not identify with any religion in the same way as it affected 
Christians (i.e., implicit priming of God concepts increased charitable behaviour). 
However, in their second study, they asked participants to identify as a non-believer or 
specifically as an Atheist. With the inclusion of an ‘Atheist’ option (instead of non-
religious), the religious prime did not affect charitable behaviour in the Atheist group.  
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With the exception of the aforementioned two, the effects of religious priming on 
Atheists has yet to be considered in the literature. Atheists are a unique category because 
they not only do not believe in a God, but they actively endorse the belief that no God 
exists (Zuckerman, 2007). This may mean religious primes are of relevance to this group 
because the primes might result in a contrast effect (compared to Agnostics who might not 
be affected by the prime at all). Thus, study into the effects of religious priming on this 
category of individuals (who actively disengage from the primed construct) is warranted. 
10.1.5 Overview of research and hypotheses 
The current study explores the effects of religious priming on attitudes towards gay 
men and lesbians. To do this, the present study uses (a) a methodology-based contextual 
prime to measure priming effects on implicit attitudes, and (b) a sample of self-identified 
Christians and Atheists.  This study will add to the growing literature on religious priming 
effects, and specifically to the scant literature on effects of religious priming on implicit 
attitudes. Furthermore, it will allow a replication of the implicit contextual variation 
findings from Studies 1 – 4, and also explore the potential for the implicit contextual 
variation technique (Mitchell et al., 2003) to induce religious priming effects. More 
specifically, in this study each participant will respond to three blocks with gay male 
targets and another three blocks with lesbian targets, and I will vary the distracter stimuli in 
each block. In one condition, there will opposite gender distracters (i.e. making the gender 
of the targets salient), in another same gender distracters (i.e. making the sexual orientation 
of the targets salient), and in the remaining blocks, same gender religious characters will be 
used, (i.e. making religion salient through contextual priming). I make the following 
predictions: 
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1) Explicit anti-gay attitudes: I expect explicit attitudes to be more anti-gay from 
Christians than from Atheists. Given that the explicit expression of anti-gay bias 
sometimes violates social norms, and in alignment with dual-process models of 
social cognitions (Wilson et al., 2000), we do not expect explicit attitudes to be 
correlated with implicit attitudes (see Dovidio et al., 2008). 
2) Implicit gender-based attitudes: I expect that when their gender (and not their 
sexual orientation) is made salient, lesbian targets will elicit more positive 
implicit attitudes than gay male targets (i.e., the “women are wonderful” effect, 
Rudman & Goodwin, 2004, p. 508; see also Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) 
3) Implicit sexual orientation attitudes: in line with previous findings (Chapters 5, 
6, & 9), I expect a reverse pattern of results when sexual orientation (and not 
gender) is made salient. Specifically, I expect lesbian targets to elicit implicit 
attitudes that are more negative when their sexual orientation is salient than when 
their gender is salient. Conversely, I expect gay male targets to elicit implicit 
attitudes that are more positive when their sexual orientation is salient than when 
their gender is salient.  
4) Implicit anti-gay attitudes  
a.  Christians: given that anti-gay attitudes are prescribed for Christians 
(Finlay & Walther, 2003; Herek, 2010), I expect that a religious prime 
would activate an anti-gay response tendency for Christian respondents 
(e.g., Ramsay et al., 2013). Thus, when the distracter targets in the 
implicit measure are of a religious nature (nuns and priests), I expect to 
find more anti-gay implicit attitudes from Christians toward both gay 
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male and lesbian targets in the priming condition compared to implicit 
anti-gay attitudes when religion is not primed, and implicit gender 
attitudes.  
b. Atheists: given the exploratory nature of a manipulation that primes 
Atheists with religion, we present two alternative hypotheses. First, if 
religious priming affects religious and non-religious participants in the 
same manner (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Johnson et al., 2010; Toburen & 
Meier, 2010), I expect that Atheists, like Christians, would demonstrate 
more anti-gay implicit attitudes in the religious priming condition than in 
the other conditions. Alternatively, given that Atheists do not subscribe to 
the value system that is presumably being activated, we could also expect 
no effect of a religious prime (i.e., observation of the same associations 
for gay male or lesbian targets presented in in the priming condition as the 
sexual orientation-salient condition).  
10.2 Method 
10.2.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 73 undergraduate students from an Australian 
university (Mage = 22.93 years, SDage = 8.07 years; 53 females) who participated for course 
credit. Forty-seven (65.40%) of the participants identified as Christian, and the remainder 
identified as Atheist. An additional 21 students had participated in the study but were 
excluded from analysis; nine were excluded for low accuracy (below chance) on the 
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implicit measure22, 10 for self-identifying as non-heterosexual (four bisexual females, 
three lesbians, three gay men)23, and two because of their religious affiliation (one Jew, 
one Muslim).   
10.2.2 Materials   
10.2.2.1 Explicit measures 
The Religious Fundamentalism scale (RF; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) 
explores levels of fundamental belief about religious teaching and the unchangeable nature 
of doctrine and religious practices. The RF scale comprises 20 items (e.g., “God has given 
mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally 
followed”) that are endorsed on a nine-point scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree). After reverse-scoring appropriate items, the scale is adjusted so that 
average scores can range from 1 to 9. Higher scores indicate more fundamental beliefs. 
The RF scale yielded a high level of reliability for the current sample (α = .91). 
The Religious Orientation Scale (ROS; Allport & Ross, 1967) comprises nine items 
that measure levels of intrinsic orientation (e.g., “It is important for me to spend periods of 
time in private religious thought and meditation.”) and 12 items measuring extrinsic 
orientation (e.g., “The church is most important as a place to formulate good social 
relationships.”). Intrinsic (i.e., instrumental) and extrinsic (i.e., utilitarian) religious 
                                                 
22 These participants also responded to explicit measures with a consistent responding style (e.g., all item 
responses were the same), suggesting they were not participating correctly. As such, the participants were 
excluded from all analyses, not just those involving the implicit measure. 
 
23 Including non-heterosexual participants did not change the significance of the results; exclusion was based 
on the logic of reducing sexual orientation-based in-group effects or internalised implicit anti-gay attitudes, 
both of which are separate empirical questions.   
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orientations distinguish motivations arising from religious tradition and from self-
contained goals (i.e., social ends, personal coping), respectively. Responses range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An average score is computed for each scale, 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of the relevant orientation. Both subscales 
yielded high levels of reliability for the current sample (αintrinsic = .82; αextrinsic = .90). 
The Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (ATLG; Herek, 1984a) 
measures explicit endorsement of positive and negative statements about gay men and 
lesbians. The scale comprises 10 statements about lesbians (ATL; e.g., “Female 
homosexuality is an inferior form of sexuality.”) and statement about gay men (ATG; e.g., 
“Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school.”), and responses range from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). After revere-scoring appropriate items, an 
average score is computed for each subscale, with higher scores representing anti-gay 
attitudes. Each subscale yielded high levels of reliability for this sample (ATL α = .83; 
ATG α = .86). 
10.2.2.2 Implicit measure 
Implicit attitudes were assessed by strength of associations between gay male and 
lesbian female (famous) faces with positive and negative words respectively using the 
person-based Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) as described in 
Chapter 4. Participants completed a 12-block GNAT (blocks randomised) that measured 
implicit attitudes toward recognisable gay men and lesbians who were presented in the 
condition of gender-salient (distracter of opposite gender), sexual orientation-salient 
(distracter of different sexual orientation, but same gender), or with a contextual religious 
prime (distracter of a religious individual; for design see Table 10, p.153). Prior to each 
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block, participants were presented with reminders of the complete set of target stimuli (and 
distracters), to attenuate learning curves associated with stimuli non-familiarity. For the 
current sample, the GNAT demonstrated acceptable reliabilities (MRaSSH = .73, SDRaSSH = 
.08; following protocol suggested by Williams & Kaufmann, 2012, see table 10). 
Attribute stimuli were the same two lists of words (eight positive words and eight 
negative words) used in Studies 1 - 4 (also see appendix A1). Target category stimuli were 
face pictures of famous gay men (e.g., Sean Hayes) and lesbians (e.g., Ellen DeGeneres), 
as necessitated for the person-based method of implicit measurement, also as used in 
Studies 1 - 4. Distracter stimuli were face pictures of heterosexual men (e.g., Justin 
Timberlake) and heterosexual women (e.g., Kate Winslet) for the gender and sexual 
orientation primes, and priests or nuns for the religious prime (see Table 10). I selected 
faces of religious individuals rather than religious iconography to allow for a socially 
relevant prime as would be suggested by social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954).   
10.2.3 Design 
This study used repeated measures factors of target (2: gay male, lesbian female), 
and the between subjects factor of participant religious affiliation (2: Christian, Atheist). 
Additionally, the implicit measure used a repeated measures manipulation of contextual 
prime block (3: gender, sexual orientation, religion).  
10.2.4 Procedure 
The study was advertised to psychology undergraduate students on the University’s 
research participation system. After being informed of the purpose and method of the 
study, students agreeing to participate were directed to a webpage hosted at 
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(http://www.millisecond.com/). After providing demographic information (i.e., age, 
gender, religious affiliation, and sexual orientation), students first responded to the 
religiosity measures (items randomised within scales, and scales randomised), followed by 
the explicit attitudes measure of attitudes towards gay men and lesbians (items 
randomised). Participants then completed the 12-block (randomised) GNAT, before being 
thanked and debriefed.  
10.3 Results 
10.3.1 Explicit Measures 
All measures were explored for normality. The measures of anti-gay explicit 
attitudes were strongly positively skewed, and this skew was corrected with a logarithmic 
transformation. Analyses are conducted on transformed data. Non-transformed descriptive 
data for the explicit measures are presented in Table 12. Scores on the explicit anti-gay 
measures were low, but unsurprisingly were slightly more negative from Christian 
respondents.  
10.3.2 Religiosity 
Independent sample t-tests were used to compare Christian and Atheist groups on 
religiosity measures. Christian participants responded with significantly higher average 
scores on all measures of religiosity than Atheist participants. Overall, the sample reported 





Descriptive, Inferential and Correlation Statistics for Explicit Measures. 
 Christian Atheist  Correlations 
Measures M (SD) M (SD) Cohen’s d 1 2 3 4 5 
Religiosity Measures         
1. Religious Fundamentalism 3.86 (1.40) 2.80 (1.17) 0.81* - .65** .17 .48** .46* 
2. Intrinsic orientation 2.99 (0.82) 2.10 (0.90) 1.03** .55* - .40* .33* .23 
3. Extrinsic orientation 3.12 (.052) 2.56 (.077) 0.85** .52* .83** - .04 .24 
     Explicit Anti-gay attitudes         
4. Lesbians 2.49 (1.38) 2.04 (1.12) 0.36 .55* .43* .49* - .75** 
5. Gay men 2.48 (1.27) 2.30 (1.68) 0.12 .51* .32 .47* .61** - 
Note: Correlation coefficients presented in boldface are significant, * p<.01, **p<.001; Pearson correlations reported above the 
diagonal are responses from Atheists (N=26), those below the diagonal are from Christians (N = 47). Significant Cohen’s d values 
indicate significant differences between Christian and Atheist group responses on the variable (between-groups t-test); Analyses were 
conducted on transformed data, but non-transformed data has been reported for ease of interpretation. 
 154 
10.3.3 Explicit attitudes 
To explore differences in self-reported attitudes, a mixed-design factorial ANOVA 
was used to analyse ALTG scores as a function of the target’s gender (2: gay male, lesbian 
female) and the participant’s religion (2: Christian, Atheist)24. Christians reported more 
anti-gay attitudes than Atheists, and attitudes were more anti-gay toward gay men than 
toward lesbians. Neither of these main effects reached significance (p > .31). The 
interaction between the two variables was not significant, F(1, 70) = 1.07, p = .31, ηp2 = 
.02.  
10.3.4 Implicit attitudes  
The signal detection theory parameters were calculated as an index of sensitivity 
for each block (i.e., d' value; Green & Swets, 1966), consistent with protocols suggested by 
the authors of the GNAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Average d' scores for gay male and 
lesbian targets and associations with the target attribute (i.e., GOOD or BAD) are 
presented in Table 10. Subsequent descriptive data and inferential statistics refer to the 
implicit attitude score (calculated by subtracting the d' value of each target’s association 
with negative words from the d' value of its associations with positive words within each 
block, see full description in Chapter 5). Thus, a positive attitude score represents an 
overall positive implicit automatic association for the target-attribute pairing. Overall, the 
sample demonstrated relatively low levels of implicit anti-gay attitudes. Lesbian targets 
elicited positive implicit attitudes in all contexts, and gay male targets elicited positive 
                                                 
24 Due to unequal number of male and female participants, and a relatively limited sample size, effects of 
participant’s gender could not be analysed. 
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implicit attitudes in the context of sexual orientation and religion, but negative implicit 
attitudes in the context of their gender see table 13).  
To explore implicit attitudes as a function of implicit contextual variation for each 
group, these values were analysed using a three-way mixed factorial ANOVA, with the 
between-subject factor of participant’s religion (2: Christian, Atheist) and the within-
subject factors of target (2: gay male, lesbian female) and contextual salience (3: gender, 
sexual orientation, religion). Analysis of the data revealed a main effect of target F(1, 66) 
= 12.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. On average, gay male targets elicited more negative attitudes 
than lesbian targets, however, this was complicated by an interaction with the contextual 
salience of the target factor F(2, 65) = 6.45, p = .003, ηp2 = .17. A simple effects analysis 
of implicit attitudes toward lesbian targets revealed that lesbian targets presented in the 
context of their sexual orientation elicit significantly more implicit anti-gay attitudes than 
when the same targets are presented in the context of their gender (p = .01), with no 
differences between the other contextual manipulation conditions (p > .31). Conversely, 
simple effects analysis of implicit attitudes toward gay men revealed that gay male targets 
presented in the context of their gender elicit significantly more implicit anti-gay attitudes 
than when the same targets are presented in the context of their sexual orientation (p = .03) 
or in a religious context (p = .01). Further, in this sample, the gender context led to 
significantly more negative implicit attitudes towards gay males than towards lesbians 
t(71) = 5.72, p < .001. However, these differences were not significant in the remaining 
conditions (i.e., sexual orientation or religion; p’s < .21; see Figure 6).  
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Table 13 
GNAT Block Stimuli, Mean d', Standard Error, and Reliabilities  




Target attribute valence 
(words) 
M (SE) RaSSH 
Gender Gay male Heterosexual female Positive 2.41 (0.09) .76 
 Gay male  Heterosexual female Negative 2.81 (0.10) .70 
 Lesbian female  Heterosexual male Positive 2.46 (0.11) .66 
 Lesbian female  Heterosexual male Negative 2.23 (0.10) .70 
Sexual Orientation  Gay male Heterosexual male Positive 1.94 (0.10) .67 
 Gay male  Heterosexual male Negative 1.74 (0.08) .96 
 Lesbian female  Heterosexual female Positive 1.92 (0.93) .73 
 Lesbian female  Heterosexual female Negative 2.01 (0.10) .77 
Religion  Gay male Priest Positive 2.77 (0.11) .60 
 Gay male  Priest Negative 2.64 (0.10) .76 
 Lesbian female  Nun Positive 2.65 (0.10) .73 
 Lesbian female  Nun Negative 2.41 (0.11) .73 
Note: RaSSH reliability scores are calculated using the protocol suggested by Williams and Kaufmann (2013); target 
category and distracter stimuli are pictures of faces presented in a 10cm x 10cm frame. 
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Figure 6. Mean (and standard error) implicit anti-gay attitudes as a function of contextual 
variation. 
 
No main effects of contextual variation (p = .32), or of participant religion (p = .40) 
were found. However, there was an interaction between these variables F(2, 65) = 6.45,  
p = .003, ηp2 = .17 (see Figure 7)25. This interaction was driven by Atheist participants F(2, 
23) = 5.25, p = .01, ηp2 = .31. Post-hoc tests revealed that Atheists demonstrated 
significantly more positive implicit attitudes when targets were presented with the religious 
contextual prime than when presented in either the context of gender (p = .006) or in the 
context of sexual orientation (p = .05). Interestingly, there were no differences for 
Christian participants as a function of context (p = .81).  
                                                 
25 This finding did not involve an interaction with the target’s gender. As such, I averaged the implicit 
































Figure 7. Mean (and standard error) implicit anti-gay attitudes (i.e., to gay men and 
lesbians) as a function of contextual variation and participant religious affiliation. 
 
Finally, independent sample t-tests revealed that implicit anti-gay attitudes in a 
religious context were significantly more positive from Atheists than from Christians 
t(45.36) = -2.08, p = .04; differences in the gender and sexual orientation contexts did not 
reach significance (p’s > .428). No higher order interaction existed (p = .30). 
10.3.5 Explicit-implicit correlations 
Bivariate correlation analysis revealed that few correlations existed between 
implicit measures. For Christians, implicit attitudes towards gay men were related to 
implicit attitudes towards lesbians when both were elicited in the context of religion (r = 






























gender and the context of religion were related (r = .57, p = .02). No other implicit 
measures were related (all p’s > .19). Implicit attitudes did not correlate with religiosity 
measures (all p’s > .119).   
Some relationships existed between explicit and implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes 
toward gay men were related to implicit attitudes differently for Christians and Atheists as 
a function of the target’s context. Specifically, in the context of sexual orientation, negative 
explicit attitudes and negative implicit attitudes towards gay men were related for 
Christians (r = .40, p = .009), but not for Atheists (p = .35). The reverse pattern existed 
when presented in the context of gender; attitudes were related for Atheists (r = .46, p = 
.04), but not for Christians (p = .77). Explicit attitudes towards lesbians were not related to 
implicit attitudes (all p’s > .16).  
10.4 Discussion 
The existing religious priming literature has yet to explore the effects of religious 
priming on Atheists. The present study used contextual prime to elicit implicit attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbians during gender and sexual orientation salient conditions, and 
in a religious prime condition, with a sample of Christians and Atheists. We also measured 
explicit attitudes and relevant measures of religiosity.  
10.4.1 Explicit attitudes 
Christians in this sample reported higher levels of religiosity than Atheists, and as 
predicted by our first hypothesis, also expressed higher levels of explicit anti-gay attitudes. 
Gay men and lesbians are often considered to be value-violators by many religious 
traditions, including Christianity (Herek, 1987). This explains our results, and matches the 
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existing evidence that religious individuals express explicit anti-gay attitudes more than 
non-religious individuals (Finlay & Walther, 2003; Whitley, 2009). Christian participants 
also reported more explicit anti-gay attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians, which 
replicates the vast majority of existing research (e.g., Herek, 2000b, 2002; Kite & Whitley, 
1996). Various explanations for this robust finding have been proposed, from the 
eroticisation of lesbians in popular culture (Louderback & Whitley, 1997) through to 
differing manifestations of sexual orientation-based threat from gay men and lesbians 
(Herek, 2000b; Herek & Capitanio, 1996).  
10.4.2 Implicit attitudes 
Implicit attitudes towards gay and lesbian targets in this sample were relatively 
positive, supporting our second and third hypotheses, the GNAT blocks in which gender 
and sexual orientation were salient replicated the findings Chapters 4, 5, and 9. 
Specifically, when gender was made salient, lesbian targets elicited positive implicit 
attitudes and gay men elicited negative implicit attitudes (which also align with the 
findings of Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). However, when the same targets were presented 
in the context of their sexual orientation (i.e., with a distracter of the same gender, and thus 
no gender comparison is available), the pattern of results revealed more negative attitudes 
towards lesbian targets. These findings add to the limited body of literature providing 
evidence of implicit contextual variation (Mitchell et al., 2003). Further, these results also 
provide support for implicit inversion theory, which suggests that gay targets are perceived 
as being more stereotypically similar to their heterosexual opposite-gender counterparts 
than heterosexual same-gender counterparts (Kite & Deaux, 1987). 
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The fourth and fifth hypotheses were not supported. The implicit attitudes of 
Christians towards gay people (i.e., gay men and lesbians) did not vary in the context of a 
religious prime, contrary to our fourth prediction. This would align with the work of Mak 
and Tsang (2008) who experimentally separated the “sinner from the sin” (p.379). 
Specifically, they found that higher levels of (intrinsic) religiosity led to more negative 
attitudes toward a promiscuous lesbian than toward a celibate lesbian. In the case of 
interpreting our findings, it could be that (for Christians) religious priming elicits no 
response to an individual (who happens to be gay) but would elicit implicit anti-gay 
attitudes from homosexual people as a group, as many of the related constructs (e.g., gay 
sex, gay marriage) violate religious belief systems. More specifically, person-based 
attitudes might reflect attitudes towards the sinner (i.e., no evidence of promiscuity), while 
category-based attitudes might reflect attitudes towards the sin (i.e., gay behaviours).  
The most parsimonious account of the finding that the implicit attitudes of 
Christians did not vary after the religious prime might be that person-based representations 
of gay men and women are less value-violating than category-based version of this 
construct (as discussed previously, see Chapter 9). A second explanation could list in the 
relatively positive attitudes in the sample as a whole, a seen in low levels of both explicit 
and implicit attitudes. That is, it is possible that religious primes only influence Christian 
participants with more negative baseline anti-gay attitudes. Conversely, religion might be a 
value system that is perpetually activated in Christian participants, which would explain 
the null priming effect (i.e., religious ceiling effects; in this sample, religion is always 
primed). A final explanation could be that the sample reported low levels of religiosity, and 
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perhaps the prime might have had an effect if the Christian part of the sample had been 
more religious. 
Unexpectedly, the implicit attitudes of Atheists toward gay people become 
dramatically more positive in the context of a religious prime. This is inconsistent with the 
hypotheses that either (a) priming would affect religious and non-religious participants in 
the same manner (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Johnson et al., 2010; Toburen & Meier, 2010), or 
(b) we would expect no effect of a religious prime given that Atheists do not subscribe to 
the religious value system that is presumably being activated. These results also stand out 
from the majority of the religious priming literature (e.g., Pichon et al., 2007; Vilaythong 
et al., 2010) in that it seems to have produced a contrast rather than an assimilation effect 
which has been observed with other primed constructs (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).  
Evidence for this account is found in the finding that an incompatible meaning 
system (i.e., priming religious beliefs) caused an aversive reaction in Atheists (see Inzlicht 
& Tullett, 2010 for evidence of neurological responses associated with defensive reactions 
after religious priming). As such, contextual religious priming activates the value system 
that Atheists reject, and then, these Atheists meet the expected priming response (e.g., 
religion says homosexuality is a sin) with a defensive reaction would result in a reserved 
response to the expected response from Christians (i.e., positive implicit attitudes).   
An explanation of contrast effect observed for Atheist may be that religious priming might 
indirectly activate associated religious value systems, such as RF (Ramsay et al., 2013). 
Johnson and colleagues (2010) have suggested that religious primes might activate related 
constructs such as conservatism, traditionalism, or right-wing authoritarianism rather than 
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religion. In this case, our findings can be interpreted as Atheist’s reactance to religious 
primes rather than the activation of religious concepts. However, this interpretation 
requires the demonstration of the same reactance effect to straight targets, or targets 
belonging to other social categories. Finally, a less likely explanation is that the religious 
prime highlights religion-based group membership. Atheists, like gay people, are out-
group members to Christian participants. As such, the increase in implicit attitudes in 
Atheist respondents could be a demonstration of a surrogate in-group bias.  
10.4.3 Explicit-Implicit Correlations 
Implicit and explicit attitudes were largely unrelated; in the case of lesbians, 
attitudes were not related at all, and in the case of gay men there were two significant 
correlations. These were in the sexual orientation salient block from Christian (but not 
Atheist) participants, and the gender-salient block for Atheist (but not Christian) 
participants. I prefer to interpret the lack of correlations in this study as support for dual 
models of attitudes (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000) which argue that explicit and implicit 
attitudes are related but distinct attitude representations of the same attitude-object, or that 
the deviant results between the two measures are due to method specific variance (Nosek 
& Smyth, 2007). An alternative theoretical stance (i.e., single-construct models; Fazio, 
2007; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) might suggest that this is evidence of socially 
desirable responding in response to the explicit measure; a secondary process might have 
been applied to explicit attitudes, which might be evidence that religion is being used to 




This study is not without limitations. Perhaps the most prominent is the lack of 
experimental blocks with straight targets, which would demonstrate if the reactance effect 
observed for Atheists participants extends to all attitudes, or is specific to religious 
violating (or at least to gay) targets. Second, all picture stimuli used to represent gay and 
straight targets were faces of famous people. In contrast, the religious prime stimuli were 
faces of non-famous people. This means that, for religious prime blocks, there is a 
significant difference in stimuli that includes fame, as well as the intended difference in 
(likely) sexual orientation.  
10.4.5 Conclusions 
Research into the complicated relationship between prejudice and religion has been 
extended to include the effects of religious priming on these social attitudes. This study is 
one of few to explore the effects of religious priming on anti-gay attitudes, and, to our 
knowledge, is the first to study the effects of priming religious concepts on self-identifying 
Atheists.  
I used the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes. I 
explored the explicit and implicit attitudes of Christian and Atheist student participants, 
and found that attitudes were predictably moderate to positive within this sample with 
implicit gender and sexual-orientation attitudes replicating previous findings (see Studies 
1-4). The use of a religious contextual prime during the measurement of implicit attitudes 
elicited an unexpected pattern of findings. Due to the religious nature of the belief system 
being activated, I predicted that religious priming would affect the subsequent attitudes of 
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Christians; however, the prime did not affect these participants, rather, I found that this 
prime resulted in an increase of positive implicit gay attitudes.  
The findings of the current study extend our knowledge of religious priming effects 
in several important ways. Importantly, it provides evidence that the effects of religious 
priming extend not only to religious out-group members, and those with low levels of 
religiosity, but even to those who adamantly do not subscribe to the belief system. This 
suggests that religion and religious concepts (or at least related concepts) are pervasive 
components for consideration in social cognition research. The findings of this study 
suggest that religious primes can elicit prosocial implicit (person-based) attitudes towards 
gay individuals, which may have important implications for intervening with negative 
attitudes. However, before such a strong conclusion can be drawn, this effect will need to 
be replicated and demonstrated that it is different for gay targets compared to straight 
targets. Finally, this study validates the use of method-based priming in implicit 
methodologies, and adds to the scant body of evidence supporting the contextual variation 
of implicit attitudes.  
Many religious teachings have been understood to sanction negative attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbians, and this prescription has led to a hostile relationship 
between religious groups and the gay community. The current findings suggest that 
individuation (i.e., emphasising personhood, rather than social category membership; e.g., 
Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, & Klauer, 2003) may provide a means for reducing 
prejudice experienced by gay men and lesbians (also see Harris & Fiske, 2006; Wheeler & 
Fiske, 2005). Conversely, focussing on the potential for religion to have prosocial 
outcomes may reduce hostility towards religious groups. If both of these are achieved, the 
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potential for positive intergroup contact (Allport, 1954) should be enhanced and allow for a 
general improvement for intergroup relations between these groups (Herek, 1996b; Herek 




Chapter 11 – General Discussion and Conclusion 
_____________________________________ 
11.1 Introduction and Overview 
 
At the beginning of this thesis, I argued that an alternative method for measuring 
implicit attitudes to gay men and lesbians was necessary to address several important issues 
pertaining to the construct being measured (e.g., the nebulous social category “gay” vs. the 
more specific “gay people”). I acknowledged that previous researchers had used category-
based stimuli to overcome issues associated with representation of this social category (e.g., 
gay people are not clearly identifiable from physical features, see Freeman et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, I suggested that the category-based stimuli used might measure attitudes 
towards gay people but is also likely to elicit attitudes to related issued such as attitudes 
toward same-sex sexual behaviours, public displays of affection, same-sex marriage, 
political activism, and gay marriage. Arguably these are important issues, but it is not 
always the intention of research to assess this broad range of issues, and I have argued that 
the interpretation of implicit attitudes as measured using these stimuli may not accurately 
reflect anti-gay attitudes experienced by gay people. 
As a solution to my critique of the typical approach to the measurement of implicit 
anti-gay attitudes, I presented the person-based approach. This measure builds on seminal 
work of Mitchell and colleagues’ (2003) demonstration of contextual variation, which 
varies the salience of the social categories by using contrasting categories. This procedure 
has been thoroughly described in previous sections of this thesis (see Chapter 4). As a brief 
recap, contextual variation allows sexual orientation to be made salient by using (for 
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example) gay men as targets and straight men as distracters (i.e., the factor that allows to 
discriminate between targets and distracters is the factor of interest). I argued that with the 
use of this contextual variation, the “person-based” implicit attitudes toward gay people 
could be measured to the same (gay) targets as a function of either their gender, or their 
sexual orientation. Furthermore, these person-based attitudes towards gay targets on the 
basis of their sexual orientation could be compared to category-based representations (e.g. 
same-sex cake toppers). The studies that comprise this dissertation were designed to 
address the objectives: 
 
5. Can contextual variation be used to make the gender or sexual orientation of a 
target salient, which would facilitate assessment of person-based implicit 
gender attitudes and implicit sexual orientation attitudes toward the same 
target?  
6. Does this person-based approach measure implicit anti-gay attitudes that are 
different to those measured using typical stimuli?  
7. What individual difference factors predict person-based implicit anti-gay 
attitudes? 
8. Can contextual variation be used to prime a relevant attitudinal context that 
differentially affects person-based implicit anti-gay attitudes?  
In this chapter, I will first review the evidence that I have presented for the person-
based approach (i.e., Chapters 5, 6, 9, & 10) as it relates to the overall objectives presented 
above. I will then discuss the general advantages and limitations of the person-based 
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approach, and how they relate to the existing literature, before closing this chapter with the 
final remarks of the dissertation.  
11.2 Reviewing the Person-Based Approach 
11.2.1 Evidence for the person-based approach 
In Studies 1 and 2, gender based attitudes towards straight targets replicated extant 
findings in the literature. That is, stronger implicit associations were demonstrated between 
straight female targets and positive attributes, and between straight male targets and 
negative attributes (or females implicitly evaluated as positive, and males implicitly 
evaluated as negative; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). In Studies 1, 2, and 5, this pattern of 
results was also found for gay male and lesbian targets when gender was the salient social 
category (i.e., when the distracter stimuli were the opposite gender to the targets, eliciting a 
gender comparison). This demonstrates that implicit person-based gender attitudes do not 
vary as a function of the sexual orientation of the target.  
The evidence for implicit person-based attitudes towards sexual orientation, and 
support for the contextual variation as a method for assessing these, was demonstrated 
across all five studies. Specifically, when the sexual orientation was salient (i.e., when the 
distracter stimuli were the same gender as the targets, removing the gender comparison), 
the pattern of results was both strongly attenuated and reversed compared to the gender-
based attitudes towards the same target (i.e., implicit associations were generally stronger 
between GAY MEN+GOOD, and between LESBIANS+BAD). To reiterate, this reversal in 
the pattern of results occurred only as a function of the contextual variation, and this pattern 
of implicit person-based attitudes towards gay targets was consistently replicated across 
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five studies. Thus, in answering the question posed by the first objective of the thesis, 
contextual variation can indeed be used to make either the gender or sexual orientation of a 
target salient. Furthermore, implicit attitudes as a function of these distinct social categories 
can be measured independently using the same targets. 
The findings that revealed the person-based approach elicits positive implicit 
attitudes towards gay men and negative implicit attitudes toward lesbians were in stark 
contrast to the existing literature which used category-based stimuli (e.g., Banse et al., 
2001; Breen & Karpinski, 2013; Steffens, 2005). It should be noted that these findings 
tended to report moderate to strong implicit negative attitudes toward gay people. However, 
in light of this inconsistency, further work was needed to establish the validity of the 
person-based approach. Specifically, the question of how person-based attitudes differ from 
typically measured attitudes remained unanswered. Thus, I in Study 3 I presented the 
evidence from a within-subjects experiment in which I directly compared attitudes 
measured via typical approaches (i.e., using category-based stimuli) and the person-based 
approach in Study 3.  
The comparison of the person-based and the typical approach to the measurement of 
implicit anti-gay attitudes replicated previous results (i.e., both from Studies 1 and 2, and 
from published research). First, lesbians were implicitly evaluated positively compared to 
gay men when category-based stimuli were used, and the opposite was the case when 
person-based stimuli were used for the same participants. Thus, the pattern of results for 
gay men and lesbians is completely reversed when the different approaches are used, 
suggesting that the attitudes being measured when using each of the two approaches are 
indeed qualitatively different. Nonetheless, these findings speak to the second major aim of 
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the thesis, showing that the evidence suggests that the person-based approach does measure 
implicit anti-gay attitudes that are different from those elicited by typically used stimuli. 
11.2.2 Use of the person-based approach 
After having demonstrated that person-based attitudes are indeed different to 
category-based attitudes, I wanted to demonstrate the use of the person-based approach in 
the context of other research that often uses implicit attitudes in answering broader 
questions. Thus, I explored the relationship between religion and implicit person-based 
anti-gay attitudes in Studies 4 and 5.  
First I showed that implicit person-based attitudes could not be predicted by 
expected variables in a sample where large amounts of variance in explicit attitudes were 
accounted for by demographic variables and higher levels of religious fundamentalism. 
Again, this finding (regarding implicit attitudes) is inconsistent with most of the literature 
(e.g., Rowatt et al., 2005; Mak & Tsang, 2008). However, I have recent work that reveals 
the same pattern of (null) results in a sample of Muslims and Atheists26. Specifically, when 
using category-based stimuli in a GNAT, large amounts of variance in explicit attitudes 
towards gay men and women could be accounted for by demographic variables, but neither 
demographic variables, ideological factors, nor contact predicted implicit attitudes; 
Anderson & Koc, 2015). In combination, this suggests that the predictors of implicit 
attitudes are indeed different to those of explicit attitudes, supporting claims that explicit 
and implicit attitudes are indeed distinct (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). More work is 
                                                 
26 Although on a related topic, this research is not presented in this dissertation because it does not 
evidence the person-based approach to measuring implicit anti-gay attitudes. 
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needed to discover variables that are related to implicit anti-gay attitudes generally, and 
person-based attitudes specifically.  
Finally, in Study 5 I demonstrated that the person-based approach could be used to 
elicit religious priming effects, also by using implicit contextual variation techniques 
(Mitchell et al., 2003). When using religious faces that were the same gender as the targets 
(see Chapter 10), I found that the implicit attitudes of Christians did not vary while the 
implicit attitudes of Atheists, somewhat unexpectedly, became significantly more positive. 
My preferred explanation of the contrast effect observed for Atheist participants in response 
to the religious prime is that they demonstrated an aversive reaction to the combination of 
religious and gay stimuli leading to a strong positive implicit response to gay targets. This 
occurs because, priming an incompatible meaning system (i.e., religious beliefs in 
Atheists), causes a defensive reaction which would result in a reserved response to the 
expected response from Christians (i.e., thus resulting in positive implicit attitudes; see also 
Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010; for a discussion on alternative explanations, see Chapter 10). 
The person-based approached produced several unexpected findings relating to 
religion. For example, religious affiliation and religious fundamentalism did not predict 
implicit person-based attitudes, and religious priming did not affect the attitudes of 
Christians. The most parsimonious explanation of these null effects may be the “sinner vs. 
the sin” account. In the context of the current findings, a distinction between the sinner and 
the sin might mean that a person-based measure of anti-gay attitudes reflects the evluations 
of  gay individuals who do not necessarily violate religious norms [no evidence of non-
celibacy] and, consequently are not implicitly penalised. In constrast, category-based 
 173 
representation is more likely to evoke the violation of the religious norms (e.g., same-sex 
sexual behaviour, gay marriage;  Mak & Tsang, 2008).  
In response to the third major aim of the thesis, the findings revealed that neither 
demographic nor religiosity factors predict person-based implicit gay attitudes, and in 
response to the fourth major aim of the thesis, the evidence suggests that the person-based 
approach can also be used to create a method-based contextual prime (at least in the domain 
of religion). In combination this suggests that our existing understanding of the relationship 
between religiosity and category-based implicit anti-gay attitudes does not extend to the 
relationship between religiosity and person-based implicit attitudes. 
11.3 Limitations and future research 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated strong evidence for the person-based approach as 
an important and meaningful measure of implicit attitudes to gay men and lesbians. The 
measure revealed good to excellent internal reliability, which was consistently 
demonstrated across all five studies. Although the third and fourth empirical chapters 
further contributed to the evidence for the person-based approach and demonstrated 
preliminary examples for its application to the relationship between religion and anti-gay 
attitudes, the findings presented raised some important questions.  
One major limitation of the third empirical chapter (i.e., Chapter 9) was that the 
evidence revealed neither demographic nor religiosity factors predicted person-based 
implicit anti-gay attitudes. It is important to note that these results were obtained in a 
sample of people with a relatively restricted range of attitudes, whose attitudes were fairly 
positive. It is possible that demographic and religiosity factors may predict anti-gay 
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attitudes in a sample of people representing a wider range of attitudes that includes the 
more extreme end of the spectrum. Second, this study did not exhaustively explore other 
individual difference factors, which might predict such attitudes. The research question I 
posed was whether demographic or religiosity factors predicted anti-gay attitudes, which 
the findings presented suggest only occurs for explicit attitudes. While this is not a 
limitation in itself, it does leave the question of what individual difference factors might 
predict person-based implicit attitudes unanswered. For example, right-wing 
authoritarianism (i.e., a individual difference factor that posits a preference for 
traditionalism and obedience to authority; Altemeyer, 1991) is a construct that has been 
shown to co-vary with religious fundamentalism (Hunsberger, 1995; Jonathan, 2008). 
Therefore, religion-specific individual difference factors might not correlate with negative 
attitudes towards gay people (i.e., person-based attitudes), while constructs that are not 
religion-specific might (see Johnson et al., 2010). This is important for future research.  
In relation to the fourth empirical chapter (i.e., Chapter 10), the unexpected finding 
that Atheists demonstrated an aversive reaction to the religious prime needs further 
exploration. For example, one would expect that Atheists would respond the same way to 
primes of other religions that prescribe anti-gay attitudes as to the Christian religious prime 
in this thesis. Thus, distracter stimuli that are (same-gender as target) picture of religious 
teachers of Islam, Hindu, or Judaism should elicit the same effect. The method-based 
contextual prime should also be explored between religions (i.e., the experiment in Chapter 
10 conducted in a non-Christian [but religiously affiliated] sample). Finally, this method-
based contextual prime has the potential to be applied to other domains; this also is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
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11. 4 Synthesis with the Existing Literature 
11.4.1 Explicit anti-gay attitudes 
Across the five empirical studies, the explicit measures revealed explicit attitudes 
that were mostly consistent, if a little positive, compared to the extant literature on anti-gay 
attitudes. All of the samples reported relatively low levels of explicit anti-gay attitudes 
(consistent with notions that either anti-gay attitudes are genuinely decreasing, or norms 
towards this social category prohibit their explicit public endorsement Herek & McLemore, 
2013; see also Pereira et al., 2009). The existing literature (e.g., Herek, 1984a; Herek & 
Capitanio, 1999) has found consistent differences as a function of the target gender which 
were partially replicated in Chapters 5 and 6, with the participants reporting attitudes that 
were less negative (but not significantly) towards lesbians than gay men. Across the thesis, 
no significant differences existed as a function of the target’s gender. This could be 
explained by a floor effect (i.e., all reported attitudes were positive). It is impossible to 
determine whether the observed attitudes correspond to genuinely positive attitudes or are 
the result of self-presentation concerns. 
Participant differences reported in this thesis also replicated the existing literature. 
Specifically, in Chapter 5 (Experiment 2) and Chapter 9 male participants reported more 
anti-gay attitudes than female participants (e.g.,  Herek, 2002; Herek & Capitanio, 1999). 
Further, an interaction with the target gender was observed in Chapter 5, Experiment 2, 
such that straight men reported more anti-gay attitudes towards gay men than towards 
lesbians. In these samples, straight participants also reported more anti-gay attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbians than gay participants (Banse et al., 2001; Cullen & Barnes-
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Holmes, 2008). Finally, in Chapters 9 and 10, Christian participants reported more anti-gay 
attitudes than non-Christians (as per Finlay & Walther, 2003). 
11.4.2 Implicit anti-gay attitudes 
As the person-based approach was introduced in this thesis as a new method, there 
are no existing findings against which to compare person-based implicit attitude results. 
However, across all five experiments presented in this thesis (Ntotal =432) the same pattern 
of results was observed. In Study 3 I demonstrated that typical approaches to measuring 
attitudes (i.e., category-based) matched the findings presented in the existing literature. 
Given these findings, it can be concluded that this thesis provides converging validity for 
the person-based approach, rather than evidence of a failure to replicate existing findings. 
Other interesting results from the thesis, which also replicated the existing literature, 
included the finding that implicit attitudes demonstrated by male participants (regardless of 
sexual orientation) towards all targets were less extreme than the attitudes observed for 
female participants (discussed by Carpenter & Banaji, 2000, as cited in Mitchell et al., 
2003). This might reflect genuinely less extreme attitudes, or it could be an issue of 
gendered task performance (e.g., males performed better on all blocks resulting in a smaller 
mean difference scores). Second, there was evidence of an in-group bias for women, 
matching the work of Rudman and Goodwin (2004), however, the present findings extend 
this work to reveal that the automatic female in-group bias extends to sexual orientation for 
lesbian, but not straight, women. More specifically, lesbian participants demonstrated an in-
group bias (i.e. more positive attitudes) towards both lesbian and straight female targets, 
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whereas straight female participants demonstrated the in-group bias for straight female 
targets only.  
Interestingly, the data presented within this dissertation contained a distinct lack of 
group-based differences that might have been expected based on the literature on attitudes 
towards gay men and lesbian women. For example, based on the existing literature, Study 2 
predicted more negative attitudes from straight participants than gay participants (e.g., 
Herek & McLemore, 2013) and Study 5 predicted more negative attitudes from Atheist 
participants than from Christian participants. In fact, these predictions were supported by 
the explicit attitudes data presented here. However, this was not the case with the implicit 
attitudes data. It is worth noting these group-based differences have been found mostly in 
studies tat report explicit attitudes (e.g., for a meta-analysis see Whitely, 2009). Indeed, the 
limited literature on implicit attitudes towards gay men and lesbians has reported mixed 
results about group-based differences (see Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008) and of course 
beyond the data presented here, there is no person-based data available for comparison. 
Thus, while the lack of group-based differences could be considered to be an indication of a 
lack of known-group validity, it could equally be the case that such differences do not occur 
at the group level (at least for these groups) in the particular case of implicit attitudes. 
11.4.3 Correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes 
Previous research has found little evidence for stable or predictable correlations 
between explicit and implicit measures (Nosek, 2007; Nosek & Smyth, 2007). This was 
also the case in the studies in this thesis, with the large majority of explicit-implicit 
correlations being non-significant. Theoretically, this can be due to a variety of reasons, 
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including methodological (i.e., [non-]shared characteristics of the measures) or cognitive 
(i.e., memory retrieval issues, lack of introspection to implicit constructs, motivational bias’ 
pertaining to explicit constructs) accounts, or a non-existent relationship between the 
constructs (see Hofmann et al., 2005). In line with dual-attitude models, in this thesis, I 
interpreted this as evidence as providing support for Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006) 
proposal that explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes are related but, nonetheless, distinct 
attitude representations of the same attitude-object. 
Although my preferred explanation for the observed lack of correlation between 
implicit and explicit attitudes towards gay men or lesbians is that these two attitudes are 
distinct but may be related (Nosek, 2007), there are several explanations of this null effect 
that are worth discussing. Hoffman and colleagues (2005) suggested five theoretical factors 
that cause low correlations between explicit and implicit measures. First, socially desirable 
response styles would lead to attenuation of reported (i.e., explicit) negativity, but does not 
affect implicit negativity (based on the assumption that implicit cognitions are beyond 
conscious control and thus not available for conscious distortion). Moreover, this only 
affects participants who are motivated to control their negativity which means can affect 
the relationship between measures for a sample (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wilson et al., 
2000). Second (and third), there are cognitive factors that might explain the lack of 
correlations. For example, Rudman (2004) has suggested that for correlations to exist, 
individuals would not only have to be willing to report negative attitudes, they would also 
need to be able to access them; in some circumstances, individuals may not be capable of 
introspecting on implicitly accessed representations. Similarly, (third) there might be 
cognitive factors that could influence the retrieval of relevant information from memory. 
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Given that implicit attitudes can be defined as associations stored in long-term memory 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001), issues with accessing memory 
would also limit the potential for correlations between these constructs. Fourth, there might 
be issues related to procedural factors with either the explicit or the implicit measure. For 
example, the presentation order of critical blocks can influence outcomes of the implicit 
measure (e.g., IAT effects are impacted by the order of presentation of compatible and 
incompatible blocks; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), and thus also correlations with explicit 
measures. At a more micro level, randomised presentation of trials in the implicit measure 
has the potential to mistake individual-level differences in the order of trials with 
individual-level differences in attitudes towards the assessed representation (Gawronski, 
2002). And fifth, in agreement with my preferred explanation as well as dual-theory 
models, the observed lack of correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes could be 
due to the constructs simply being distinct from one another. 
• Research has demonstrated that the lack of correlations between explicit and 
implicit measures typically reflects important and meaningful factors (e.g., social 
desirability, method specific variance) rather than evidence for the validity of implicit 
measures. Nonetheless, such a finding is important, suggesting that the seemingly common 
attitude-object is the target of different explicit and implicit attitudes. Taken together with 
research demonstrating the important contribution of implicit attitudes in predicting 
behaviour both in isolation, and incrementally beyond the predictive validity of explicit 
measures, (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Dovidio et al., 1997; Gawronski et al., 
2003) it is essential to assess both if we are to understand important real-world issues such 
as the prejudice  and discrimination faced by gay men and lesbians.  
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11.5 General Limitations  
11.5.1 Accounting for contact 
One limitation that is common to all experiments presented in this thesis, is that the 
variability of previous contact that participants had with gay and lesbian people was not 
measured, and thus I have not accounted for effects of the contact hypothesis (e.g., Allport, 
1954). Certain demographic features of individuals within the sample (i.e., straight, 
religious, male) may be systematically related to having less (or poorer quality) social 
contact with a gay or lesbian person. Similarly, other demographic groups might be more 
likely to have friends or family members who disclose their same-sex orientation to them 
(Kaufmann, Williams, Hosking, Anderson, & Pedder, 2015). In reality, certain 
demographic features of the sample might encourage any gay people that they encounter to 
keep their sexual orientation invisible (Herek, 1996a; Herek & Capitanio, 1996; S. J. Smith 
et al., 2009; Techakesari et al., 2015). For example, if a gay person believes that disclosing 
their sexual orientation to Christians will attract negative attitudes, it is logical that they 
will avoid disclosing their sexual orientation to a Christian individual. If this is the case, 
then Christian individuals would be less likely to meet (openly) gay people, which would 
limit the potential for their negative attitudes to become changed via contact, and thus a 
disclosure-attitudes relationship cycle may be born.  
11.5.2 Gay People vs. gay behaviour 
The present study did not directly measure differences between negative attitudes 
toward gay people and negative attitudes toward same-sex sexual behaviour. For example, 
in the case of religious participants, the general construct of anti-gay attitudes may be 
driven by perceptions that gay behaviour is a direct violation of the doctrinal proclamation 
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that “thou shalt not lie win mankind, as with womankind: [because] it is an abomination” 
(Leviticus 18:22, King James Version). This proclamation does not extend to celibate 
individuals who are gay. Thus, the potential to violate religious belief systems through 
same-sex sexual behaviour is not possible with the person-based approach which presents 
the face of a single gay individual. As discussed earlier, Mak and Tsang (2008) have 
conceptualized this as ‘loving the sinner’, but ‘hating the sin’ (p. 379). Thus, it could be 
that, for Christians, having a salient religious identity, or effects of religious priming, could 
elicit acceptance of a gay person but not of gay people as a group in a religious sample.  
11.5.3 Sample selection bias 
As is often the case with anti-gay attitudes research, the current study may lack 
generalizability as a result of the fact that the sample was self-selected, mostly female, and 
highly educated compared to the general public. Specifically, most samples in this thesis 
comprised females and some were comprised solely of students. Both of these groups have 
previously been found to have more politically liberal and egalitarian attitudes toward gay 
men and lesbians (e.g., Steffens, 2005). Consequently, it is possible that both the explicit 
and implicit attitudes reported in this thesis were less negative than may have been found in 
other, more representative samples (e.g., less educated sample, or higher proportion of 
male). However, this has no direct implication for the interpretation of the results, given 
that these concerns are not relevant to the observed dissociation between implicit attitudes 




11.5.4 Sample size 
The size of the samples vary across the five studies, and at times this might lead the 
analyses conducted within this thesis to be underpowered. Largely, the analyses used were 
within-subjects, and thus did not require large samples. However in other cases, such as in 
Chapter 6, there were multiple between-subject variables. I determined sample sizes in this 
thesis by matching existing work in the field. For example, I based the sample size in 
Chapter 6 on the seminal work on implicit attitudes towards homosexuality (Banse et al., 
2001), in which the researchers also used a research design with four participant cells and 
24 participants per cell. Regardless of the potentially problematic sample sizes, the effects 
sizes were large. However, the potential confound of the smaller sample sizes are worthy of 
mention here.  
11.6 Advantages of the Person-Based Approach 
The methodology presented in this thesis has several advantages compared to 
traditional approaches used to measure implicit ant-gay attitudes. Specifically, using an 
individual’s face to represent the category gay, or more specifically gay men or lesbians, 
more closely aligns with the methods used to represent gender and ethnicity in implicit 
methodologies. It also removes confounds associated with presenting couples as stimuli 
rather than an individual face. This method also ensures that the target is presented in a 
context that makes their sexual orientation salient. The resulting attitudes toward a sexual 
orientation-salient target are qualitatively different to the attitudes that are elicited by the 
same stimulus when their gender is salient. In this way, the person-based approach ensures 
that sexual orientation is the only social category being evaluated when measuring implicit 
anti-gay attitudes.  
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Although there are some disadvantages to the use of well-known faces as stimuli 
(see Chapter 7 for full discussion), the method is efficient (i.e. no learning phase is 
necessary), and the pattern of results has been replicated across 5 experiments in this thesis 
(Ntotal =432) and across a range of samples, including student and community samples, gay 
and straight samples, and religious and non-religious samples. This suggests this method of 
representation is reliable. Thus, a real advantage of this approach lies in the construct being 
measured; researchers interested in the measurement and application of attitudes 
specifically towards gay individuals now have an alternative choice to the previous 
category-based methods of representation.  
11.7 Conclusions  
The aims of this thesis were to present the person-based approach to measuring 
implicit ant-gay attitudes. Consistent with this aim, I provided a comprehensive review of 
the literature to date, and presented evidence for its ability to measure attitudes towards gay 
individuals. Across five experiments, I have presented evidence that the person-based 
approach elicits gay attitudes that are: (a) different from gender-salient person-based 
attitudes, and (b) different from category-based attitudes. I have replicated the same pattern 
of person-based results and presented reliability statistics in each study, suggesting that the 
person-based methodology is reliable. I have also presented initial evidence of the validity 
of this method, by demonstrating a divergent relationship from typical methods of 
representation.  
Future research should focus on further establishing the validity of the person-based 
approach, and on addressing the concerns of using well-known faces. This thesis also adds 
to the limited body of literature providing evidence of implicit contextual variation 
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(Mitchell et al., 2003), and provides support for implicit inversion theory, which suggests 
that gay targets are perceived as being more stereotypically similar to their opposite-gender 
straight counterparts than same-gender straight counterparts (Kite & Deaux, 1987). Finally, 
the results of this study also provide strong evidence for a dual process theoretical model of 
implicit attitudes 
Beyond providing evidence of the person-based approach, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that levels of anti-gay attitudes in Australia are relatively low (at least explicit 
attitudes, demonstrations of implicit anti-gay attitudes are somewhat more negative). I do 
not interpret the overall findings of this thesis as evidence that there is no prejudice against 
gay people. However, I found evidence for category-based implicit antigay attitudes (i.e., 
anti-gay attitudes that are more negative towards gay men than lesbians), consistent with 
previous research, but no such findings when implicit attitudes were measured towards gay 
men and lesbians. However, I do note that lesbians are significantly less implicitly 
associated with positive than women evaluated on the basis of their gender.  
It is important to highlight that the person-based approach produces gender-based 
results for gay targets that replicate those of straight targets (i.e. positive attitudes towards 
females and negative attitudes towards males). The hypotheses pertaining to person-based 
gender attitudes (i.e., attitudes towards gay targets when their gender is salient) were 
derived from the existing literature and were supported by the findings presented in the 
dissertation. This suggests that the person-based approach to gender attitudes replicates 
other implicit gender-based attitudes. Yet the findings pertaining to person-based sexual 
orientation attitudes do not match hypothesis that were derived from the existing literature. 
It could be argued that the lack of corroborative findings is actually indicative of a lack of 
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validity for the person-based approach. Whilst acknowledging this as a possibility, it is still 
worth considering that the general pattern of results (i.e., the reversal in valence of attitudes 
towards the same targets as a function of the contextual variation manipulation) was 
replicated across 5 studies. This suggests that, indeed, person-based attitudes are (a) 
different to gender based-attitudes, (b) different to attitudes elicited by typically used 
stimuli, and (c) are not predicted by demographic or ideological variables that predict 
explicit and (sometime) implicit category-based attitudes toward gay people. I contend that 
the construct of implicit gay attitudes is multi-faceted, and thus person-based and category-
based methodologies elicit responses that are related to (but independent from) each other, 
thus explaining the lack of corroborative findings. More specifically, it appears that both 
category-based and person-based attitudes toward ‘homosexuality’ (i.e., towards the 
category of gay, or towards gay people, respectively) tap onto different components of the 
same construct. 
In closing, the findings of these experiments highlight the importance of stimuli 
selection. The existing research into implicit gay attitudes has been measuring a very 
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Appendix A Experiment Materials 
Appendix A – 1 Implicit stimuli. 
  Appendix A - 1.1 Visual stimuli.  






Appendix A – 1.1(ii) Heterosexual male stimuli 























     
     













































Appendix A - 1.2 Word stimuli.  







































Appendix A – 2 Explicit Scales. 
Appendix A - 2.1 Anti-gay bias scale(s).  
Appendix A – 2.1(i) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG; Herek, 
1984a). 
1. Lesbians just can’t fit into our society.  
2. A woman’s’ homosexuality should not be a cause for job discrimination in any 
situation.* 
3. Female homosexuality is detrimental to society because it breaks down the natural 
divisions between the sexes. 
4. State laws regulating private, consenting lesbian behaviour should be loosened.* 
5. Female homosexuality is a sin. 
6. The growing number of lesbians indicates a decline in American morals. 
7. Female homosexuality in itself is no problem, but what society makes of it can be a 
problem.* 
8. Female homosexuality is a threat to many of our basic social institutions. 
9. Female homosexuality is an inferior form of sexuality. 
10. Lesbians are sick. 
11. Male homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children the same as 
heterosexual couples.* 
12. I think male homosexuals are disgusting. 
13. Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school.  
14. Male homosexuality is a perversion. 
15. Just as in other species, male homosexuality is a natural expression of sexuality in 
human men.* 
16. If a man has homosexual feelings, he should do everything he can to overcome 
them. 
17. I would not be too upset if I learned that my son were a homosexual.* 
18. Homosexual behaviour between two men is just plain wrong. 
19. The idea of male homosexual marriages seems ridiculous. 
20. Male homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not be 
condemned.* 
Notes: Scale items for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale items 1 
through 10 comprise the ATL subscale; Scoring is reversed for starred (*) items. 
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Appendix A – 2.1(ii) Index of Homophobia (IHP; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980). 
1. I would feel comfortable working with a gay man. 
2. I would enjoy attending social functions at which gay men or lesbians were present. 
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I found out that my neighbour or flatmate were gay. 
4. If a member of my sex made a sexual advance towards me I would feel angry. 
5. I would feel uncomfortable knowing that I was attractive to members of my own 
sex. 
6. I would be uncomfortable in a gay bar. 
7. I would feel comfortable if a member of my own sex made an advance towards me. 
8. I would be comfortable if I found myself attracted to a member of my own sex. 
9. I would feel disappointed if I learned that my child was homosexual. 
10. I would feel nervous or out of place in a group of homosexuals. 
11. I would feel comfortable knowing that my clergymen (i.e., religious leader) was 
homosexual. 
12. I would be upset if my brother or sister told me they were homosexual 
13. I would feel that I had failed as a parent if I learned that my child was gay. 
14. If I saw two men holding hands in public I would feel awkward. 
15. If a member of my sex made an advance towards me I would be offended. 
16. I would feel comfortable if I learned that my daughter's female teacher was a 
lesbian. 
17. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my spouse or partner was attracted to 
members of his or her own sex. 
18. I would be at ease talking to a homosexual at a party. 
19. I would be uncomfortable if I learned that my boss was homosexual. 
20. It would not bother me to walk through a predominantly gay section of town. 
21. It would disturb me to learn that my doctor was homosexual. 
22. I would feel uncomfortable if my best friend (of the same sex as me) told me they 
were homosexual. 
23. If a member of my sex made an advance towards me I would feel flattered. 
24. I would feel uncomfortable knowing that my male son's teacher was gay. 
25. I would feel comfortable working closely with a female homosexual. 
 
Notes: Responses are measured by the participants’ level of endorsement on a 9-point 







Appendix A - 2.2 Religiosity Scales.   
Appendix A-2.2(i) Religious Orientation Scale (ROS; Allport & Ross, 1967). 
 
Extrinsic (sub)scale 
1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in 
my life. 
2. It doesn’t matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life. 
3. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection. 
4. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships. 
5. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.  
6. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray. 
7. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let religious considerations influence 
my everyday affairs. 
8. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social 
activity.  
9. Occasionally I feel it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to 
protect my social and economic well-being.  
10. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to 
establish a person in the community.  
11. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life. 
12. Religion helps to keep my life balanced and steady in exactly the same way as my 
citizenship, friendships. And other memberships do. 
Intrinsic (sub)scale 
1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and 
meditation. 
2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church. 
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. 
4. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as 
those said by me during services.  
5. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Devine Being. 
6. I read literature about my faith (or church). 
7. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather 
than a social fellowship.  
8. My religious beliefs are really what lie behind my whole approach to life.  
9. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the 
meaning of life. 
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Notes: Responses are measured by the participants’ level of endorsement on a 5-point likert 
scale; the ordering of all 20 items should be scrambled. 
Appendix A-2.2(ii) Quest Scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). 
 
1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change. 
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs. 
3. I might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties 
4. I was not very interested in religion until i began to ask questions about the meaning 
and purpose of my life. 
5. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious 
6. (-) I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years 
7. (-) I find religious doubts upsetting 
8. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of growing awareness of the 
tensions in my world and in my relation to my world. 
9. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions 
10. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing 
11. God wasn’t very important to me until I began to ask questions about the meaning 
of my own life. 
12. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers. 
Notes :(-) indicates reverse scoring; responses are measured by the participants’ level of 




Appendix A-2.2(iii) Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RF; Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992). 
1. God has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed.  
2. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.* 
3. Of all the people on this earth, one group has a special relationship with God 
because it believes the most in his revealed truths and tries the hardest to follow 
his laws. 
4. The long-established traditions in religion show the best way to honour and 
serve God, and should never be compromised. 
5. Religion must admit all its past failings and adapt to modern life if it is to 
benefit humanity.* 
6. When you get right down to it, there are only two kinds of people in the world: 
the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God and the rest, who will not. 
7. Different religions and philosophies have different versions of the truth and may 
be equally right in their own way.* 
8. The basic cause of evil in the world is Satan, who is still constantly and 
ferociously fighting against God. 
9. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right 
religion.* 
10. No one religion is especially close to God, nor does God favour any particular 
group of beleivers.* 
11. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion. 
12. No single book of religious writings contains all the important truths about life* 
13. It is silly to think people can be divided into “the Good” and “the Evil”. 
Everyone does some good, and some bad, things.* 
14. God’s true followers must remember that he requires them to constantly fight 
Satan and Satan’s allies on this earth. 
15. Parents should encourage their children to study all religions without bias, and 
then make up their own minds about what to believe. 
16. There is a religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth. 
17. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is 
no such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.* 
18. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong. 
19. There is no body of teachings, or set of scriptures, which is completely without 
error.* 
20. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, true religion. 
 226 
Notes: Responses are measured by the participants’ level of endorsement on a 9-point 
scale;  
* = con-trait item. 
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Appendix B Participant Recruitment and Informed Consent 
Appendix B – 1 Information Letter (Chapter 5 and 9). 
      
SCHOOL OF 
PSYCHOLOGY  
Australian Catholic University 
Limited 
ABN 15 050 192 660 
Melbourne Campus (St 
Patrick’s) 
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy, 
Vic. 3065 
Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy MCD 
VIC 3065 
Telephone  03 9953 3106 
Facsimile    03 9953 3205 
www.acu.edu.au 
   
 
 
Dear Participant,  
 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project to explore the role of ‘religiosity’ on 
implicit and explicit social attitudes to homosexuality. This project is being undertaken for 
the thesis component of a Doctorate of Philosophy.  
 
Participation in this project will involve completing several questionnaires designed to 
assess your religious beliefs and your attitudes to homosexuality. These measures include. 
In addition, you will complete an implicit measure called the “Go/ No Go Association 
Task” of GNAT which has been designed to assess another aspect of your attitudes to 
homosexuality. Participations will take approximately 50 minutes. 
 
The current study involves no foreseeable risks of harm or discomfort for participants 
beyond the inconvenience of time taken to participate.  
 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary and there is no way that your responses 
can be used to identify you. You are free to withdraw from this study at any stage, 
including the withdrawal of any unprocessed data. At the conclusion of your participation 
you will be asked if you would agree to have your data included in the sample to be 
analysed. If you agree, your data will be processed and cannot be withdrawn after this. 
 
Your participation and results will remain confidential subject to legal limits. No 
identifying information will be collected as part of your results. All data and will be stored 
in secure files in the School of Psychology for a period of five years from the date of any 
publication, at which time they will be destroyed.  Findings will be reported as group 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Exploring attitudes to  
      homosexuality: The role of attitude-relevant  
      factors and context effects 
STAFF SUPERVISOR: Leah Kaufmann 
STUDENT RESEARCHERS: Joel Anderson 
COURSE: Doctorate of Philosophy 
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results only and no individual will be identified in any publications resulting from this 
work. 
 
Most people find participating in studies interesting, however, if any part of this participation causes 
you concern Dr Bill Johnson II, a lecturer in the School of Psychology, is available to discuss any 
issues arising from you participation. He can be contacted on 9953 3117. 
 
  
Any questions regarding this project should be directed to the Principal Investigator: 
 
 Leah Kaufmann ................................................................................................... 
 9953 3015 ............................................................................................................ 
 School of Psychology .......................................................................................... 
 115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy VIC 3065  
This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Australian Catholic 
University. 
 
In the event that you have any complaint or concern about the way you have been treated during the 
study, or if you have any query that the Investigator or Supervisor and Student Researcher has 
(have) not been able to satisfy, you may write to the Chair of the Human Research Ethics 
Committee care of the nearest branch of the Research Services Office.  
 
VIC: Chair, HREC 
C/- Research Services 
Australian Catholic University 
Melbourne Campus 
Locked Bag 4115 
FITZROY VIC 3065 
Tel: 03 9953 3158 
Fax: 03 9953 3315 
\ 
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. The participant will 
be informed of the outcome. 
 
If you agree to participate in this project, you should click on the link below. 
 
 
Leah Kaufmann      Joel Anderson 
Principal Investigator      Student Researcher 
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Appendix B Participant Recruitment and Informed Consent 
Appendix B – 2 Information Letter (Chapter 6 and 10). 
      
SCHOOL OF 
PSYCHOLOGY  
Australian Catholic University 
Limited 
ABN 15 050 192 660 
Melbourne Campus (St 
Patrick’s) 
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy, 
Vic. 3065 
Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy MCD 
VIC 3065 
Telephone  03 9953 3106 
Facsimile    03 9953 3205 
www.acu.edu.au 
   
 
 
Dear Participant,  
 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project to explore implicit and explicit social 
attitudes to homosexuality. This project is being undertaken for the thesis component of a 
Doctorate of Philosophy.  
 
Participation in this project will involve completing several questionnaires designed to 
assess your attitudes to homosexuality. In addition, you will complete an implicit measure 
called the “Go/ No Go Association Task” of GNAT which has been designed to assess 
another aspect of your attitudes to homosexuality. Participations will take approximately 30 
minutes. 
 
The current study involves no foreseeable risks of harm or discomfort for participants 
beyond the inconvenience of time taken to participate.  
 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary and there is no way that your responses 
can be used to identify you. You are free to withdraw from this study at any stage, 
including the withdrawal of any unprocessed data. At the conclusion of your participation 
you will be asked if you would agree to have your data included in the sample to be 
analysed. If you agree, your data will be processed and cannot be withdrawn after this. 
 
Your participation and results will remain confidential subject to legal limits. No 
identifying information will be collected as part of your results. All data and will be stored 
in secure files in the School of Psychology for a period of five years from the date of any 
publication, at which time they will be destroyed.  Findings will be reported as group 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Comparing Typical and 
Person-Based Implicit 
Attitudes 
STAFF SUPERVISOR: Leah Kaufmann 
STUDENT RESEARCHERS: Joel Anderson 
COURSE: Doctorate of Philosophy 
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results only and no individual will be identified in any publications resulting from this 
work. 
 
Most people find participating in studies interesting, however, if any part of this participation causes 
you concern Dr Helen Aucote, a lecturer in the School of Psychology, is available to discuss any 
issues arising from you participation. She can be contacted on 9953 3013. 
 
  
Any questions regarding this project should be directed to the Principal Investigator: 
 
 Leah Kaufmann ................................................................................................... 
 9953 3015 ............................................................................................................ 
 School of Psychology .......................................................................................... 
 115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy VIC 3065  
This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Australian Catholic 
University. 
 
In the event that you have any complaint or concern about the way you have been treated during the 
study, or if you have any query that the Investigator or Supervisor and Student Researcher has 
(have) not been able to satisfy, you may write to the Chair of the Human Research Ethics 
Committee care of the nearest branch of the Research Services Office.  
 
VIC: Chair, HREC 
C/- Research Services 
Australian Catholic University 
Melbourne Campus 
Locked Bag 4115 
FITZROY VIC 3065 
Tel: 03 9953 3158 
Fax: 03 9953 3315 
 
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. The participant will 
be informed of the outcome. 
 
If you agree to participate in this project, you should click on the link below. 
 
 
Leah Kaufmann      Joel Anderson 
Principal Investigator      Student Researcher 
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Appendix C Human Research Ethics Committee  
Appendix C – 1  Letters of Approval  
Appendix C – 1.1 Committee Approval Form (Chapters 5 & 6). 
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Appendix C – 2  Modifications to existing protocols 






Appendix C – 2  Modifications to existing protocols 
Appendix C – 2.2 Modifications to existing protocols (Chapters 10). 
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